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ABSTRACT
After a hundred years, psychical research (and 
experimental parapsychology) are still regarded as 
pseudosciences. Despite sceptical attacks, however, 
work continues: the results cannot be lightly
dismissed. Evaluation of this work demands 
philosophical attention, since there are large 
metaphysical assumptions made, and the experimental 
results are vulnerable to logical criticism.
The supposed kinds of paranormal phenomena are 
anatomized, and the current terminology criticized. 
Broad's basic limiting principles are examined, and the 
extent to which psychical research might threaten 
conventional science is considered.
The metaphysical foundations of psychical research are 
examined. Psychical research takes a dualist view of 
human beings, although its experiments are 
behaviouristic. Survival of death is assumed to be a 
matter susceptible to empirical verification. These 
assumptions are critically examined.
I argue that ESP neither gives us knowledge, nor is it 
a form of perception. Although psychical researchers 
interpret their results in causal terms, this is 
illegitimate. Backwards causation, therefore, need not 
be canvassed as an explanation.
As the basis for a scientific discipline, spontaneous 
cases are inadequate, as they involve underdescription 
Clack of detail) and overdescription (tendentious
exaggeration). Observational cases, given the absence 
of theoretical explanations, and the prevalence of 
fraud, also fail as science. Hume's arguments on 
testimony, and modern versions of them, are considered.
Experimental parapsychology fails because ESP and PK 
seem to occur without conscious awareness or 
significant physiological signs, and in a way that 
transcends space and time. There is thus no way that 
science can gain a grip on them. Without a theory and a 
mechanism, there is nothing but a series of statistical 
quirks.
The proposed models do not mesh in with the 
experimental results. Paranormal forces, if they 
existed, might contaminate all scientific work, and no 
one could ever know. Taken on its own terms, psychical 
research is impotent to undertake the task it has set 
itself.
Copyright © John A. Lord, 1988
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE
PSEUDOSCIENCE AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH
At the borders of orthodox scientific thought, there 
lies a miscellaneous group of theories, topics, and 
hypotheses which are generally rejected by the majority 
of scientists. This group, usually labelled "marginal" 
or "anomalous" sciences, or even (more tendentiously) , 
"pseudosciences", has attracted many vocal proponents 
and supporters. *
There is, however, little that the whole range of these 
"sciences" has in common, save their rejection by 
orthodox scientific opinion. In some cases, for 
instance, orthodox science has been subsequently shown 
to be mistaken in its failure to accept new ideas. The 
history of science is replete with examples of such 
errors. For example, the unwillingness to credit the 
possibility of meteorites ("stones that fall from the 
sky", to adopt Thomas Jefferson* s dismissive phrase) is 
frequently referred to as a signal blunder on the part 
of the scientists of the time. And when Wegener, who 
had been trained as a meteorologist, put forward his 
theory of Continental Drift, his work was dismissed by 
orthodox geologists, who regarded him as an outsider. 
Time has, however, vindicated Wegener's ideas, which 
have now become incorporated into the mainstream of 
geological science. Similarly, Anton Mesmer, who first 
demonstrated the hypnotic trance state, was attacked by 
the physicians of his day as a charlatan. His own 
explanation of what was taking place in his experiments 
(couched in terms of "animal magnetism") was, it must
be said, of very doubtful value, and probably this 
inadequacy contributed to the reaction against him. But 
today, no one seriously doubts the reality of 
hypnotism, despite the fact that the precise mechanism 
governing its operation is still not properly 
understood. In much the same way, acupuncture has been 
resisted for many years by Western physicians, but has 
now become cautiously accepted in some quarters; like 
hypnotism, its mode of operation is still not known, 
though various possibilities are currently being 
investigated. What is clear is that the ancient Chinese 
physiological system that attempted to explain it has 
been shown to have no basis in reality.
In each of these cases, a serious hypothesis was 
offered, and, in time, came to be accepted. Some 
anomalous sciences, however, although they put forward 
scientific claims, have been shown to be misguided. 
Phrenology actually took as its foundations certain 
testable scientific theses (for example, that mental 
traits and abilities are localized within the brain). 
Subsequent research has shown this, and its other 
assumptions, to be false. The science of phrenology has 
now vanished: all that remains of it is a mildly 
amusing parlour game. In more recent times, Fliess - 
with the encouragement of Freud - advanced the 
hypothesis of biorhythms. Further investigation has, 
however, failed to furnish any convincing evidence that 
Fliess was right, and biorhythms seem unlikely to 
survive.
These cases are really quite different from some others 
commonly met with in the literature of marginal 
science: there are certain topics which, though they
cannot lay claim to have any serious scientific 
content, would have a considerable impact on the
relevant areas of science if they could be shown to 
have some factual basis. If there are alien 
civilizations despatching flying saucers to the Earth, 
then biology, astronomy, and astronautics will undergo 
important changes. Similarly, if the Loch Ness monster 
or the abominable snowman could be located, then 
zoology and palaeontology would be presented with 
exciting new problems to tackle. Such topics as these 
are not essentially inimical to the scientific 
enterprise - at their most serious, they seek to expand 
it.
There are, though, certain other marginal sciences that 
fly so completely in the face of orthodoxy that 
acceptance of them would require a total revision of 
the relevant areas of science, and indeed of our view 
of the world. In this connexion, the names of 
Velikovsky and von Daniken are among the most recent to 
attract popular attention. Biology was able, earlier 
this century, to come to terms with the fact that the 
coelocanth was not, as everyone had supposed, extinct: 
if the Loch Ness monster could be found, it might well 
present a similar challenge, but the challenge could be 
met. Now if Velikovsky were correct, then the situation 
would be very different: physics, astronomy, and
anthropology as we know them would effectively cease to 
exist. There could be no question of assimilating 
Velikovsky*s claims within the present framework of 
those sciences. If Velikovsky were right, then we 
should have to demolish them, and carry out the 
reconstruction on quite different foundations.
****
Of all the marginal sciences, though, the one which is 
most rigorously documented must be psychical research.
In spite of its imposing claims to scientific and 
intellectual respectability, however, psychical 
research is still, after a hundred years of systematic 
work, the focus of heated controversy. Nonetheless, it 
must be said that psychical research stands in rather 
greater repute than the majority of pseudosciences.
Many books on pseudoscientific topics are shoddily 
researched and trashily written, and are aimed at a 
totally uncritical market. The claims that they make 
are so patently ludicrous that only a fool could 
delight in them - a point I have made elsewhere (Lord, 
1980). After several years' perusal of many books on 
pseudoscientific topics, I can.concur with the 
judgement of Antony Flew: most of them are (I use his
own term) "bunkum"; they are either self-evidently so, 
or become so when we apply a modicum of critical 
thinking and investigative flair. Psychical research, 
and in particular, its experimental wing, 
parapsychology, is, however, "a horse of quite another 
color" (Grim, 1982, p.179). That is to say, the 
quantity and (to an extent) the quality of the evidence 
offered are just too great for us to dismiss it out of 
hand whilst still claiming to retain "a good academic 
conscience."
The issues raised by psychical research are wide- 
ranging, and, it is sometimes claimed, of quite 
literally transcendent significance. Psychical 
research, once accepted, will - we are told - 
revolutionize our view of humankind, and overturn 
orthodox science. Important concepts, such as "mind", 
"knowledge", and "cause" will require to be redefined 
to accommodate these findings; the profound question of 
the survival of death would be subject to empirical 
investigation; people could be shown to have the 
capacity to acquire information through no known
channels of sense, and to move remote objects by "will­
power" .
These are, as I have said, large claims. But can they 
be sustained? Psychical research is still not generally 
accepted in scientific circles: its credentials,
despite the considerable body of work that has been 
carried out, are still not established. Can psychical 
research lay claim to scientific status, or are its 
findings due to error, artefact, or even fraud? 
Clarification of the central issues in so controversial 
an area is a task of some importance, for if only some 
of the claims that are made can be shown to have a 
basis in fact, then their potential importance could, 
hardly be exaggerated. If, however, psychical research 
is flawed, then it should be criticized ruthlessly: 
there is no virtue in devoting resources to an 
investigation that will continue to yield only paradox 
and controversy. In any case, since psychical research 
lays claim to scientific status, it cannot complain if 
it is judged by the same rigorous standards that more 
orthodox sciences apply to themselves.
The question at issue here is: can psychical research - 
and, more specifically, experimental parapsychology - 
make out a claim to enjoy scientific status? This 
question is not simply a straightforward empirical one, 
for two reasons. First, although some of the issues do 
involve scientific matters, they also pose 
metascientific ones (concerning the philosophy of 
science) and these demand philosophical treatment. 
Secondly, psychical research comprehends problems which 
have philosophical implications, and as such are not to 
be answered without a measure of philosophical 
consideration.
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It is my intention in this work to provide an answer to 
this central question. That answer will be'"No". My 
approach to psychical research will be at the 
conceptual rather than the scientific level, combining 
critical readings of the claims made by its proponents 
with a philosophical consideration of their merits. I 
should say that it is not my intention here to 
construct and defend one particular philosophical 
theory, but to draw such weapons from the philosophical 
armory as may be necessary to mount an attack upon the 
foundations of psychical research.
The philosophical literature on psychical research is, 
in terms of quantity, quite small. It contains two 
separate strands, which I shall refer to as 
"philosophical parapsychology" and "the philosophy of 
parapsychology". My use of these terms is intended as 
analogous to "philosophical psychology" and "the 
philosophy of psychology". The former term, now more 
usually called "the philosophy of mind", is an attempt 
to elucidate our concepts of the mental, a project 
which need not draw upon empirical scientific research 
(indeed, it sometimes contradicts it). The latter is a 
specialized branch of the philosophy of science which 
investigates the theories and explanations put forward 
within the discipline of psychology.
The bulk of the philosophical literature on psychical 
research falls squarely under the heading of 
philosophical parapsychology; the writers concerned 
have addressed themselves to the philosophical 
difficulties raised by the findings of the psychical 
researchers, and, generally, have sought to show how 
certain important concepts (such as "cause" or "mind") 
might have to be redefined so as to accommodate them. 
Since, on the face of it, these findings conflict
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seriously with our ordinary expectations, considerable 
conceptual reconstruction has been proferred as a means 
of resolving the situation. For many of these 
philosophers (for example, Broad, Price, and Mundle) 
psychical research has been a major interest for a 
substantial part of their careers, and they address' the 
topic with a measure of conviction: one is left in no 
doubt that, to them, the questions posed are of real 
importance. Many other philosophers who have written on 
this subject, however, give the impression that they 
are uncommitted to any belief in the reality of 
psychical phenomena. What they have found in psychical 
research is the opportunity to revivify certain long­
standing philosophical problems (such as the nature of 
the relationship between mind and body). Psychical 
research furnishes such writers with useful puzzle 
cases around which an argument can be constructed.
In the literature of philosophical parapsychology, we 
see stated the case for (to use Broad's famous phrase) 
the relevance of psychical research to philosophy. The 
philosophy of parapsychology, on the other hand, seeks 
to demonstrate the inevitability of the relevance of 
philosophy to psychical research. Against a background 
of the philosophy of science, it seeks to examine the 
validity of the theories, experiments, and proofs which 
are offered by psychical research, usually paying 
particular attention to the experimental work of the 
parapsychologists. The literature that falls under this 
heading is comparatively sparse, though it does contain 
a number of provocative contributions, most notably 
from Antony Flew.
The present work will mainly fall within the category 
of the philosophy of parapsychology, though I shall 
consider certain important questions relating to basic 
conceptual issues. As I have already indicated, I shall 
reach sceptical conclusions.
After a preliminary outline of the subject matter of 
psychical research, the phenomena which it 
investigates, and the terminology which it employs, I 
shall discuss the question of paranormality: what is it
for a phenomenon to be described as paranormal? In Part 
Two, I shall go on to consider specific philosophical 
problems raised by psychical research. The first, and 
perhaps most important, of these is in the area of the 
philosophy of mind. Psychical research makes
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assumptions about the nature of mind which are 
vulnerable to criticism. Although the typical 
experiments in card-guessing and dice-influencing are 
essentially behaviouristic in their methods, their 
underlying presuppositions are derived from a dualist 
view of human nature. The question of the survival of 
death, which psychical research tends to assume is 
subject to straightforward empirical investigation, is 
also permeated by Platonic-Cartesian dualism. These 
assumptions are, I believe, fundamentally mistaken.
In relation to cases of so-called extra-sensory 
perception, I shall next consider certain 
epistemological issues. Extra-sensory perception is not 
to be considered, I believe, as a form of either 
sensation or perception, nor can we claim to acquire 
knowledge by means of its alleged operation. Causation 
is another area which has attracted a deal of 
attention, particularly in relation to the so-called 
idea of backwards causation. Psychical research, in 
discussing the results of its experiments, not
infrequently helps itself to causal terminology. Can 
this be justified? Is there, in fact, any serious 
reason to assume that a causal factor is at work in 
such cases?
Having, in Part Two, examined and criticized the 
foundations of psychical research, I shall in Part
Three go on to answer the question I posed earlier in
this chapter: can psychical research lay claim to 
scientific status? As there are, by common consent, 
three distinct types of case studied by psychical 
research, I shall take each of these in turn, and show
that they are all, in their different ways,
unsatisfactory as the bases for a science. My 
discussion will pay particularly close attention to the 
experimental cases, since these tend, not surprisingly, 
to be the ones that have generated most of the
excitement in scientific quarters. I shall argue, in
Part Four, that experimental parapsychology suffers 
from a defect that is fatal to its scientific
pretensions: if we accept the claims that are entered
for the phenomena by the psychical researchers, then it 
is possible to show that psychical research itself is 
impotent to investigate them scientifically. The 
phenomena, once admitted on the psychical researchers' 
own terms, generate insidious difficulties.
This work will, then, present a negative view of 
psychical research. Whenever psychical research has put 
forward its claims, there have always been sceptics 
prepared to rebut them. If the psychical researchers 
have striven to demonstrate, and the philosophers to 
explain, then the sceptics have busily explained away 
the alleged results, attributing them to fraud, 
incompetence, statistical artefact, and so on. The 
sceptic’s usual response to the claims of psychical
research is to argue that the phenomena that are 
reported cannot occur, or did not occur, or - at the 
very least - did not occur quite as described.
But this form of scepticism suffers from one great 
demerit: it fails to convince the psychical researchers
themselves. When the sceptics claim, as they commonly 
do, that the experiments have not been successfully 
repeated (as does Flew, in Grim, 1982), then the 
psychical researchers will point to what are considered 
(by some) to be replications of Schmeidler's sheep/goat 
effect (1958). Allegations of fraud (for example, by 
Hansel, 1966, 1980) will be countered by an appeal to
personal integrity (as in Soal' s reply to G.R. Price-, 
in Ludwig, 1978), and expressions of incredulity that 
so many researchers could be involved in a series of 
conspiracies (Eysenck, 1958). It will, moreover, be 
said that orthodox science is itself by no means 
untarnished by bogus claims (see Broad and Wade, 1982). 
Even the invocation of Laplace's famous dictum, that 
"the more extraordinary the claim, the greater must be 
the weight of evidence in its favour" (as in Iremonger, 
1957) will produce the reply that the level of 
statistical significance called for in 
parapsychological experiment is substantially higher 
than that commonly used in, say, psychology or the 
biological sciences (see Tyrrell, 1947).
No, this form of scepticism has left the psychical 
researchers untouched: something more radical is called
for, and it is this desideratum that I shall attempt to 
supply. I shall avoid making the usual assumptions of 
the sceptics, which can, in the heat of debate, easily 
degenerate into the bald assertion that psychical 
researchers are either knaves or fools (if paranormal 
phenomena do not occur, then those who purport to
demonstrate them are either falsifiers of evidence or 
incompetent dupes). Neither shall I take the common 
sceptical path of worrying over experimental details, 
drawing attention along the way to potential 
methodological pitfalls - a line of criticism seen at 
its most trenchant in the works of Hansel. The critic 
if his object is to persuade the psychical researcher 
takes a wrong turning at precisely this point, and he 
need not be surprised at the vigorous reception he is 
accorded. In any case, this path is not one that I am 
qualified to travel down: it properly belongs within
the domains of the experimental psychologist (for 
example, Hyman or Hansel) and of the professional 
magician (for example, Randi or Christopher). While I 
shall bear their strictures in mind, I shall not rely 
on them in the framing of my central arguments.
In answering the question concerning the scientific 
status of psychical research, I need not, as sceptics 
have tended to do, deny that paranormal phenomena do, 
or a fortiori, can occur. In order to demonstrate the 
impotence of psychical research, I shall accept, for 
the sake of argument, the reports that are given of 
allegedly paranormal phenomena. That is to say that I 
shall assume that witnesses gave their testimony in 
good faith, and that experiments were properly 
conducted. What I shall doubt, and I shall doubt them 
with a Cartesian tenacity, are the fundamental 
assumptions that underpin such reports, and the 
tendentious interpretations that are placed upon them.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ANATOMY OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH
It is important, at the outset, to clarify the kinds of 
phenomena that psychical research takes to be its 
proper study. At first sight, these seem to be a very 
miscellaneous assortment of oddities. But there are, at 
a deeper level, similarities that tie them together. As 
well as sketching an outline of psychical research and 
its subject matter, I shall, in this chapter, discuss 
some of the terminological problems that are 
encountered in framing an account of the phenomena at 
issue. While it is acknowledged by some writers that 
the vocabulary of the paranormal is confusing, 
misguided, and even tendentious, the standard available 
alternative, the "neutral" terminology of Thouless and 
Wiesner (1947), is not without difficulties.
Defects in terminology create special problems in 
understanding what might be going on in
parapsychological experiments, and these have led some 
psychical researchers to propose that cases of what are 
usually claimed to be kinds of either extra-sensory 
perception (ESP) or psychokinesis (PK) might be reduced 
to one or two basic types. This idea has something to 
commend it; however, the effecting of the reduction is 
not so easy as it might sound, for we do not have any 
means of ensuring that, having carried it out, we have 
got it right. The root of the problem is that there are 
no rules - or even rough guidelines - for establishing
how we can differentiate between the phenomena under 
consideration.
What, then, is psychical research? The Society for 
Psychical Research CSPR) laid down the following 
definition in its Constitution (printed at the 
commencement of Volume one of the Society*s 
Proceedings'): "an organized and systematic attempt to
investigate that large group of debatable phenomena 
designated by such terms as mesmeric, psychical, and 
Spiritualistic". This "large group" is subsequently 
glossed as being "an important body of remarkable 
phenomena which are prima facie inexplicable on any 
generally recognized hypothesis". This definition is 
widely accepted, though it should be said that in North 
America, the term "parapsychology" is usually preferred 
to "psychical research", possibly because of its 
scientific resonances. In this work, I shall conform to 
the usual British usage, and take parapsychology to be 
a sub-discipline of psychical research, in which 
statistical techniques are employed by scientifically- 
trained persons who seek to investigate ESP and PK.
The whole range of topics which psychical research 
undertakes to study seems, as I have said, to be a 
disparate collection. We have phenomena such as visible 
ghosts, invisible poltergeists, seance room effects, 
out of the body experiences, metal bending, extra­
sensory perception, and psychokinesis, to take some of 
the more noteworthy examples, but the list could be 
extended almost indefinitely. The most systematic 
research has been carried out, however, in the areas of 
ESP and PK. The whole range of phenomena which 
psychical research treats of may, it is generally 
accepted, be denominated under three separate headings: 
Cl) Spontaneous Cor sporadic, or anecdotal) cases
This category comprises "one-off" phenomena which occur 
unbidden and unexpected, and which rely upon personal 
testimony for their evidential support. Such phenomena 
are sometimes reported as being spectacular and are 
often endowed with a transcendent significance by those 
who witness them. Ghosts, phantasms of the living, out 
of- the body experiences, and sporadic poltergeist cases 
all come under this heading.
<2) Observational (or evidential) cases 
Here, phenomena are bidden to occur (though they may 
not always "come when you do call them"), or happen 
with sufficient regularity to allow a programme of 
investigation and recording to be set in train. Typical 
examples would be seance room phenomena (involving 
mediums), levitation, metal bending, hypnotic 
regression, and recurrent poltergeist manifestations. 
Such phenomena may not occur precisely as expected, but 
they do afford the psychical researcher an opportunity 
to anticipate them with appropriate preparations.
(3) Experimental cases
This group consists of the laboratory work, employing 
cards, dice, or other randomizing devices, together 
with a statistical analysis to arrive at a final 
result. Such work I take to be paradigmatic of 
parapsychology. It constitutes the most systematic, 
thoroughgoing attempt by scientifically trained 
experimenters to discover the critical preconditions 
for the occurrence of ESP and PK, and ultimately, it is 
proposed, their modus operandi. In its sheer 
thoroughness, its insistence on a "clean" laboratory 
environment, and its application of sound statistical 
techniques, this research compels close attention. The 
use of statistical methods was first proposed by 
Francis Bacon in Century X of his Sylva Syl varum, a 
posthumously published collection of the vulgar errors 
of his time. The systematic application of these
methods was pioneered by Barrett and his colleagues in 
the formative years of the SPR, and further developed 
by Rhine in the 1930s. Compared with the spontaneous 
cases, however, such experimental demonstrations are 
tediously unspectacular, relying as they do upon the 
application of an appropriate statistical formula to 
establish the paranormality of an occurrence after it 
has taken place. Despite this difficulty, such 
experimental studies present the sceptic with a serious 
case to answer, in virtue of the rigorous techniques 
that have, it is claimed, been employed.
When we consider the experimental work, our attention 
is turned away from such things as ghost stories and 
spoon-bending to questions of card-guessing and dice- 
influencing. Thus our focus changes from observed, 
gross, macrolevel events to inferred microlevel ones. 
This change may seem to make psychical research more 
secure from a scientific point of view, but the gain 
can be shown to be insubstantial, since the 
interpretation of the data in such inferred cases is 
not so unproblematic as most parapsychologists assume-
Although psychical research tends to assume that all 
the three types of case are, ultimately, of a piece, 
and that the distinctions between them are to be drawn 
solely in terms of the quality of the evidence, there 
are no rules available to show us that this assumption 
is correct. It may even be that we are dealing with 
three entirely different kinds of phenomena, each with 
its own essential structure. To take an example, it is 
sometimes asserted that spontaneous poltergeist cases 
are continuous with the recurrent ones (which fall into 
the category of observational cases), and further, that 
both groups are closely tied in with experimental PK 
phenomena. Indeed, some parapsychologists follow Roll
in using the abbreviation RSPK (recurrent spontaneous 
psychokinesis) as a designation for the observational 
poltergeist phenomena. But this assumption may be 
entirely unwarranted. Certainly we can say that the 
quality of the evidence in the three types of case 
varies considerably. That there is something linking 
all three of them together (apart from their 
metaphysical implications) is debatable.
In settling such questions, we are hampered by the 
inadequate and sometimes tendentious terminology 
employed in psychical research. In some instances, 
terms have been taken from the popular vocabulary, 
which originally borrowed them from folklore, 
mythology, and similar areas. Thus we encounter 
expressions such as "clairvoyance", "ghosts", or 
"reincarnation", and these, or similar, words are 
produced whenever an explanation of some supposedly 
paranormal phenomenon is called for. But such 
conveniently available terms carry with them a great 
deal of conceptual baggage which can be too easily 
overlooked. We may find ourselves saying, for example, 
in an unreflecting moment, that we understand what is 
meant by "reincarnation". However, such an assumption 
of understanding is often based on an incomplete 
picture. Thus, if we say that reincarnation is the 
process that takes place when a mind (or soul, or 
spirit) informs a new body after the death of the one 
it had previously occupied, our definition would at 
least have etymological warrant, and might help someone 
to elucidate, say, the scriptures of Buddhism. But when 
we begin to fill in the details of this picture, and to 
justify each of those details, we shall encounter 
problems: does the dualist view of the universe 
actually make sense? If there are two radically 
different kinds of stuff, then how do they interact?
Why is one kind immortal, and the other highly 
perishable? By what mechanism does reincarnation work? 
When we ask these, and other, questions, it quickly 
becomes apparent that our claim to understand 
reincarnation was overambitious. In the absence of an 
adequate definition of what reincarnation is and how it 
works, the design of a scientific test of "the 
reincarnation hypothesis" is a fruitless exercise, 
since, until we have a clear idea of what we seek to 
demonstrate, we shall be in no position to judge 
success or failure.
As well as employing several existing words, psychical 
research has introduced a number of neologisms. Some of 
these are decidedly tendentious, suggesting that the 
phenomena operate in certain ways. Thus we have 
"precognition", implying that ESP is a species of 
cognition, "Extra-sensory perception" itself disposes 
us to think of these phenomena as operating in 
(roughly) the same way as normal perception.
"Telepathy" and "teleaesthesia" (the latter was a term 
coined by Kyers) carry more than a suggestion that some 
kind of feeling or sensation accompanies such 
occurrences, ESP is sometimes referred to (albeit 
popularly) as a "sixth sense". Leaving aside the 
captious objection that modern psychology allows for 
several more sensory modalities than the traditional 
five, this usage is unhelpful. Are we to accept that 
manifestations of ESP come within the province of a 
single extra modality, or that for each of the five 
traditional modalities, there is a paranormal 
dimension, thus allowing for paranormal seeing, 
paranormal hearing, even paranormal tasting? (This last 
suggestion is not so bizarre as it might sound, for in 
its early years, the SPR conducted a series of 
experiments in which the subjects were invited to guess
the qualities of substances - such as vinegar and sugar 
- which the experimenters themselves were tasting).
As an alternative to such tendentious terminology, a 
"neutral" nomenclature has been proposed by Thouless 
and Wiesner (1947), and is now widely adopted for the 
phenomena studied by parapsychology. These phenomena 
are collectively known as "psi", the extra-sensory 
perception varieties being termed "psi gamma", and 
psychokinesis "psi kappa". The possibility of devising 
a neutral nomenclature is, however, fraught with 
difficulties. First, a supposedly neutral terminology 
is open to the objection that scientific observation is 
a theory-laden activity. That is, in undertaking 
scientific work, we bring to the task a measure of 
informed presupposition. Secondly, it is generally 
recognized that the phenomena with which parapsychology 
deals are inherently problematic, to the extent that 
they can seem to deny rational understanding. In such 
circumstances, the adoption of a neutral terminology 
may actually be less than illuminating.
The desire for neutrality ties in with the demand for 
"open-mindedness". Sceptics are often called upon to 
assess the reported phenomena with an open mind; were 
they to do this, the psychical researchers urge, the 
controversy would largely be ended. In this, they are,
I think, mistaken. For while I might, for example, keep 
an open mind on a straightforward question, such as the 
identity of the murderer of Julia Wallace, in 
paranormal contexts, such a prescription cannot be met. 
When faced with such astounding phenomena as are 
alleged to take place in poltergeist cases or seance 
room manifestations, there is no cleai— cut conceptual 
framework into which they can be fitted. This problem 
raises doubts as to the possibility of training
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researchers to observe paranormal phenomena, especially 
in the spontaneous and observational cases.
The difficulties that psychical research has to face 
are sometimes attributed to its being a "young 
science": its problems in both establishing formal
principles and gaining recognition as a genuine branch 
or sub-branch of the scientific enterprise are put down 
to immaturity. But is immaturity itself the only cause 
of these problems? Psychical research has been in 
existence for almost as long as experimental 
psychology, which is often itself described as a "young 
science", but it has to be said that the strides it has 
taken have far outstripped anything that psychical 
research can offer. The first psychology laboratory was 
established in 1881, by Wundt, in Leipzig; the Society 
for Psychical Research was formed in the following 
year, and though a large part of its early work was 
concerned with the collection of anecdotal cases and 
with the testing of mediums, it set on foot from the 
very start a number of experimental studies that 
utilize the same statistical approach that was to be 
adopted by Rhine and his colleagues at Duke Univeraity 
nearly fifty years later. It is true that these early 
trials lack the sophistication and "laboratory 
atmosphere" of much subsequent work; reading the 
numerous reports in the earliest volumes of the 
Society's Proceedings, one is often struck by the 
informality of the design of these experiments, and the 
rather ingenuous assumptions that underlie them, but it 
cannot be denied that they are, in substance, of a 
piece with the later, more systematic work. Part of the 
reason for the controversy that surrounds this later 
work is that it relies upon the same metaphysical 
assumptions that were made by the founding fathers of 
psychical research, and still runs up against the
terminological difficulties that I have been 
discussing.
How, then, might we characterize the phenomena at 
issue? As regards the spontaneous and observational 
cases, there is no generally agreed typology that we 
can use to cover them. But, since many psychical 
researchers lean towards the view that such cases might 
eventually be subsumed under the headings that are used 
in the experimental studies (as seen in the case of 
RSPK), what sort of typology might be appropriate to 
categorize the experiments? The basic traditional 
schema (which,it must be said, is often admitted to be 
inadequate) is as follows:
PSI GAMMA
(1) Clairvoyant ESP
(2) Telepathic ESP
(3) Precognition 
PSI KAPPA
(4) Psychokinesis
In type (1), the subject is said to acquire information 
(about, say, the present target card in the pack) 
directly from the card itself, without any intervention 
on the part of the person handling the cards. In type
(2), the information is obtained from the person 
controlling the cards rather from the cards themselves. 
Type (3) involves the acquisition of information about 
the identity of 'the next (or sometimes the next but one 
or two) card(s) in the pack. Type (4) is completely 
different (or so it is assumed), in that it involves 
the transfer of energy to a physical object (say, a 
die) that is thus caused to land with a chosen face 
upwards.
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It should be noted at the outset that there is a 
category mistake here, since precognition implies that 
there is a temporal dimension involved in ESP, which 
can apply in both clairvoyant and telepathic cases, and 
also, mutatis mutandis, presumably to PK. Precognition 
is, then, not a third type of psi gamma, but a special 
kind of either clairvoyance or telepathy. It is also 
posited that as well as forward temporal displacement 
in psi phenomena, there can occur backwards 
displacement (so that, as well as precognition, we 
might also have retrocognition). If we are to allow 
temporal displacements in the ESP cases, we should also 
grant that they might occur in PK. This means that we 
should expand our original four term typology to nine, 
using the notation proposed by Flew (1953): S =
simultaneous (for present), P = plus (for future), and 
M = minus (for past). The new typology would thus read:
(1) M clairvoyance
(2) S clairvoyance
(3) P clairvoyance
(4) M telepathy
(5) S telepathy
(6) P telepathy
(7) M psychokinesis
(8) S psychokinesis
(9) P psychokinesis
Even this version is in need of further refinement, 
however, since we have not even begun-to specify the 
the nature of the transaction that takes place in such 
cases. It is usually assumed that the "conunodity" 
involved in clairvoyance and telepathy is information, 
and that that in psychokinesis is energy. Thus, in a 
card-guessing experiment, the person who guesses the 
cards is usually said to be obtaining information about 
the target card either directly from the card itself
(in the clairvoyance cases) or from the experimenter 
who is concentrating on the card (in. telepathy). In PK 
experiments (and we may take the dice-throwing work as 
a convenient paradigm here), the subject is taken to be 
influencing the fall of the dice by imparting energy to 
them.
This seemingly innocuous reading is actually highly 
suspect, and will call for further examination. For the 
moment, we should note that, if we accept that 
information or energy are somehow being transferred, 
then this could be achieved in two distinct ways. 
Wheatley (Krippner, 1977, p.162) points out that 
"information transfer" could be understood as either 
"perception" or as "communication". These terms are, 
perhaps, given the context, less than transparent. I 
should prefer to speak of "yielding and extracting"
(for "perception") and "transmitting and receiving"
(for "communication"), since these paired words give 
some idea of what each side of the partnership in a 
parapsychology experiment might be supposed to be 
doing, and can also be used to cover the "energy" cases 
of psychokinesis.
In the first mode, energy or information can be 
pictured as being passively given up to a person or 
object: a card might yield information as to its suit
to someone actively engaged in guessing it, or a die 
might actively extract energy from someone passively 
awaiting its next cast. In the second, the person 
guessing the cards would be interpreted as passively 
receiving the information from the card (which was 
actively "transmitting"), and the die would be taken to 
have passively received an "energy charge" that had 
been actively transmitted to it, resulting in its 
falling with the desired face uppermost. In each case,
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then, there is no side to the experimental equation 
that we can unequivocally describe as being either 
passive or active; we may read the situation either way 
and still have no grounds for judging what is actually 
going on, or indeed, any means of finding out.
The problem of establishing which party to a paranormal 
transaction is active and which is passive creates 
intractable problems for parapsychology. It may be that 
there simply is no way of arriving at a decision, for 
we must remember that these parties are of widely 
differing metaphysical constitutions. We have living 
organisms (not only human beings, but horses, cats, 
eggs, plants, and even mould cultures). We also have 
inanimate objects, such as cards, dice, computers, 
radioactive sources, and tape recorders. Given such 
disparity in kinds, we need not expect the task of 
framing a solution to the problem to be a simple one. 
The easy assumption that there are readily 
distinguishable agents and patients (as is made by 
Broad, 1962, p.25) is a serious oversimplification.
An experiment may be presented to us in one particular 
light, but be subject to alternative readings, each of 
which can claim to have a plausibility equal to that of 
its rivals. For instance, if we consider the classic 
card-guessing experiments, in which the subject is 
asked to guess the identity of the cards in succession, 
without anyone else looking at them, the psychical 
researchers are apt to present this (and we are asked 
to follow) as being a case of simultaneous 
clairvoyance. No one else viewed the cards during the 
experiment, so we feel led to say that telepathy could 
not have been involved. But there is nothing to license 
this characterization, save intellectual laziness. For 
it could no less (and no more) plausibly be proposed
that the experiment should be interpreted as one of 
precognitive telepathy. After the guessing had been 
completed, the experimenter picked up the deck of 
target cards and made out a list of them in their 
proper order, so that he would be able to compare his 
list with the subject's guesses. What the subject was 
doing was not simultaneously obtaining information from 
the targets, but gaining access to information that 
would, at a future time, exist within the 
experimenter's mind after the experiment had been 
concluded. There is, however, no need to stop there: 
for it could, equally, be taken to demonstrate 
precognitive clairvoyance, whereby the subject had 
access, not to the contents of the experimenter's mind, 
but to the list of targets that he would write up. We 
cannot even rule out the possibility that psi kappa, 
rather than psi gamma, is at work. The subject may be 
using the "psychic shuffle" (as Rhine has called it) to 
influence (retroactively) the order of the cards he was' 
required to guess.
There is much more that needs to be said on the whole 
question of the differentiation of phenomena, and the 
matter will be further explored in Part Three, The 
difficulties involved have forced psychical researchers 
to ask whether some types of psi might not be more 
basic than others, and to attempt some kind of 
reduction of the phenomena to one or two basic types.
But until we are in a position to untangle the various 
competitors, there is no safe criterion we could use 
for effecting the reduction. It would have to be seen 
as a purely theoretical exercise, designed to remove 
some of the clutter in the way of our understanding.
But until adequately testable theories of the modus 
operandi of psi are forthcoming (and there are, it must 
be said, no indications that they will be, or even of
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what they might be like), we could have no idea if the 
clutter we were removing was gold or garbage.
CHAPTER THREE
THE CONCEPT OF PARANORMALITY
If, as I have suggested, the terminology used by 
psychical researchers in specific instances is 
problematic, even misleading, is it possible to provide 
a more general characterization of these phenomena: one
that is neither unwarrantedly tendentious nor question- 
begging, and which might prove more illuminating than 
the rather bland statement of the SPR? The phenomena 
have, in the literature, been variously referred to as 
"preternatural", "supernatural", "anomalous", and 
"paranormal", with "abnormal" making an occasional 
appearance. There are important distinctions that can, 
and should, be drawn between these terms.
"Preternatural" and "supernatural" are words that 
should, initially at least, be avoided, since they both 
suggest that the phenomena in question lie outside the 
range of science's grasp, and so their use, if taken 
strictly, would rule out the possibility of a 
scientific investigation from the very beginning 
(although it should be noted that Scriven has preferred 
the term "supernatural" consistently in his writings on 
psychical research; this is idiosyncratic, and his 
usage of it appears to be interchangeable with other 
writers' use of the term "paranormal"). It scarcely 
needs to be said that the sceptics' task would be made 
very much easier if they could, simply on the basis of 
linguistic choice, rule out the possibility that 
psychical research might ever achieve scientific 
conclusions.
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The word "anomalous" offers suggestive possibilities, 
but we should note that its use requires some care. Its 
strict meaning is: “having no connexion with
(scientific) laws": thus an anomalous phenomenon is one 
that science fails to capture in its nomological net. 
However, there is also the looser, everyday sense of 
"anomalous" that conveys the idea of incompatibility or 
oddity. So if we are told that "Smith's experiment 
produced anomalous results", we do not interpret this 
as meaning that Smith had discovered some important new 
information that lay beyond current scientific 
understanding, for which he might be expecting to win a 
Nobel prize: on the contrary, we take it to indicate
that his results failed to make sense, and that his 
experimental design or procedures should be called into 
question.
The terms "paranormal" and "abnormal" have proved to be 
the ones on which attention has been focused, since if 
psychical research is to establish its claim to 
scientific status, it might legitimately seek to 
establish what might be called "the laws of 
paranormality": "laws of anomaly", on the other hand,
is a self-contradictory expression. Abnormality, taken 
alone, is of course lacking in particularly paranormal 
interest, since science often reports abnormal 
occurrences, without having recourse to the terminology 
of psychical research to describe them. The seminal 
contributions to the debate on what constitutes 
paranormality are those of Broad (1953, 1962).
Broad proposes that there are "basic limiting 
principles" (BLFs) which form the framework of "all our 
practical activities and our scientific theories"
(1953, p.7). These BLPs are accepted without question 
by "practically everyone who has been brought up within
or under the influence of Western industrial 
societies". In fact, though, the examples of BLPs which 
Broad offers (and which he admits are not an exclusive 
list) are stated in rather austere technical language, 
and it is extremely doubtful that "practically 
everyone", before Broad drew them up, could be said to 
have "accepted them without question". Some of the 
BLPs, he asserts, "seem to be self-evident", and the 
others are so "overwhelmingly supported by all the 
empirical facts" that we do not dispute them. When an 
event occurs that seems prima facie to conflict with 
one or more of the BLPs, then such an event is defined 
by Broad as being ostensibly paranormal.
Some of the BLPs certainly do seem to be self-evident, 
as, for example, "it is self-evidently impossible that 
an event should begin to have any effects before it has 
happened", (though we should notice that some 
philosophers would disagree), But not all of the BLPs 
are so transparent. For example, in his enumeration of 
the BLPs concerning the nature of mind, Broad sketches 
a dualist account of the person. This seems neither 
self-evident, nor to have overwhelming empirical 
support. Moreover, it is not improbable that many 
Westerners today would opt (possibly uncritically) for 
a materialist monist view.
Broad also offers, as a foil, a definition of an 
"abnormal" phenomenon: such a phenomenon will
apparently conflict "with a well-established law of 
nature, but not with any basic limiting principle"
(1962, p.4). This is further qualified by saying that 
some abnormal phenomena do not conflict with a lav; of 
nature, but are explicable in terms of such laws and 
"certain special conditions which are seldom fulfilled 
in the ordinary course of events". In this connexion,
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he cites the case of a baby's being born with two 
heads, but this scarcely seems to conflict with a law 
of nature, unless Broad is assuming that such laws are, 
ultimately, mere generalizations from common 
experience. This does in fact appear to be Broad's 
intention, for he notes that "the occurrence of an 
abnormal phenomenon' shows ... that some accepted law of 
nature does not hold without exception": in other
words, laws of nature are to be seen as essentially 
probabilistic.
But Broad's account is not without its problems. First, 
his introduction of the idea of laws of nature is 
subject to a critically important ambiguity. When he 
says some law of nature does not hold without 
exception, is he taking the uncontroversial position 
that the law itself lacks generality: that it has been
too tightly drawn for it to include certain rare but 
not impossible contingencies; or is he - much more 
radically - suggesting that laws of nature might be 
subject to momentary suspension, thus allowing not only 
for normal events, with odd abnormalities, but also for 
occasional "paranormalities"? This question goes to the 
heart of the nature of the paranormal and of psychical 
research. We might imagine, on the one hand, that 
paranormal phenomena are law-governed, and display 
regularities which we are, at present, incapable of 
observing, but which we could, and one day might, 
discover. But on the other hand, we might just as 
easily imagine that there are no paranormal laws at 
allx the paranormal is what we see breaking through 
when a law of nature (or what we at present assume to 
be such a law) is subject to temporary suspension.
Secondly, Broad does not make it clear exactly what he 
takes to be a law of nature; he also speaks of
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"scientific theories", and of "the principles of 
physics", but what connexion holds between these three 
terms is not discussed. The matter of the relationship 
between BLPs and scientific theory is a difficult one, 
and Braude, in the course of a lengthy discussion 
<1979, p. 247-256) asks whether the BLPs are presupposed 
or implied by scientific theory, Broad, of course, 
asserts that the BLPs lie at a deeper level than 
scientific statements: they underpin our fundamental
understanding of the world. If, on the other hand, they 
are merely implied by scientific theory, then their 
interest is considerably diminished. Braude argues 
that, if Broad's claim for the BLPs is intelligible, it 
is almost certainly false. However, the question is 
susceptible to a more radical solution: far from
Broad's principles being "self-evident" or 
"overwhelmingly supported" by empirical observations (a 
position which, it should be noted, invokes both a 
priori and a posteriori knowledge), Broad is taking the 
alleged paranormal phenomena as his starting point. 
Although he purports to define the proper study of 
psychical research by reference to his BLPs, which he 
considers to be fundamental, he has actually worked in 
reverse, taking the findings of psychical research as 
given, and drawing up his limiting principles purposely 
to suit them. These principles need not be taken as 
being basic to our conceptual scheme: on the contrary,
they have been constructed as an ex post facto response 
to the claims of psychical research.
Thirdly, Broad does not examine an important question: 
can basic limiting principles actually change? As 
Western industrial societies develop, surely their 
views on many important issues must change to keep 
pace. Modern technological developments have seriously 
challenged many standard assumptions, which, although
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they do not appear in Broad's shortlist of BLPs, would 
have been regarded in his lifetime as being basic by 
the majority of those "brought up within or under the 
influence of" such societies. We only have to consider 
the impact of new discoveries in computer technology, 
embryo research, and 1ife-support machines to realize 
that traditional ideas about intelligence, life, and 
death have undergone considerable changes in the last 
decade. These topics are so basic to our world view 
that we find the idea of change to be extremely 
uncomfortable, but we cannot ignore the challenge. So 
is Broad prepared to allow that his own list of BLPs 
might be subject to change? Presumably he is, since his 
concern is to show that psychical research is 
important, and relevant to philosophy. For if 
paranormal phenomena occur, then, in order to describe 
and comprehend them, Western societies will have to 
cast aside their basic limiting principles, (no doubt 
to replace them with some others which are compatible 
with psi), If, however, the BLPs' are really to be 
interpreted as fundamental to our world view, and at a 
more primitive level than scientific theory, then we 
shall be forced into the position of saying that 
psychical research is doomed to remain forever outside 
the grasp of science. Broad seems, in introducing his 
BLPs, to be trying to have his cake and eat it: he
wishes to plead for the importance of the paranormal to 
philosophy, while at the same time setting it beyond 
the reach of investigation.
Fourthly, the notion of a BLP is just too loosely 
drawn. It is not stated how many principles there might 
be (Broad, it will be remembered, admits that his list 
is not exhaustive), and, as Braude rightly notes, we 
are not offered any general characterization of a BLP: 
there is no explanation of what "in general, a
phenomenon must conflict with in order to conflict with 
a BLP" (1979, p. 251), As I have already said, there is 
a tacit assumption made in psychical research that an 
"open mind" should be a precondition for interpreting 
the evidence: if we were to examine this evidence with
an unprejudiced eye - with an open mind - then we 
should find it convincing. Now if, as Broad claims, the 
BLPs underlie our conceptual scheme, and the phenomenea 
which we asked to consider conflict with, even 
undercut, that scheme, then we shall have met the 
prescription of open-mindedness, but at the expense of 
having no conceptual scheme left which is adequate to 
the task of assessing the phenomena.
Broad demands that any psychical researcher must ask 
certain questions about an ostensibly paranormal event:
" (1) Did it really happen? Has it been accurately 
observed and correctly described? (2) Supposing that it 
did really happen and has been accurately observed and 
correctly described, does it really conflict with any 
of the basic limiting principles?" (1953, p.7). But 
since Broad explicitly requires an "ostensibly 
paranormal event" to be one that prima facie conflicts 
with one or more of the BLPs, his demand will leave us 
with no means of judging it, for the in the absence of 
any conceptual scheme, the notion of "description" 
makes no sense, and there can be no application of 
"correctness" here either, for we have no yardstick by 
which to measure it. The introduction of BLPs is thus 
self-defeating.
Other proposed definitions of paranormality have 
usually been couched in terms of the incompatibility 
of the phenomena with scientific theory, coupling this
with a claim that such incompatibility is, in a 
significant sense, problematic. Scriven, for example, 
demands that if a phenomenon is to count as 
"supernatural" (his preferred term), then we have to 
show that it "was not explicable in terms of the 
entities in the pantheon of contemporary physics and 
psychology" (Thakur, 1976, p.185); moreover, the 
phenomena are marked out by "their exceptional 
idiosyncracy or generic differences from the other 
phenomena of nature" (p.181). Braude stipulates that an 
event is paranormal if it is inexplicable in terms of 
current scientific theory, cannot be explained 
scientifically "without major revisions elsewhere in 
scientific theory", and if it "thwarts our familiar 
expectations" (1979, p. 260), But Braude does not 
specify just what revisions we might be called upon to 
make elsewhere in science, nor does he indicate how, 
having made them, we could establish their correctness. 
And his examples of "thwarted expectations" (such as 
"if a television set turned into Leonard Bernstein") 
are, if they are intelligible at all, several orders of 
magnitude more challenging than the reports from the 
parapsychologists' laboratories. Braude is in fact 
aware of some of the problems posed by this definition, 
and offers a much more radical one: that a phenomenon
is paranormal if it is in principle inexplicable (by 
science).
Mabett (1982), in reviewing some of the literature on 
the definition of "paranormality" , analyses it into 
three categories. The first takes paranormal phenomena 
to be unexplained, though not in principle inexplicable 
by science; the second takes them to be inexplicable in 
principle by science (but not uncaused or totally 
inexplicable); the third, that they are ultimately 
inexplicable. It is not clear whether Braude's latter
definition would fall under the second or the third of 
these headings, and Braude himself admits to 
uncertainties: if he intends it in the second (weaker)
sense, then, should an explanation of, say, telepathy 
be forthcoming at some future time, then we should have 
to say that telepathy was not (on this definition) a 
paranormal phenomenon at all; if he opts for the third 
(stronger) sense, then, assuming an inexplicable 
phenomenon to be an impossible one, as Braude does, 
then there can be no paranormal phenomena at all. In 
this latter point, Braude is, I believe, mistaken, for 
he is assuming that any scientific system is (or could 
be made) complete, so that anything that fell outside 
its comprehension would be automatically and properly 
ruled out as impossible. Such a view is difficult to 
sustain: the history of science is replete with
counter-examples, and it should be noted that Meehl and 
Scriven, in their rejoinder to G. R. Price (Ludwig,
1978), firmly reject any such notion.
It is often said that the existence of paranormal 
phenomena threatens to overturn the edifice of science. 
This claim, which is open to serious question, may be 
interpreted in two different ways. First, it could mean 
that numerous standard, apparently well-founded 
theories in physics, psychology, and other areas are 
going to have to be abandoned, in order to accommodate 
the findings of psychical research. Secondly, it could 
be interpreted as meaning that the operation of 
paranormal phenomena is so insidious that it 
effectively undermines the experimental processes of 
science; this view, which is not so commonly discussed,
I shall take up in greater detail in Parts Three and
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Four, when I consider the question of the scientific 
status of psychical research.
Although the standard sceptical arguments against 
psychical research deny outright that science could be 
threatened, there is an intermediate view, which has 
been named "Flewism" by Beloff (Ludwig, 1978, p.367). 
Flewism is a form of mitigated scepticism which is 
prepared to accept (at least some of) the reported 
phenomena, but which interprets them in such an
attenuated way that they are capable of carrying little
weight. If such a programme could be sustained, then 
paranormal events are to be explained away as 
coincidences (interesting ones, perhaps, but 
coincidences nonetheless), and their potential impact 
on science would be minimal. Psychical research, on
this, view, deals in mere oddities.
It is infortunate that though this matter of the 
conflict between science and the paranormal is often 
raised, its precise nature is rarely specified. Qne 
reason for this is that, as has often been said, 
psychical research defines its subject matter 
negatively: it concerns itself with those things that
do not fit in. As Mrs Kneale puts it: "psychical
research is what is left over when the regular sciences 
have marked out their territories. It is that 
collection of facts which physics, biology, psychology, 
etc. , • have failed to assimilate" (Ludwig, 1978, p.67).
Nonetheless, the phenomena with which psychical 
research deals constitute a very odd collection, and 
some of them, such as apparitions and poltergeists, do 
not, one could say, fit the scientific picture in any 
way at all. But then, there are others that perhaps 
might. Take, as an example, the remarkable navigational
capacity of homing pigeons. For many years, biologists 
had not been able to offer any satisfying explanation 
for this, and the possibility that a paranormal factor 
might be responsible was canvassed by a number of 
psychical researchers (see, for example, West, 1954, 
p.129, and Wolstenholme, 1956, pp.156-186), In the 
event, however, this particular phenomenon has now been 
largely explained in "normal" terms: the crucial
problem is salved, and the solution in no way invokes 
paranormal capacities, or indeed anything remotely 
psychical.
That said, the psychical researchers must be given 
credit for realizing that the problem could admit of 
wide solutions, and for attempting to furnish one 
within the terms of their own specialism. As it turned 
out, their attempt was misguided, but that does not 
mean that it should never have been made: psychical 
research is perfectly entitled to put in bids for the 
right to investigate any phenomenon which is currently 
unexplained (provided, of course, that it is prepared 
to come up with a serious explanation at the end of it: 
simply to say that homing pigeons use clairvoyance is 
neither a working hypothesis nor an experimental 
result, although, superficially, it could be read as 
either).
Any such explanation would, however, have to contain 
one distinctive feature: parapsychology, to justify its 
claim to a stall in the scientific marketplace, must 
not simply essay explanations of phenomena which are, 
in the present state of scientific knowledge, 
unexplained (all ground-breaking scientific research, 
surely, is concerned to do that). What it must do, if 
it is to make a distinctively parapsychological 
contribution, is to put forward explanations which are
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distinctively parapsychological. This may sound 
tautological, but what makes the study of, say, physics 
into the discipline of PHYSICS is not simply that it 
offers us explanations of physical phenomena in the 
world: after all, philosophy or theology might attempt 
to do that. To be PHYSICS, it must couch its 
explanations in strictly physical terms. To explain 
physical phenomena in theological terms is not to do 
"theological physics" (whatever that might be), it is 
to trade one discipline for another. Similarly, if 
parapsychology is to command individual attention as an 
experimental science, it must make its particular 
contributions in parapsychological terms: it must
explain the phenomena in ways which are 
parapsychologically interesting.
As well as defining its subject matter negatively 
(those things that do not fit in) , psychical research 
makes use of an important silent assumption in 
describing its experimental work. This assumption could 
be called "the polarity principle". The experiments, we 
are told, are devised with stringent precautions, to 
ensure that sensory perception and normal inference of 
the targets are precluded. The use of statistical 
methods, to assess the odds against chance, then erodes 
the possibility of explaining away the scores in terms 
of coincidence. It is then tacitly assumed that, 
because the obvious normal explanations have been thus 
eliminated, the only explanation available must be a 
paranormal one. Only two poles of explanation are 
allowed, and when one is discounted, the other must 
apply; this is taken to be a strict dichotomy, allowing 
no middle ground. In this way, sceptics have been 
pressed into the position of denying that the 
precautions were adequate: hence the suggestions of
fraud (as in G. R. Price, or Hansel), or of sensory cues 
(as in Dingwall, 1973).
But the apparent simplicity of the polarity principle 
may be misleading, for until we know more about the 
paranormal, the assumption of a "psi hypothesis" is 
less than illuminating. To say "having eliminated all 
forms of sensory contact and chance coincidence, we 
feel that our results are consistent with the psi 
hypothesis" is not particularly illuminating, because 
the "psi hypothesis" can quickly degenerate into the 
simple statement that there is no satisfactory 
explanation for these results. Simply to invoke psi is 
not to explain.
****
So can psychical research lay claim to scientific 
status? This is a question which I shall address in 
Part Three, but we should note that any positive answer 
ought to place considerable stress on the possibility 
of normalization: that is, if science is to comprehend 
the phenomena, we shall need to understand whatever 
laws govern their operation. The paranormal event, as 
it stands, seems to obey no laws at all, and the 
problem with so much of the present terminology is that 
it predisposes us to assume that the phenomena do not 
fall within the ambit of science. Such an objection 
need not be fatal, however, since, were knowledge to 
advance, new definitions might be introduced.
But normalization is, for the psychical researcher, a 
double-edged weapon. On the one side, normalization is 
the whole purpose of the enterprise: to establish the
(so-called) paranormal within the framework of science. 
But on the other, it could result in the dissolution of
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psychical research. As the phenomena became hived off 
into various specialized areas of science, so psychical 
research shrinks and withers. We have already seen this 
taking place with hypnosis, and a similar process is at 
present overtaking the out of the body experience 
<0BE). Blackmore, in the course of her exhaustive study 
(1982a), arrives at a purely psychological hypothesis 
to account for these experiences: they are to be 
investigated and explained in terms of altered states 
of consciousness. There is no "astral projection", and 
"nothing leaves the body in an OBE" (p. 240). But even 
if psychical research lost the out of the body 
experience to psychology, it would not mean, she has 
claimed (1982b), that the psychical researchers should 
abandon study of them altogether. This rather generous 
interpretation would only apply, I think, to those who 
had originally trained as psychologists, and they would 
have to work within the confines (the paradigm, even) 
of psychology, and the hypotheses and explanations 
which they put forward would for that reason be devoid 
of any specifically parapsychological interest.
The directions that psychical research might take could 
proliferate indefinitely: in the 1970s, as a result of
the work of Targ and Puthoff, people began to talk of 
paraphysics, though whether this was an attempt to 
introduce a new discipline alongside parapsychology, or 
a replacement for it, was never made clear. The 
phenomena studied by the paraphysicists seem to be of a 
piece with those studied by "conventional" 
parapsychologists. The only obvious difference is that 
paraphysics is the preserve of trained physicists who 
have (understandably) a bias in favour of finding 
physical explanations (rather than psychological ones) 
of the phenomena. But since both schools have been 
conspicuously short on explanations (both psychological
and physical), there seem to be no grounds for making 
an adjudication. Such fragmentation might, of course, 
carry on indefinitely: we might, perhaps, in future 
years, witness the inauguration of parachemistry, 
paraphysiology, even parasociology. The lack of any 
guiding principles of what is to be taken seriously in 
this domain indicates a seriously impoverished level of 
attainment in psychical research.
****
I have outlined the central subject matter of psychical 
research, and touched upon some of the problems that 
must be overcome if it to lay a serious claim to enjoy 
scientific status. These matters will be dealt with in 
greater detail in Part Three. In Part Two, I shall 
concentrate on the essential metaphysical 
presuppositions of psychical research. It is, I 
believe, at the most fundamental level that psychical 
research goes wrong. And if its basic concepts are 
confused at the very outset of the investigation, then 
no amount of well-designed experiments Ceven those that 
produce statistically interesting results) will serve 
to demonstrate the importance of allegedly paranormal 
phenomena.
PART TWO
THE METAPHYSICAL FOUMDATIOHS OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH
CHAPTER FOUR
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AMD THE PHILOSOPHY OF HIED
I: DUALISM
In this chapter and the succeeding one, I shall discuss 
two central issues which psychical research 
comprehends. I call them central because the whole 
research programme depends upon them, and because they 
are of considerable philosophical importance. First, 
what is the nature of the relationship between the mind 
and the body, and secondly, can we claim that human 
beings (in any significant sense) survive death? The 
position of psychical research in regard to the former 
question is a curious one, as many of its proponents 
presuppose a dualist position, yet persist in producing 
empirical arguments in order to prove it. I say that 
this is curious, because dualism is a philosophical 
theory, and as such should be argued for on a 
philosophical basis - if the arguments are sound, then 
empirical results are otiose; but if the philosophical 
arguments are inadequate, then no amount of well- 
intentioned experimental work can serve as a proof.
I shall outline some of the ideas that are put forward 
by psychical researchers concerning this crucial 
question of the relationship between the mind and the 
body, and the quasi-religious view of the world that 
underlies them. Next, I shall draw attention to some 
problems of the dualist theory, problems which, I 
believe, render it untenable. The experimental work 
relies on two significant presuppositions which cut 
across the presumption of dualism: there is, I shall
argue, a tension between these two positions. In the 
following chapter, I shall consider the question of 
survival, which bulks so large in the literature of 
psychical research.
Psychical research is often stated to be an open-minded 
examination of the evidence for the paranormal. But 
there is a "hidden agenda"; what lies behind the 
collection of cases and the recording of scares is the 
need to prove a point, and a very large point at that. 
As Dingwall has put it (Angoff, 1971, p.38), "I do not
think I could name half a dozen C parapsychologists] 
whom I could call objective students who honestly 
wished to discover the truth. The great majority wanted 
to prove something or other", and that something or 
other was a religious belief: for Victorians such as
Myers, new scientific discoveries had seriously 
undermined the foundations of their faiths. The search 
for telepathy might reveal that mind-to-mind 
communication was a fact, and if the mind could 
communicate without using bodily organs, then the mind 
might be separable from the body. The existence of an 
ability to guess a few playing cards correctly was 
going to be used to prove the immortality of the human 
soul. "Thus the supernatural might be proved by science 
and psychical research might become, in the words of 
Sir William Barrett, a handmaid to religion."
This emphasis on religion is pervasive; thus Myers 
describes psychical research as "the preamble of all 
religions" (quoted by Flew, 1987, p.15). Conan Doyle, 
who was more of a Spiritualist than a psychical 
researcher, nonetheless based his beliefs on the 
"evidence", precisely the same kind of evidence that 
the psychical researchers themselves were 
investigating: "Nothing is secure until the religious ■
basis is secure, and that spiritualistic movement with 
which I am proud to be associated is the first attempt 
ever made in modern times to support faith by actual 
provable fact" (quoted in Hall, 1978, p.95). Rhine was 
no exception to this trend, talking ardently of solving 
"first-rate problems Cof theology] with first-rate 
methods [of science]" (1954, p.206), and looking to 
parapsychology to offer "the possibility of a 
scientific approach to the question of the basic nature 
of man" (1948, p.17)
The truth of dualism is to be taken as understood. From 
dualism it is short step to the possibility of 
survival, and thence, to religion. Nearly all writers 
that have started from this point have followed the 
same path. C. D. Broad, is a significant exception. In 
the two versions of his BLPs (1953, p.10, and 1962, 
p.4), we are offered the fallowing:
A. "A necessary ... immediate condition of any mental 
event is an event in the brain of a living body. ... 
Mental events which are so inter— connected as to be 
experiences of the same person are immediately 
conditioned by brain-events in the same brain. If two 
mental events are experiences of different persons, 
they are in ^ene-raI immediately conditioned by brain- 
events which occur in different brains", and
B. "We take it for granted .. . that a person cannot 
directly initiate or modify by his volition the 
movements of any thing but certain parts of his own 
body". Broad also offers (in the later version only) a 
principle concerning survival, which I shall discuss in 
the succeeding chapter:
C. "we take for granted that, when a person's body 
dies, the personal consciousness, which has been 
associated with it and expressed through it during his 
lifetime, either ceases altogether, or, if not, ceases
to be able to manifest itself in any way to those still 
living on earth".
Broad is assuming that the body is accompanied by a 
mind or a "personal consciousness", which is capable of 
acting upon the brain and body (and only on the brain 
and body), and which achieves articulation, as far as 
we on earth are concerned, through the vehicle of the 
body. But Broad goes no further, and certainly does not 
commit himself to any belief in survival or in 
religion. However, even Broad's limited position is not 
without its difficulties. He uncritically puts forward 
a number of doubtful philosophical theses, concerning 
such problematic matters as the interaction between 
minds and brains, and the idea of acts of volition, 
without attempting to justify them.
Principle A is used to specify (negatively) cases of 
telepathy. The point here is that when an experimenter 
looks at a target card which happens to be a circle, 
and the subject records a circle on his scoresheet, we 
should usually interpret this to mean that two mental 
events take place, and that these events are dependent 
on two brain events. What Broad wishes to put forward 
is the view that in paranormal cases, this picture may 
not apply: at the crucial moment, there may be some
purely mental mediation between the experimenter and 
the subject, of a sort that by-passes their brains. To 
guarantee the paranormal interest there must be some 
form of mediation, of course, since in its absence, all 
we should have would be mere coincidences. But Broad 
really is overstating the case, for it is no less 
cogent to argue that there is mediation operating from 
brain to brain rather from mind to mind, but that our 
present technology for neural monitoring is incapable 
of detecting it. The most that we can say of ESP is
that it is not decisively a purely mental event, but 
neither is there any evidence to show that it is a 
brain event either. It nay just be an anomaly (in 
either sense of the word).
Broad's principle B, which would be transgressed if 
cases of "paranormal energy transfer" (PK) were to 
occur, assumes that only bodily movements are initiated 
or modified by a person's "volition". The point of 
introducing this notion is that, it is alleged, some 
people can, some of the time, use their volition to 
move objects directly (that is, without touching them). 
There are two points here that call for closer 
attention. First, the idea of "acts of willing" or 
"acts of volition" is obscure (see Melden, 1961, ch.5). 
It is even more so in relation to PK, for in the bodily 
cases, we can posit a number of causal links, described 
in terms of neural pathways, muscular articulation, and 
so on. The philosophical difficulty appears when, 
having traced the causal chain back from, say, the arm 
that was raised in the air, to the appropriate brain 
event, we attempt to import talk of "minds" or 
"personal consciousnesses". The chain breaks at just 
this point. The problem with PK cases is that there is 
no clear chain at all (certainly no demonstrably causal 
one). The experimental subject is supposed to perform 
an "act of willing"; Rhine puts it as follows: "many
people believe they can mentally influence dice. They 
think they are able,- when in certain moods, to 
influence the fall of dice by the direct action of the 
will" (1948, p.80). However, in what this form of 
willing consists, and how it sets about its operations 
are questions which are never satisfactorily answered. 
There are no causal links shown forth (or at least none 
that go beyond post hoc ergo propter hoc'), and the
nature of the "willing" itself amounts, we may assume, 
to little more than intense concentration.
The second notion that Broad introduces is that of 
"direct" movement. He allows that in the case of my 
raising my arm, I am using my volition directly to 
achieve that end. If, however, I lift the paperweight 
from my desk, a process which would also require 
volition, then I should be said on his account to be 
lifting it indirectly, a usage which seems perverse in 
the extreme. If I arranged a series of strings and 
pulleys, and hoisted the paperweight into the air in 
this way, then I should quite properly say that I was 
"lifting it indirectly". But if I reach out, grab it, 
and bear it aloft - what could be more direct than 
that? The point is not a purely verbal one. By drawing 
a distinction between direct and indirect action, Broad 
is suggesting that the kinds of action that we use in 
moving parts of our bodies and also in influencing the
fall of dice in a PK experiment are of a piece:
something that the will (the mind) does to the physical 
world.
When I lift the paperweight, the story goes, my mind 
directly moves parts of my body, which does the gross 
work of lifting at one remove. In the PK experiments, 
the bodily effort is by-passed: the feat is achieved by
pure volition, or will. But I think that Broad has
allowed himself to misled by an ambiguity of the word 
"will". When I lift the paperweight of my own volition, 
of my own free will, this is a trifling matter, 
requiring no great concentration. To "will" the 
paperweight to hover unsupported in the air is, 
however, a very different matter, requiring, one might 
imagine, some act of willing in a very much stranger 
sense. We should note that Rhine, who carried out
experiments in what he called a "tug-of-wills", in 
which two subjects would attempt to influence the dice 
in competition with one another, clearly had such an 
idea in mind.
The problem of the mind and its place in psychical 
research has pervaded the literature, but rarely are 
the philosophical implications given adequate 
consideration. The central question here is: to what 
extent might empirical discoveries in psychical 
research clarify (and perhaps modify) our understanding 
of mental concepts? Large claims are often entered, but 
can they shown to have substance? The diversity of 
opinion affords an indication of the confusion. Some 
writers have held that if telepathy were to be 
demonstrated, then materialism will have been 
falsified. H.H. Price (Smythies, 1967) and D. M. 
Armstrong (1968) have, from diametrically opposed 
positions, come to such a conclusion. On the other 
hand, Mundle (Wheatley, 1976), Mellor (1975), and 
Cooper (Thakur, 1976) have all proposed that telepathy 
and materialism are, in principle, compatible,
Carrington (1932) has imported quasi-Freudian terms in 
order to explain the operation of ESP (assuming that 
the invocation of a "subconscious mind" to account for 
the phenomena would somehow clarify the matter), Beloff 
(Wolman, 1977) argues that the experimental results 
point towards a dualist interpretation; Rhine (1948) 
claims that they actually prove dualism, Wheatley 
(Krippner, 1977) leans to a monist account. Those who 
hope to find in psychical research a body of evidence 
which could be used to solve the "mind-body problem" 
have been frustrated. Far from psychical research 
providing us with empirical data upon which we could 
base a conceptual reconstruction, it has served to
confuse rather than clarify: the philosophical
difficulties remain untouched.
What is wrong with dualism? The theory has a long and 
profoundly impressive pedigree, is uncritically 
accepted by many people, and can be said to pervade the 
language and ideas of Western societies. Nonetheless, 
it is, I believe, mistaken, and its central ideas 
infest psychical research. The idea that we consist of 
two radically different kinds of stuff is deeply 
counter— intuitive: I am a human being, a person. The
possibility that I am actually two separate things, 
which, by a happy circumstance, maintain a single, 
synchronized existence for most of the time is, 
whatever sanction it may find in ordinary language, an 
improbable option. As Flew has pointed out, "the 
assumptions of the Platonic-Cartesian way, which in 
some contexts we find it so easy to make, are 
nevertheless extraordinary and extraordinarily 
questionable" (1976, p.108). The dualist view allows 
that not only is there a close synchronization between 
my constituent parts, but that one of those parts is 
the real me, capable of carrying on a continued 
existence, long after my body has perished.
One might ask, how is this synchronization, this 
coordination, - actually achieved? For the majority of 
people and for most of the time the coordination 
appears to be perfect. Even supposing that we can 
explain this, how do we account for the fact that these 
fundamentally different substances can act one upon the 
other? What mechanism can react with something that 
lacks any material existence? By what conduit can 
something without substance influence the physical
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world? If minds are made of some invisible substance, 
and we can only observe the workings of our own, then 
what of other minds - do they exist, or are they merely 
figments of our imagination? All we see, according to 
the dualist, is bodies: gross, material bodies. What of 
the tenebrous, impalpable spiritual presences behind 
them? Are they there (in a serious sense) at all? And 
if they are, how can we tell? It is one thing to 
identify, to individuate, different physical objects 
(such as bodies). There are well-established methods 
for doing this, but for minds, we have no criteria. A 
mind that is "articulated" through a human body can be 
identified (and re-identified) by reference to the 
criteria that we use for bodies and for persons. A 
disembodied mind cannot be subject to the same rules, 
for it is, to take just one example, assumed to have no 
spatial location.
These are just some of the familiar arguments that have 
been raised against the Platonic-Cartesian dualist 
picture of the person. There is much to be said for 
abandoning this theory in favour of a monist view, 
which has the advantage of economy, and does not suffer 
the same defects (monist theories, it should be said, 
are not without defects of their own, but the better 
forms of monism collapse less readily into incoherence 
than does dualism).
Although the experiments in parapsychology are 
dualistic in their underlying assumptions, their 
procedures derive from an altogether different school 
of thought, that of behaviourism. When J.B, Rhine 
instigated his programme of experimental work in the 
late 1920s, the American psychological establishment 
was very firmly behaviouristic. The introspectionist
school had gone into a sharp decline, partly due to its 
problematic presuppositions, but mainly because of J.B. 
Watson's polemical attacks, and his proposal of a 
research programme based on abjective physiological 
data. The Freudian school and its numerous derivatives 
held a place, but it was not to assume any central 
importance until the 1930s, as a consequence of the 
emigration from Middle Europe.
It is important to appreciate that Rhine, who was not 
by training a psychologist, and MacDougall, his mentor, 
were both opposed to Watson's "revolution" in 
psychology (Rhine, it should be noted, had religious 
reasons: he was an ardent Baptist, and had considered, 
after taking his doctorate in botany, becoming a 
minister). Both men sincerely felt that the new 
behaviourist paradigm told less than the whole truth 
about the nature of mankind. To Rhine this nature was 
still a "profound mystery" (1948, p.11): "we hear very 
little about the problem of what we are" (p.13). If 
paranormal phenomena could be demonstrated 
scientifically, then the "traditional belief in man's 
spiritual nature" (p.16) would be vindicated. We could 
show that there was more to human bahaviour than a mere 
collection of conditioned reflexes: "More recently a
number of psychologists have recognized that 
behaviourism 'leaves Hamlet out of the play'" (1954, 
p.164). A fortiori, the paranormal might point the way 
to a proof of the existence of the human soul (a claim 
Rhine explicitly endorses). Such souls might also lay 
claim to some form of immortality, though this is 
admitted to be more problematic: "the question is
merely, ' Is there anything extra-physical or spiritual 
in human personality?' The experimental answer is yes. 
There is now evidence that such an extra-physical 
factor exists in man. The soul hypothesis as defined
has been established, but only as defined. Not the 
supernatural character of the soul, not its divine 
origin, its transmigration, its immortality - indeed 
nothing has been dealt with so far but its elemental 
reality" <1948, pp.165-166).
Such beliefs are not uncommon in the literature of 
psychical research. H. H. Price has claimed, for 
example, that."the man who denies survival tof death] 
is certainly on dangerous ground. But I think that he 
still has a leg, or half a leg, to stand on" (Smythies, 
1967, p.35). But he does not offer any good reasons for 
taking such a dismissive position. A Platonic yearning 
for dualism, which has been discussed by Robinson, (in 
Ludwig, 1978, pp. 87-88), and which is taken to license 
all manner of phantasies about a "life beyond", is one 
of the central ideas in Rhine's world-view; the other 
is a passionate disfr'ust of mechanistic explanations.
We can, I think, see a broadly similar pattern in the 
work of Arthur Koestler, who wrote a vigorously 
polemical work attacking behaviourist psychology, 
organized an international conference attacking 
reductionism, and wrote fluent and provocative works on 
parapsychology.
Koestler’s anti-mechanistic tendencies are clearly 
displayed in his defence of the biologist Paul 
Kammerer, where he attempts to rehabilitate some of 
Lamarck's ideas: "If Darwin was wrong in some important 
respects, that does not mean that Lamarck was right.
But it might mean that Lamarck was not completely and 
entirely wrong" <1971, pp.125-126). It is interesting 
that Rhine anticipated Koestler in this matter: in a
tribute to his mentor MacDougall, he wrote that 
"although by that time [the 1920s] biologists had 
almost all rejected the old hypothesis of Lamarck ...
in favour of other theories more in keeping with the 
mechanistic trend of the age he did not hesitate to 
reopen the question. ... He has given his results to 
science, regardless of the fact that in so doing he 
stands practically alone in his conclusion" (1937/1950, 
p.36). Rhine, it seems, is drawn to Lamarckianism, at 
least in part because it is out of step with the 
"mechanistic trend". This is a poor reason for 
accepting a scientific theory, but in any case, it 
misses the paint. Both Lamarck and Darwin postulated 
mechanistic theories. The mechanism for Darwinian 
evolution was discovered, and that for Lamarckianism 
was not, and the theory is immeasurably the poorer for 
this failure. It is no answer to say that Lamarckian 
inheritance actually happens, but in a non-mechanistic, 
spiritual way.
Given that Rhine was so implacably hostile to 
behaviourist psychology, and to mechanistic 
explanations in general, it is odd, to say the least, 
that the programme of parapsychological experiment to 
which he devoted his career should be firmly based on 
behaviouristic principles and practice. In the classic 
work on card-guessing and dice-influencing, no use is 
made of introspective techniques (Rhine actually rules 
this out as impossible, in Hook, 1960, p.73), nor 
indeed of psychoanalytical or psychophysiological 
models. The technique simply demands that the subject's 
performances with cards or dice are compared with the 
outcomes, and the final result is matched against the 
mean chance expectation.
This does not appear, at first, to have much in common 
with the behaviourism first propounded by J.B. Watson: 
there is, for example, no talk of reflexes, neural 
pathways, or conditioning, although Rhine's use of
rewards for correct guesses (1948, p.120) has much in 
common with the behaviourist's reinforcement. However,
I shall show that Rhine's experimental approach is 
solidly based on behaviouristic principles.
By the end of the nineteenth century, experimental - 
psychology had a toe-hold on scientific credibility. It 
had established two major lines of enquiry: the 
psychophysiological and the introspectionist. The 
former wing concerned itself with exacting measurement, 
particularly in the area of perception, which formed 
the foundation for the subdiscipline of psychophysics. 
The latter concentrated on the "softer" aspects of 
mental life, relying on observers who had been trained 
to introspect their inner states and processes, and 
report on them.
Now Watson repudiated everything that introspectionism 
stood for: he pinned his scientific faith firmly to the 
psychophysiological school, and acknowledged the work 
of Pavlov as his starting point. Watson's attacks on 
dualism are as intemperate as those of Rhine on 
behaviourism: in his more polemical moments, he is apt
to dismiss any talk of "mental" activity whatsoever. It 
is hard to know how to read Watson, for he changes 
frequently from denying the scientific utility of 
mental concepts (methodological behaviourism) to 
denying the existence of mind altogether (metaphysical 
behaviourism) (Lord, 1977). But what emerges from his 
attempt to fashion a thoroughgoing scientific 
psychology is a form of words which behaviourists ever 
since have regarded as a fundamental creed: "The
behaviourist asks: Why don't we make what we can 
observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit 
ourselves to things that can be observed, and formulate 
laws concerning only these things. Now what can we
observe? We can observe behavior - what the organism 
does or says" (1930, p.6).
This demand for interpersonally perceivable data lies 
at the heart of Rhine's experimental work. Watson, 
unable to pin down Thought under laboratory conditions, 
found that laryngeal movement (essentially, talking,to 
oneself) was accessible, and boldly redefined "thought" 
as laryngeation: no further investigation of "thinking"
as such would be necessary; close attention to the 
larynx would suffice. In much the same way, Rhine, 
unable to detect any ESP occurring, resorted to 
statistical tests with Zener cards. Rhine limited his 
observations to what his subjects did or said, or, more 
accurately, what they wrote on their scoresheets, for 
no serious attempt was made to discover what they were 
doing to guess as they did.
The experiments were conducted on a "black box" 
principle, which derives from the familiar 
behaviouristic model of stimulus and response. The 
experimental subject is presented with a presumed 
stimulus (that is, the "agent" concentrates on the next 
card), and she responds accordingly (the "patient" 
writes her guess on the scoresheet). But no 
consideration is given to the problem of finding out 
what is actually going on in each of the black boxes 
during the experiment. Rhine, in his very experimental 
design, is precluding the possibility that we might 
discover anything about ESP or PK, except that they can 
be assumed, on purely statistical grounds, to occur.
His position in the behaviourist tradition is closer to 
that of B.F, Skinner than of J.B. Watson, for Skinner 
takes the whole of the organism as his basic unit of 
analysis, whereas Watson was interested in the 
underlying neurophysiological structures. Rhine simply
reports gross behaviour patterns, without making any 
attempt to probe beneath them.
Now it is true that a commitment to methodological 
behaviourism does not entail a commitment to 
metaphysical behaviourism, but in Rhine's landmark 
experiments, we have a situation where the former 
principle is embraced in order to disprove the latter. 
It might be that Rhine, intent upon demolishing the 
behaviourist edifice that bulked so large in the 
psychology of his day, had deliberately designed his 
experiments according to that model, for the purpose of 
attacking behaviourism from within, as a Trojan horse, 
but there is nowhere in his writings any hint that this 
was his purpose, and, in any case, I suspect that Rhine 
lacked the intellectual subtlety for such an approach.
But there is a further problem with this black box 
model: because no attempt is made to look inside the 
boxes, no one knows just what might be happening when 
somebody makes a correct guess. And even the person 
making the guesses is in no position to say, because, 
as has sometimes been noticed, paranormal phenomena of 
both the ESP and PK varieties occur without conscious 
awareness.
I shall refer to this as the "unconsciousness 
principle", and shall have more to say on it in Part 
Three. Now there is a great deal of loose talk, 
especially in the semi-popular literature, about 
"projecting thoughts", or of thoughts being 
"transferred directly from one mind to another" (Rhine, 
1948, p.18), but because of the unconsciousness 
principle, these are forms of words that go well beyond 
what we can legitimately assert. Rhine was aware of the
problem, and mentions it twice in New worlds of the
mind (1954):
Let me emphasize, too, that psi is profoundly 
unconscious ... it is simply not capable of 
being dragged into consciousness unconverted 
and direct. Such seems to be the case as it 
stands today. There are not even any good 
leads to conscious control in sight (p.92).
Later, and more trenchantly, he declares: 
that psi is unconscious has already been 
characterised as being the most important 
psychological fact about it. It can be 
emphasized further that the operation of 
psi is really unconscious. It is unconscious 
in a different degree or way from experiences 
that are merely forgotten or repressed or 
1 left out of consciousness by the shift of 
attention or preoccupation with an object 
of concentrated interest. The operation of 
the psi function is, so far as the researcher 
can indicate, irrecoverably unconscious (p.174).
Recent research has not altered this situation.
It follows from this that no one can be said to use 
psi, or to have a psi ability: asking an experimental 
subject to co-operate by using her ESP is rather like 
asking her to digest her food. Any attendant willing, 
concentration, or mental imagery is irrelevant to the 
matter in hand. Similarly, when she writes down her 
guess on a scoresheet, all she is doing is making a 
mark on a piece of paper: she is not recording a "psi 
thought", nor telling of a "psi experience", since 
there are none. No special feeling accompanies the two 
or three correct "paranormal" guesses that would mark 
them out from the five "normal" ones in -a run of twenty 
five cards. But if the subject doing the guessing is 
not conscious of what she may be doing, the person who 
is "transmitting" is in no better case. He does not 
know (no one does) how to "transmit a thought", and 
psychical researchers have failed to supply a 
prescription. He may close his eyes, screw up his face, 
tense his muscles, and concentrate furiously, keeping
the image of the target before his mind's eye the 
while. But it is not clear just how this can be said to 
be a projection. Given the unconsciousness principle, 
there seems to be no ready way of discovering what is 
going on. Thouless (1972) thinks that this problem 
might be salved by the ingenuity of future 
experimenters, but we should need to know so much more 
that such sentiments seem merely to be the hollow 
expression of a pious hope.
However, talk of "abilities" and "performances" is 
still frequently met with. For example, Celia Green 
claims that she "worked out how to do ESP" (1971, 
p.17), though the remarks she subsequently offers are 
little more than descriptions of so-called psi- 
conducive states rather than a genuine recipe for 
bringing ESP about (the distinction is an important 
one: if I have to learn a large body of material, say
for an examination, then peace and quiet may be 
necessary for my being in a "learning-conducive state", 
but knowing that in no way helps me to set about the 
actual business of doing the learning).
In 1983, the Bulletin of the Foundation for Research 
into the Nature of Man described (anonymously) a 
recently devised computer program which offers "a game 
of mind over matter", in which the player tries "to 
mentally influence the number of spots that will be 
shown on a pair of dice that are displayed on a VDU 
screen" every time a key is pressed (No.30, pp.1-2).
But how this influence works, in physical terms, and 
how we make it work, psychologically, are points that 
are never discussed. Similar examples could be produced 
indefinitely, but I shall add just one more: Louisa 
Rhine, although she notes that psi is unconscious 
(1971), still comments on the "forms of psi experience"
(p.46), and on "a general capacity to know without the 
senses or to move objects by mental force" (p.33). To 
assume that psi is unconscious and at the same time to 
speak of "experiencing" and "knowing" in such contexts
is to take an untenable position.
To avoid the problems inherent in such terms, we might 
prefer to be neutral, and to speak of "capacities", 
(though I admit to some misgivings here, since 
capacities and abilities can be hard to untangle).
There is a considerable discussion as to whether a psi
capacity is spread more or less uniformly through the
population, or whether it is the prerogative of a few 
select individuals. Thus Wheatley considers that the 
evidence points to the view that "most people simply do 
not have psychic experiences or capabilities at all" 
(Krippner, 1977, p.166), whereas Targ and Puthoff, in 
respect of their own subjects at least, say that "it 
turns out they're all gifted" (1977, p.69), Lurking 
behind this is what might be called the evolutionary 
problem: it is an index of the state of psychical
research that some writers are able to argue that psi 
is an ancient relic of our heritage, which, with 
increasing civilization, we are losing, and others that 
it is a new power, which we are on the threshold of 
developing.
Psychical research is in a state of confusion. It does 
not help us to clarify the-nature of our mental 
concepts, but merely muddies the waters further. Its 
attempt to reanimate the Platonic theory of the person 
fails to consider the philosophical problems involved, 
and its black box experiments and the unconscious 
nature of the phenomena both point the way towards a 
damning critique of the scientific status of 
parapsychology. However, psychical research places
particular stress on the importance of the question of 
survival: I shall now turn to a consideration of this
matter.
CHAPTER FIVE
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HIED
II: SURVIVAL
The question of the survival of death is far toe large 
a topic to be fully discussed in a single chapter. 
Nonetheless, it occupies such a central role in 
psychical research that it cannot be avoided. As I have 
already noted, psychical research tends to assume that 
the survival issue is a purely empirical one, which can 
be settled by recourse to the evidence. Psychical 
research, as a scientific enterprise, is uniquely 
qualified to undertake the collection and evaluation of 
such evidence. That, at least, is the unspoken 
assumption. The hope of many was and is that after 
centuries of doubt, religious beliefs might be put on 
firm foundations.
But even if solid evidence were to be forthcoming (and 
I shall argue that this is by no means as 
straightforward a possibility as it might at first 
sound) it would not settle the matter conclusively. 
Survival, for example, is not to be equated with 
immortality, nor does it imply the existence of a 
Deity. Proof of survival, tout court, then, would not 
go very far towards establishing what many people 
seek. It may be, for example, that we do survive, but 
only for five years before annihilation overtakes us.
If such a situation obtained, we should be able to talk 
of survival, but it would not obviously imbue the 
Universe with any extra meaning or purpose.
I am assuming, of course, that evidence could be 
produced and assessed. There are good reasons for 
thinking that, in principle, this is not the case. For 
the evidence would have to be of a very strange sort. 
The most direct evidence, it might be urged, would be 
that presented to me: when I am dead, I shall know 
whether I survive or not. Even this will not answer all 
my questions about survival, though. Does everyone 
survive, or am I one of the exceptions? But to talk of 
"evidence" in such a context is to overstate the case; 
evidence needs to be interpreted within a conceptual 
framework, and after death, I (as a survivor) am going 
to be so radically altered, as are my surrounding 
circumstances, that the reliability of my 
interpretation might seriously be called into question. 
More strongly, we could argue that in the personal case 
there is no such thing as evidence. If I do not 
survive, then ex hypothesi, I cannot have evidence 
against survival, and if I do, then evidence is 
irrelevant. Finding myself to be surviving, I should no 
more seek evidence to prove that I was than a fully 
awake person would try to establish that she was not 
dreaming.
These problems aside, it is clear that for practical 
reasons we must seek indirect evidence of survival. In 
psychical research, such evidence is of two kinds.
First, there is the information that is acquired from 
mediums who claim to be in touch with the dead, and to 
act as a conduit between their world and ours.
Secondly, there are cases that suggest some form of 
reincarnation, in which a living person has some 
memories of a "past life". Both these types of case 
(which derive, it should be noted, from different 
relgious traditions) presuppose that something is there 
to survive: it has a non-physical nature, and can
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continue to exist either as a separate entity on a 
"spiritual plane", or in virtue of its capacity for 
informing a new physical body. These views need not be 
read as mutually exclusive.
In an attempt to introduce a measure of scientific 
control, tests have been devised using messages 
enciphered in a manner known only to one person. If 
before their death the cipher proved impenetrable, but 
subsequent to their death it could be broken through 
the agency of a medium, then this would be strongly 
suggestive of survival. But such an interpretation 
depends upon a substantial leap of inference. Thouless, 
who made a special study of such messages, and left his 
own (1963, p.130; 1972, pp.162-164) was especially
concerned to rule out the possibility of decipherment 
by ESP. He tested various people, to see if they could, 
using telepathy, discover the cipher key from him. They 
failed. If, now that he has died, the messages could be 
revealed, then this, he would have urged, is strong 
evidence for survival. But the inferential leap is made 
at precisely this point: the assumption made is that 
telepathy generally takes place simultaneously. The 
medium who failed to crack Thouless's cipher five years 
before his death but who succeeded five years after may 
not have been in post mortem contact with him at all, 
but relying on retrocognitive telepathy, or even on 
precognitive clairvoyance (reading o.ff the account that 
was to be published some months later).
The canons of reasoning, common-sense, and economy to 
which Thouless helps himself cannot so readily be held 
to apply in psychical research. Such tests as Thouless 
proposes might be suggestive of survival, but we could 
not say more than that. It is not that any one of the 
possible paranormal explanations that we might put
forward is more or less preferable, or more or less 
economical; the point is that there is no way of 
telling which is to be accepted.
Writers on mediums and the survival question often 
refer to the material known as the "cross- 
correspondences" , a considerable body of cases 
collected by the SPR, in which automatic writings 
produced independently by different mediums can be 
compared. When comparisons are made between the 
differents scripts, occasional striking coincidences 
can be found. This is taken by some to be evidence for 
survival. It must be said, however, that these 
coincidences occur sporadically, with no detectable 
pattern, and are of a trivial nature. The bulk of the 
material is enormous, and much of it remains 
unpublished. The task of assessing it thus a formidable 
one. I can only say that, despite assertions to the 
contrary, ESP is here a no less cogent paranormal 
explanation of the evidence than the survival 
hypothesis.
The preference for an explanation in terms of ESP 
rather than survival was argued for by Dodds (1932), 
who pointed out that there was strong independent 
evidence for telepathy, whereas the spiritualistic 
interpretation was fraught with difficulties. But we 
can put the case a little more forcibly: there is no
method for excluding telepathy or clairvoyance from the 
displays of mediums. Once we accept the possibility of 
ESP, we cannot ignore it simply because it does not 
suit our present purpose. Admittedly, such ESP would 
have to work at a higher level of efficiency than we 
should expect from the card-guessing experiments, hence 
the name that is often given to the supposed quality: 
"super-ESP".
The problem may be stated by means of an example. Let 
us imagine that a medium contacts a ’’spirit", who 
reveals an item of factual information about a member 
of the sitter's family. If this information can be 
verified, then it suggests that the medium was 
genuinely in touch with the spirit. If it cannot be 
verified, then it is, as evidence, worthless, and must 
be discounted. The means of confirmation must be 
available. Let us say that the information is then 
checked in the relevant parish registers, and found to 
be correct. On the face of it, here is a piece of 
evidence for survival. But it could, just as • 
convincingly, be interpreted as an occurrence of super—  
clairvoyance, whereby the medium was able to gain 
access to the contents of the parish registers by 
paranormal means.
Gauld <1982, p. 15) admits the intractability of this 
problem, but feels that, because the idea of 
unconscious supei— ESP is "unobservable", it is 
profitless to advance it; the postulation of super-ESP 
is "barren of further consequences". This may be so, 
but it seems more like a powerful argument for finding 
out about ESP before going on to consider survival, 
rather than for dismissing it out of hand. We should 
also note that "ordinary ESP" (if we may call it that) 
is equally unobservable, yet parapsychologists continue 
to investigate it. Once we admit the possibility of 
ESP, then it contaminates all serious evidence for 
survival.
\
The cases of ostensible reincarnation have been 
actively studied by Stevenson <for example, 1975 and 
1979). There are serious methodological problems in 
these reports, and their interpretation is by no means 
unproblematic (see Wilson, 1981, pp.53-63). What is
particularly noteworthy is the absence of any law-like 
regularities in the experiences: there seem to be no
rules governing reincarnation. If psychical research is 
to make good its claim to scientific status, it must 
not only present us with claims that have been 
investigated by scientific methods — it should also be 
able to show that its findings hang together in a 
systematic pattern.
The interest of the psychical researchers in survival 
is, of course, intimately connected with the dualist 
picture: if a physical body is accompanied by a non­
material consciousness, then perhaps that consciousness 
can detach itself from the mortal encumbrance of its 
material shell. Such detachment need not require the 
death of the physical body: the out of the body 
experience (QBE) is a case in point. When somebody 
reports having had an OBE during sleep, during which 
they were able to have access to information not 
normally available, then many psychical researchers 
would be inclined to refer to this as an OBE. But as in 
the survival cases, there is nothing to be said against 
an account in terms of ESP. There is actually something 
very odd about such an OBE account: Leggett, an
enthusiastic dualist, claims that "a human being can 
feel emotionally and think discursively independently 
of the physical body" <1977, p. 7) , and it is clear from 
his argument that this separation is to be thought of 
as an actually occurring one, and not simply a bare 
conceptual possibility. From the cases that he cites, 
however, it is clear that Leggett's witnesses were not 
just feeling and thinking - they were also seeing <it 
is a commonplace feature of OBE reports that they 
include some reference to standing apart from or 
looking down upon "my body"). The Cartesian picture of 
mind as unextended thinking substance has been
illegitimately expanded here to include such blatantly 
physical features as spatial location and perceptual 
capacities.
* ***
There is one further question concerning survival which 
I must consider, and that is the status of Broad's 
basic limiting principle concerning survival, which I 
mentioned briefly in the previous chapter. In most 
contexts, I think we can agree with Broad when he says 
that we tacitly accept the following: "when a person's
body dies, the personal consciousness ... either ceases 
altogether, or, if not, ceases to be able to manifest 
itself in any way to those still living on earth"
<1962, p.4). Broad, in framing his BLPs, makes it plain 
that he is considering the tenets that are held in 
Western industrial societies, and which form the 
framework for our practical and scientific activities. 
For those purposes, the principle is tacitly accepted: 
the question of survival is not even raised in such 
contexts. Nonetheless, there are contexts where it 
occurs, and which have nothing to do with psychical 
research (Broad, it will be recalled, uses the BLPs to 
specify the subject matter of psychical research: if
something conflicts with a BLP, then it is ostensibly 
paranormal).
During the daily round - boiling a breakfast egg, 
replying to letters, or driving home from work - the 
survival question does not impinge at all. But if we 
take ourselves to church on a Sunday, or become 
enmeshed in a mid-week discussion on theology, then the 
matter of survival suddenly snaps into sharp focus. In 
such contexts, the issues are aired with a directness 
that cuts across the BLP completely. And yet Broad
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takes this principle to be fundamental to our 
conceptual scheme. Can it be then that the vicar whose 
sermon invokes the joys of the.Kingdom of Heaven is 
indulging in self-contradiction? Or even, as Broad 
seems to be claiming, that he is giving a lecture on 
psychical research? The majority of theologians would,
I think, deny both interpretations. Religious language 
occupies a special place in our conceptual scheme, and 
has its own particular rules. Broad is making the 
assumption that language has but a single function, one 
that can be characterized by drawing a boundary of 
limiting principles around it. But this is to take a 
procrustean view of the uses of language: although 
survival has no place in scientific discourse, it is 
central to eschatology.
It should also be said that Broad's principle is less 
than illuminating: we either, he says, do not survive,
or we do survive (but are unable to communicate the 
fact to those on earth). As far as we on earth are 
concerned, there is no way of deciding between the 
alternatives. The difference in their implications is, 
however, enormous. Broad's principle boils down to the 
uninteresting claim that either we survive or we do 
not; it would be hard to disagree.
Scriven (1956) makes the interesting point that, no 
matter how sophisticated our explanatory schemata might 
became, there will always be certain questions that 
will resist a full and satisfactory explanation. This 
category he refers to as the "supernatural"; the origin 
of the universe, the evolution of mankind, and the 
survival of death are all ultimate questions that fall 
under such a heading. We can probe them, but firm 
conclusions will always elude us. In the case of 
survival, part of the problem lies not in the absence
of evidence, but in the difficulty of deciding what is 
to count as evidence. Bishop Butler said that the 
question of survival, "as it is the most important 
question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most 
intelligible one which can be expressed in language" 
(quoted in Flew, 1953, p.62). But, when we consider how 
we might set about answering it, it becomes obvious 
that the question is far from clear.
Certainly, as far as experimental parapsychology is 
concerned, there is no need to import any assumptions 
concerning survival in order to construct a paranormal 
account of the results. By stripping away untestable 
explanatory hypotheses, psychical research can move 
closer to a scientific position. Survival may well take 
place, but psychical research cannot prove it, and nor 
does it need to assume it.
CHAPTER SIX
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AHD EPISTEMOLOGY
There are certain epistemological issues which have an 
important bearing on psychical research. If ESP is a 
form of perception, and if the results of its operation 
can properly be said to give us knowledge, then the 
importance of psychical research can scarcely be 
overstated. If, on the other hand, no act of perceiving 
takes place, no information is acquired, and the 
results amount to no more than a series of striking 
coincidences, then psychical research is in no position 
to offer any epistemological insights. In this chapter, 
I shall examine these matters, concentrating on 
experimental cases of ESP <PK, having no obvious 
epistemic component, will not be discussed). I shall 
argue that the answer to both questions (concerning 
perception and knowledge) is negative, and provide an 
alternative characterization of the experimental 
findings: one that, although it is not without 
problems, takes the available evidence as far as it can 
go.
The question at issue here can be stated as follows:
"if I am participating in a card-guessing experiment, 
and the current target card is a circle, and moreover I 
guess that it is a circle, then can I legitimately 
claim that I (in some way) perceived that it was a 
circle, and that this perception entitled me to enter a 
claim to knowledge?" The question of what we might 
term, as a convenient shorthand, "paranormal knowledge" 
is a significant feature in the literature. Broad, in
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his basic limiting principles, takes it for granted, as 
does Ayer, though from a different perspective (1956, 
p.187) . Among parapsychologists, Eysenck (1958, p. 106) , 
Rhine (1948, p.24), and Thouless (1972, p.32) all 
accept it. The idea that knowledge is central to the 
question is a pervasive one, and talk of knowledge and 
information transfer is a consequence of talk of 
perception.
Broad's BLPs make a natural starting point for this 
discussion. In the two formulations, he offers a total 
of four principles:
A. "It is impossible for a person to perceive a 
physical event or a material thing except by means of 
sensations which that event or thing produces in his 
mind".
B, "We take it for granted that a person A cannot know 
what other experiences another person B is now having 
or has had", except by certain well-known methods.
C, "It is impossible for a person to know .,. that an 
event ... happened at such and such a place and time" , 
except by certain well-known methods.
D. "We take it for granted ... that a person cannot 
foresee . . . any event which has not yet happened". 
(Conflated from Broad, 1953, pp.10-12, and 1962, pp. 3- 
4).
It is striking that Broad accepts that both perception 
and knowledge are involved here. It will be recalled 
that he posits a negative definition of paranormality: 
if something conflicts with a BLP, then the conflict is 
to be taken as the criterion of its (ostensible) 
paranormality. So by setting up his epistemological 
principles in terms of perception and knowledge, Broad 
is inescapably committing himself to the view that a 
correct guess in an experiment is to be interpreted as
a case of knowing. Thus Broad begs the crucial 
question: "is it legitimate to speak of acquiring
knowledge by paranormal means?"
Broad, in sentences that I have, for the sake of . 
brevity, not quoted, offers a number of specific 
methods of having or acquiring knowledge, such as 
personal awareness, memory, inference, and so on. But 
are clairvoyance and telepathy also to be interpreted 
as methods that people can employ, or are they merely 
names that we give to odd coincidences?
In an ESP experiment using Zener cards, there will be 
twenty five trials for each shuffle. The results will 
be purely statistical, of course, and as such, they 
will require interpretation. Simply to say that this 
subject scored significantly above the mean chance 
expectation in a long series will not be sufficient. An 
extra premiss must be added to the argument: "such a
deviation cannot reasonably be attributed to normal 
processes, but must have been brought about 
paranormally"-. The subject, it is implied, is doing 
something in the course of the experiment. How if this 
were the case, then the subjects should be able to 
reflect on their performances. If they have access to 
information by paranormal perceptions, then we should 
expect this reflexion to bring forth a sense of 
confidence, of sureness about the results of particular 
guesses. But this rarely happens - there is still no 
way of telling the five out of twenty five "ordinary 
guesses" from the two or three "paranormal" ones. As I 
have said in Chapter Four, psi occurs without conscious 
awareness. H.H. Price is, I think, partly correct when 
he says that "the experience on his [the subject's] 
side seems to be exactly the same both when he is right 
and when he is wrong. If he were knowing in the correct
cases and only guessing in the incorrect ones, there 
ought to be an experienced difference between the two" 
(Wheatley, 1976, p.116). I say "partly correct" here, 
because the cases that might involve knowing would 
actually be of two kinds: the exciting paranormal ones,
and the uninteresting lucky guesses. The wrong ones 
would be, not guesses, but unlucky guesses.
The use of perceptual terminology in the context of ESP 
or psi gamma must be taken to be purely metaphorical. 
There is no sensory organ which can be said to be the 
recipient of ESP, and there is no conscious awareness 
on the part of experimental subjects of the operation 
of any "sixth sense". The cards are turned, the guesses 
are recorded, and that is all that happens: there is no
causally efficacious mediation between the two 
operations. Ho one perceives anything, they simply 
record their guesses. It is only when the statistical 
analysis has been carried out that any serious talk of 
paranormality appears.
So if the subjects cannot be said to be perceiving, can 
they lay any claim to have knowledge of the target 
cards? Of course, not all knowledge depends upon direct 
perception: we know that Caesar conquered England in 55
B.C., although there is no one alive who could be 
called as a witness; we can also be said acquire 
knowledge by inference or by induction. But in the psi 
cases, there seems to be no link between the target and 
the guess. The scores may be so high as to be puzzling, 
and may thus be thought to call for an explanation, but 
it is illegitimate to assume that any such explanation 
could be couched in terms of knowledge.
The classic analysis of knowledge is the Justified True 
Belief theory (JTB), which dates back to Plato. On this
account, a claim to have knowledge is analysable into 
three components: a person A can claim to know
proposition P if and only if (i) P is true, (it) A 
believes that P, and (iii) A is justified in believing 
that P. As Gettier notes (Phillips Griffiths, 1967, 
p.144), recent formulations of JTB have offered 
slightly different components, while retaining the 
essential structure. Thus Chisholm substitutes 
"accepts" for "believes" in (ii), and demands "adequate 
evidence" rather than "justification" in (iii). Ayer 
asks that A should be "sure that P is true", rather 
than merely believing in (ii), and moreover "has the 
right to be sure" for (iii). Whichever version we might 
prefer, it is clear that JTB does not admit paranormal 
knowledge claims. It is clear that criterion (i), that 
of truth, is met: the target card is a circle. However,
the subject is not required to believe this; he may do, 
he may not. He may be asked to note those guesses where 
he felt particularly confident, and he may do rather 
well on these, but there is still a large gulf between 
"guessing confidently" and "believing", and there 
cannon, m  such cases, be any question of 
justification. Subjects do not in general report any 
kind of imagery associated with their guessing: they do
not see a circle or a letter C before their mind's eye, 
nor do they hear an inner voice whispering the word 
"circle". They just guess, and record their choice in 
the prescribed manner. A guess can be right or wrong, 
but it cannot be justified, since if it had a genuine 
justification, it would stand higher in any epistemic 
scale that we could construct.
Even if we were to adopt the versions of JTB offered by 
Chisholm and Ayer, the case for paranormal knowledge 
claims could not be made out, Chisholm's preference for 
"A accepts P" over "A believes that P" certainly might
accommodate paranormal guessing, but his demand for 
"adequate evidence" could not be met. There cannot be 
adequate - or, indeed, any - evidence in such cases: 
that is what makes them so noteworthy. Ayer's stress on 
"being sure" is also incompatible with any paranormal 
knowledge claim. If we accept JTB, in any version, then 
whatever might be going on in a parapsychology 
experiment cannot be referred to as being a case of 
knowledge.
Other currently-held views on knowledge would similarly 
exclude paranormal knowledge claims. Austin's 
performative theory (1970, pp.76-116) offers an 
analysis of knowledge claims: "when I say 'I know', I
give others my Word: I give others my authority for 
saying 'S is P'" (p.99). Of course, in the
parapsychology case, the experimental subject is in no 
position to give any such assurances. The bulk of such 
subjects get vastly more wrong calls than right ones, 
and simply because someone scores seven instead of five 
cards in an experiment, it is quite unreasonable to 
suppose that this entitles them to give their warrant 
about the identity of the next card to appear.
Paranormal knowledge claims would also fail on 
Goldman's causal theory (1967), which requires that 
facts be causally linked to beliefs. Although psychical 
research sometimes makes a show of pretending to 
establish causal links, its view of causality is 
ambiguous. I shall explore this matter in more detail 
in the next chapter, but I shall note for the present 
that there are no demonstrable causal chains to be 
found in psychical research, and so any attempt to 
analyse knowledge claims using Goldman's theory is 
doomed from the outset.
I conclude that paranormal occurrences such as 
telepathy and clairvoyance fail to give us any right to 
claim to have knowledge. Attempts to introduce notions 
such as "confidence" or "conviction" should also be 
regarded as suspect, since there are no rational 
grounds for the choices made (see Thouless, 1972, 
p.38), and any confidence that a subject reports in a 
particular call amounts to nothing more than a mere 
hunch.
Can we give a less controversial description of these 
experimental cases? Parapsychologists seem too 
adventurous in claiming that the psi hypothesis is the 
only serious explanatory candidate. First, because the 
psi hypothesis does not actually explain anything at 
all, it merely asserts that something peculiar takes 
place that can sometimes have rather odd results. 
Secondly, because to claim that a number of anomalous 
results in card-guessing experiments must be a 
demonstration of ESP is to jump to conclusions. As Ayer 
has put it: "to talk of extrasensory perception is not
to give any explanation of the subject's performance 
but merely to stake the claim that an explanation is 
called for" (1965, p.50). Much the same position was 
earlier taken by Robinson (Ludwig, 1978, p.81): "to
call a coincidence a case of telepathy is not to 
explain it, but precisely to deny the possibility of 
one sort of explanation of it". Against this view, 
Scriven (Thakur, 1976, p.193) says that, in certain 
contexts, it is "perfectly appropriate for somebody to 
offer as an explanation of a puzzling phenomenon the 
hypothesis that it is due to telepathy; by this he or 
she means to convey the fact that transfer of 
information is occurring other than by the typical 
means, and the existence of this information in the 
mind of some individual associated with the
experimenter is a necessary condition for success". I 
do not think that Seriven's formula will work: although
he refers to Robinson's argument as an "attempt to 
dispose of the supernatural by a piece of logical 
legerdemain", he does in fact do little more than 
reproduce what Robinson had said a quarter of a century 
before: to "explain" something as a case of telepathy 
is simply to exclude "normal" explanations. All Scriven 
can offer is a claim that the telepathy hypothesis has 
"plenty of meat" in it, "meat that can be tested. For 
example, it denies that ordinary sensory transfer is 
occurring, and it denies that clairvoyance would be an 
adequate explanation of the events". The claim that the 
telepathy hypothesis is open to testing must be 
regarded as being extremely doubtful, and the 
possibility of differentiating it from clairvoyance is 
small.
What is needed is a description of ESP which is 
testable and also lacking in tendentiousness. The best 
account is, I would suggest, to be couched in terms of 
guessing or intuiting: experiments in so-called ESP
demonstrate that some people are better at guessing 
than others. We need not be surprised at this: the
experiments may have been designed to demonstrate the 
reality of ESP, but if so, they were designed 
remarkably badly. The experiments are simply guessing 
tests, and subjects are invited to guess the target 
cards, not to "have a paranormal experience", or to 
"concentrate their psychic powers", or to "employ 
clairvoyance". The experiments have proved just what 
the design apparently set out to test - that some 
people are better at guessing than we should expect 
them to be. A similar interpretation can be applied to 
cases of precognition, which can be glossed as examples 
of guessing what is going to happen next, and PK could
be thought of in terms of luck: some people are luckier 
(with dice, or whatever) than we should expect them to 
be.
This guessing hypothesis is more familiar, more down to 
earth, than the flat claim that some people, some of 
the time can obtain information through unknown 
channels. It serves to bring the results within our 
conceptual reach. Explanations must come to an end at 
some point, and philosophical clarity is served by 
positing an explanation that falls within our reach 
(guessing) rather than one that falls outside it (ESP). 
Such an explanation is also more economical (though 
this point should not be regarded as being conclusive).
There is, to echo Scriven, plenty of meat in this 
hypothesis, meat that can be tested: for example, it
denies that all people guess in line with mean chance 
expectation, and offers psychologists a potentially 
fruitful opportunity to investigate a relatively 
unexplored human activity. Moreover, it avoids the 
problem, remarked upon by Flew (1953, pp.117-118), of 
how we are to distinguish between the five "ordinary" 
guesses and the two or three "paranormal" ones: we
cannot, because they are all of the same kind. To this 
extent, the guessing hypothesis has greater explanatory 
force than any rival alternatives.
The attempt to bring the experimental results under the 
descriptions of "guessing" and "luck" is not a new 
programme: Spencer Brown (1957, p.112) mentions it 
obliquely, and Flew (1953, p.130) offers guessing "as a 
convenient stopgap way of thinking of the phenomena" :
"if we must have a model, in terms of which to think of 
experimental psi-gamma and to try to make it 
intelligible to ourselves, then the model of guessing
would be a great deal better than those of perception, 
communication by radio, or the fabulous offstage 
activities of ghostly minds or even - if these can be 
called models - those of cognition (jargon for 
'knowing’) or thought-transference". Flew is right to 
rail against the popularly-held but philosophically 
unsound pictures that are sometimes put forward. 
However, his proposal of guessing as a model for 
understanding ESP seems unhelpful: the experiments are,
after all, just card-guessing trials, and the 
significant results are merely anomalies in guessing 
behaviour. As such, it is less than illuminating to 
propose a model of them that is couched in terms of 
guessing. We do not gain a grip on the concept of 
guessing by proposing to understand it in terms of 
guessing,
Ayer states bluntly: "the only thing that is remarkable
about the subject who is credited with extrasensory 
perception is that he is consistently rather better at 
guessing cards than the ordinary run of people have 
shown themselves to be" (1965, p.61). However, guessing 
and luck have rarely been taken seriously enough by the 
psychical researchers. If the subjects have no rational 
grounds, as Thouless has said (1972, p.38), then surely 
they are just guessing, but Thouless is unwilling to 
take such a coramon-sense solution. If the cases of so- 
called ESP were something more than mere guessing (and 
of course there is a dark suggestion that they are), 
then the subjects should have some grounds for their 
choices. As they do not, I conclude that the guessing 
hypothesis, while it is not without its difficulties, 
offers a better picture of the experimental findings 
than any of the so-called explanations that are couched 
in paranormal terms. It avoids any tendentious talk of 
"perception" or of "knowledge", and says no more and no
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less about the experimental results than can 
legitimately be asserted.
CHAPTER SEVEN
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND CAUSALITY
Causality raises two important questions for psychical 
research. First, in cases that are assumed to involve 
ESP or PK, is it legitimate for us to introduce the 
idea of causation into our descriptions of the events 
and processes that we might assume to take place? 
Secondly, if a causal account of such events can be 
supplied, then how are we to deal with those cases that 
seemingly involve some kind of temporal displacement 
(as in precognition)? Any causal account of these will 
have to involve the difficult notion of backwards 
causation.
If, however, it can be shown that a causal account 
cannot be made available, then psychical research will 
face some testing difficulties: all it could offer 
would be a series of bare experimental correlations, 
linked together on little more than the basis of post 
hoc, ergo propter hoc, and, if we allow backwards 
causation, ante hoc, ergo propter hoc.
Broad, in his list of thp basic limiting principles, 
puts forward three concerning causality. However, these 
only appear in the earlier version (1953, p.9). The 
later version (1969) makes no reference to causes, an 
omission which may not be without significance. The 
difficulties that stand in the way of providing even a 
remotely plausible causal account have often been 
remarked upon.
If we consider a typical card-guessing experiment, then 
the events that are observed might be characterized 
under two heads: first, there is someone who looks at
cards, one by one, and concentrates on the symbols 
displayed; secondly, there is another person who is 
recording her guesses. If we find that the two sets' of 
record sheets (showing targets and guesses) coincide to 
a degree that seems to us to lie outside the mean 
chance expectation, then we feel tempted to posit a 
relationship between the two classes of event. The 
habits of our thinking may push us further, towards 
making a tacit presumption that this relationship might 
be characterized in causal terms. However, such a move 
would be illegitimate: psychical research would have to 
utilize devices such as concomitant variation, in which 
experiments are repeated, varying each significant 
factor in turn, and observing the resulting differences 
in the experimental outcome. Psychical research is 
sometimes criticized for failing to do this, but as I 
shall demonstrate in Part Three, it is incapable of 
carrying out such tests. All we are offered is the 
suggestion that there ought to be some sort of 
relationship - for if there is no relationship, then 
there can be no point in investigating mere 
coincidences. Although he admits that he is unable to 
find any causal connexion, Rhine says: "one will
naturally continue trying to think about psi phenomena 
in terms of causation" (1954, p.70). Of course, there 
is a considerable gap between trying to think of them 
in that way,* and actually demonstrating it.
Psychical research thus finds itself faced with three 
options with regard to the question of causation:
(1) the relationship that we assumed to hold between 
the two classes of event is an illusory one, and the
correlation between the two sets of records is an 
artefact, a "co-incidence";
(2) a relationship does hold, and it is moreover 
causal. However, we cannot, as yet, give a satisfactory 
account of it until further work on paranormal 
phenomena has been carried out;
(3) a relationship holds, but not a causal one. I have 
in mind here such proposals as Jung's synchronicity 
(1972) - which he describes as "an acausal connecting 
principle", or Kammerer's "law of series" (see 
Koestler, 1971). Both these notions (they scarcely 
deserve to be dignified with the titles of "principles" 
or "laws") depend upon the presumption of the existence 
of "meaningful coincidences".
It might be suggested that there is a fourth 
possibility: that paranormal events are subject to 
causal laws, but that the laws in question are of a 
"higher order": paracausal, rather than merely causal.
But it is hard to see any future in such a proposal, 
since the cashability of "paracausation" must be 
seriously doubted.
Braude, in a detailed critique (1979, pp.217-241), has 
effectively disposed of Jung's synchronicity, and even 
Koestler does not pretend that Kammerer's work is much 
more than an interesting curiosity. Part of the problem 
is that the idea of a coincidence (a meaningful one, as 
opposed to a mere one) is difficult to pin down. There 
are no rules here; anything we choose might be allowed. 
If something strikes us as being interesting, we might 
add it to our collection of oddities. Thus, to adapt 
the kind of case that Kammerer discusses, suppose that 
I go to a recital at which Beethoven's Opus 132 Quartet 
is the main work on the programme. I am to sit in Row 
I, Seat 32, and my cloakroom ticket is number 132. So 
far, I think Kammerer might have been impressed. But it
does not stop there, for I take a cab home, and note 
that its licence number is 123. How am I allowed to 
count that as another hit, or a near miss, or is it 
just ... another number? I have no way of determining 
the answer to this question.
The difficulty is not unlike that raised by many 
popular superstitions. We are often told, for example, 
that it is "bad luck" to walk under a ladder, or to 
spill salt. Even worse, to break a mirror will bring 
down seven years of bad luck on our heads. The 
consequences sound dire, but how are we to recognize 
them, should they occur? It is easy to pin any 
misfortune on "bad luck", but if my lawn mower breaks 
down next Spring after ten years of trouble-free 
operation, it may well be due to obsolescence and my 
reluctance to have it regularly serviced, rather than 
my penchant for walking under ladders whenever they 
cross my path. As there are no rules for making an 
interpretation, and no method for demonstrating links 
between two unrelated incidents (save of course my own 
private predilections) we can dispense with option (3).
Option (1) is, of course, without specific paranormal 
interest, so psychical research is left with (2). What 
problems lie in the way of providing a causal account 
of paranormal phenomena? A necessary condition for 
positing the existence of a causal relationship between 
two events is that they shall-be constantly conjoined 
(whether that is a sufficient condition is not relevant 
to the present discussion). In paranormal cases, there 
is no constancy in the conjunction. Such events as take 
place are perceived as irregularities in the normal 
pattern (seven correct guesses, rather than five,..), 
and it is this irregularity that makes them noteworthy.
Although we have talk of transferring energy and 
information (which certainly sound like causally 
mediated processes), we can only measure the extent of 
the transfer indirectly: nothing binds the two sides of 
the supposed transaction together. One participant has 
the information, and the other is supposed to acquire 
it. But is it transferred from one to the other? No, it 
simply "appears". If psi occurs, then it seems to 
operate without any kind of means, and psychical 
researchers, while still thinking of psi as being 
essentially causal, have failed to offer any convincing 
explanation of its modus operand!. In the absence of 
any means, such as a bodily organ to control it, psi is 
just the name that is given to some rather odd 
statistics. This is not causation; it is more like 
magic - it happens on what might be called the 
"Abracadabra principle".
What of the cases involving temporal displacements, 
such as precognition? Of course, any causal description 
of these is going to have to take account of backwards 
causation. As Brier puts it (1974, p.xi): "of the three 
kinds of ESP, precognition is the one which raises most 
of the philosophical questions. ... How might we 
explain precognition? This is a different case [from 
clairvoyance or telepathy]. We find it difficult if not 
impossible to imagine waves that go* into the future and 
return to the present bearing information about where 
(and when) they have been. How can events in the 
future, events which do not yet exist, make their 
presence known to those living in the present?" The 
problem only exists because we are tempted to think of 
psi - as we think of most events and processes - in 
causal terms. Brier's aim is to vindicate precognition;
as lie notes, some sceptics have based their rejection 
of precognition on the impossibility of backwards 
causation. If, however, it can be shown that backwards 
causation is not an incoherent concept, then such an 
objection would be confounded. But Brier's programme 
will only go part of the way: it would not, of itself,
show that precognition is possible, still less that it 
happens, but merely that one argument against it would 
have to be discarded.
There is an extensive literature on backwards 
causation, which Brier has comprehensively reviewed. I 
shall not recapitulate the main points here. I shall 
only say that in the absence of a satisfactory causal 
account of non-temporally displaced psi, consideration 
of even more intractable areas seems premature.
There are special problems encountered in the cases 
where a temporal displacement is inferred. First, why 
should it be that sometimes the effect occurs (as near 
as can be judged) simultaneously, and in other cases, 
there is a temporal gap (either forwards or backwards)? 
What governs this apparently arbitrary difference? 
Secondly, how are we to specify the range of operation 
of these displacements? Experimental demonstrations 
tend to concentrate on quite small displacements 
between call and target, typically of the order of plus 
or minus one or two (as seen in the famous - though now 
discredited - work by Soal on Basil Shackleton). But 
what of much wider displacements, say of the order of 
minus 478, or plus 253? Small displacements are 
relatively easy to detect, measure, and assess; large 
ones have so many difficulties in the way of their 
discovery that it is not surprising that they have been 
neglected.
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Thirdly, these displacements need not be only temporal: 
they could also be spatial. It is possible to imagine 
that a subject in Beloff's Edinburgh laboratory in 1980 
was scoring only in line with mean chance expectation 
on the targets that Beloff had prepared, but was using 
"postcognition" to score very highly on a series of 
targets that Rhine had prepared at Duke in 1930.
Because of obvious practical considerations, such 
possibilities can never be adequately investigated, but 
that does not mean that psychical researchers can 
dismiss them out of hand as being idle flights of 
fancy. The problem in the way of a causal account here 
is that we simply have two events, separate in both 
time and space, and with nothing to bind them together.
There are also displacements reported in the sporadic 
cases, and here, supplying a causal account is just as 
difficult. First, we have to untangle straightforward 
coincidences from not only ostensibly precognitive 
events, but also from predictions involving rational 
inference (a means which would be excluded in the card- 
guessing experiments). The method of counting hits by 
reference to probability does not apply in sporadic 
cases, for there is no way to assess the odds against 
chance. To calculate the probability of a particular 
event, we should have to slice up the universe into a 
series of discrete events, and we have no commonly 
agreed formula that will allow us to do this. How many 
events take place in a day? The answer to this question 
depends on a metaphysical stipulation of what is to 
count as a single event, and no formula for determining 
it is logically prior to any other (see Braude, 1979, 
p.230 for an excellent discussion of this problem).
Secondly, even if we could arrive at a generally agreed 
formula, how wide is the temporal gap that we are
prepared to tolerate between the precognitive warning 
and the event itself? Here, the situation is the 
reverse of that which we find in the experimental 
cases; there, short gaps have attracted the attention 
(plus one or two). In sporadic cases, a very much 
larger temporal gap is demanded, since this is the only 
way to preclude rational inference. Thus there is 
something very noteworthy in a prediction made in 1879 
that by 1979, the United Kingdom would have a woman 
Prime Minister named Thatcher, whereas such a 
prediction made on the eve of the 1979 general election 
is parapsychologically uninteresting. So by allowing, 
in the sporadic cases, that a prediction made over a 
long period is more impressive than one made over a 
short period (assuming that they both turn out to be 
true) we effectively rule out the possibility of 
determing the odds against chance until the last trump 
has sounded. And when we try to assess the possibility 
that a case is mere coincidence, then the probability 
method of the parapsychologist's laboratory again fails 
us, for the longer a temporal gap we allow, then the 
greater is the possibility of a striking coincidence 
occurring.
G.G. Taylor (1983), in a sceptical analysis of 
precognition, opts for a definition of precognitive 
cases which allows for description (but not 
explanation). That description is to be couched in 
terms of coincidence. So-called precognition is then 
conceived of in non-causal terms. Taylor seems to me to 
be right in refusing to allow causal descriptions, not 
only because, as he says, the notion of backwards 
causation is incoherent, but also because a proper 
causal account of non-displaced psi occurrences has not 
been provided.
Even if it could, it might turn out to be less than 
interesting: causal explanations offer a rich texture 
of interconnexions; events mesh in with other events: 
one thing, as the saying goes, leads to another, and we 
can trace the binding threads. Backwards causation, on 
the other hand seems an impoverished thing; all we are 
offered is a single instance of a supposed causal 
relationship. There are no backwards causal chains that 
stretch from the future to the past, only one-off 
occurrences that conveniently save the appearances (see 
Braude, 1986).
If we wished to attempt a causal description, it would 
have to look something like this: imagine a card-
guessing experiment, which yields plus-two 
displacements. We can describe this in two ways, either 
my guess at time t causes the target at t+2 to be in 
accord, or the target at t+2 causes my guess to be in 
accord. The former explanation is in terras of forwards 
causation, the latter of backwards causation. How are 
we to choose? It could be argued that the card is 
already there in the pack, and my guessing is not going 
to make it change places, so we should prefer the 
backwards version (though if we change the "randomizing 
equipment" from Zener cards to a console of five 
coloured flashing lights, then such an objection would 
lose its force),
But though there is a show of causal talk here, there, 
is no serious account of what actually happens. In 
sporadic cases, causal explanation is just as 
difficult. One might imagine a case where I dream of an 
enormous volcanic eruption, in which many people are 
killed. It is usually claimed that a forwards causal 
account (in which my dream causes the eruption) would 
be counter-intuitive, and so a backwards account should
be offered (in which the eruption in the future can, 
even before it has come about, cause my dream). But 
psychical research, by its very tenets, cannot permit 
itself the luxury of allowing its thinking to be 
conditioned by mere assumptions about what seems 
reasonable. It is not without interest to note that 
Braude, in his earlier book (1979, p.32) helps himself 
to the notions of reasonableness and plausibility to 
argue in favour of the highly unreasonable and 
unplausible notion of retroactive PK. (Though it should 
be noted that in his mare recent work (1986, ch.5) he 
has had second thoughts).
PART THREE
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH: SCIENCE OR PSEUDOSCIENCE?
CHAPTER EIGHT
SPONTANEOUS CASES
In Part Three, I shall examine the crucially important 
question: is psychical research a genuinely scientific
enterprise? I shall approach this question in three 
stages, looking at spontaneous, observational, and. 
experimental cases in turn. I shall argue that none of 
these can support the presumption of scientific status. 
As we have seen, psychical research makes"some very 
large claims for the phenomena which it studies. I have 
shown that these claims, so enthusiastically entered, 
are not sufficiently made out: the dualist picture of
the human being is filled with paradox and pitfalls; 
the question of survival of death is not to be taken as 
a straightforward empirical one, merely requiring 
careful sifting of already established evidence; psi 
does not give us knowledge or information, and, if it 
happens in any meaningful sense at all, does so without 
causal mediation. Moreover, psi seems to happen without 
any conscious awareness on the part of those 
participating in experiments. Given these difficulties, 
can we say that psychical research is a science?
With regard to the spontaneous cases, there are five 
particular problems that stand in the way. First, if 
psychical research is to make a bid for scientific 
credibility, then there are good reasons for thinking 
that the spontaneous cases should not occupy too great 
a part within it. Scientific disciplines rely on theory 
and experiment. Spontaneous cases, as their name 
suggests, are extremely difficult to tackle
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scientifically, since they are unique occurrences, and 
do not obviously admit of any generalized 
interpretation, A good story can be a fascinating 
thing, but no science can subsist for long in mere 
tales and curiosities. If odd, unexplained phenomena 
were to be observed, then scientists might well note 
them and pursue them. But gradually, as knowledge is 
gained, controlled experimental results supplant the 
purely anecdotal stuff, which, while it might offer 
provocative insights to anthropologists and social 
psychologists, remains at the pre- or sub-scientific 
level.
Secondly, I should imagine that most psychical 
researchers would agree with my last point, and say 
that spontaneous cases are best understood as 
suggestive pointers, indicating potentially fruitful 
areas for developing hypotheses. Such hypotheses could 
then be subject to experimental testing (see, for 
example, Thouless, 1972, pp.16-17). The crucial idea 
here is experimental testing. Too much "theoretical" 
writing in psychical research is little more than 
romantic speculation of the most untrammelled kind (see 
Heywood, 1978, pp.201-221 for a review of some typical 
examples). By now, though, experimental parapsychology 
has generated its own momentum, and its programme 
should be capable of standing alone, without having to 
rely on spontaneous cases.
Thirdly, as many investigators in this field have 
found, eyewitness testimony is frequently a very 
unreliable source of information. Psychologists and 
criminologists are well aware of the startling 
discrepancies which appear when the evidence from 
different eyewitnesses is collated and compared (see 
Loftus, 1979 for an overview of the current state of
knowledge). The classic experiment in this field is 
that of Allport (1947), in which a lecture is 
dramatically interrupted, and the students are then 
asked to write up their recollections of it. But 
psychical researchers - most notably Hodgson (1887) and 
Besterman (1932) - have made original experimental 
contributions to the field, Clearly there are 
circumstances when we have to accept eyewitness 
testimony - to reject it altogether would condemn us to 
solipsism. But our acceptance should be tempered by 
careful, critical sifting, ready to detect any 
discrepancy or self-deception.
The value of eyewitness testimony varies, however, 
according to the kind of event that is described. Let 
us assume that there are three types of event: normal,
abnormal, and paranormal. In normal cases, which 
involve no unusual circumstances, eyewitness testimony 
can, provided due account is taken of the vagaries of 
memory, be accepted as broadly reliable. Abnormal cases 
- those which present us with totally unexpected 
situations, such as a violently interrupted lecture or 
a bank robbery, and which occur so swiftly that we do 
not have time to re-orientate ourselves to the new 
circumstances - offer special problems. Here, the 
testimony of different witnesses can differ widely. 
Paranormal events are even more problematic, for here, 
there is no normal standard that we can re-orientate 
ourselves to. If one were, for example, to be a victim 
of an aircraft hijack - an abnormal occurrence - one's 
recollection of the first few minutes might be very 
confused indeed. After that, one might begin to adjust, 
to take proper note of persons and events, so that, 
after the ordeal, one was in a position to give a 
thorough, accurate description of what transpired. In 
supposedly paranormal cases (such as "seeing a ghost"),
however, there is no opportunity for adjustment to the 
normal.
The Society for Psychical Research, it must be said, 
fell victim from its very beginnings to a series not 
only of frauds and hoaxes but also honest but mistaken 
reports. The Society seemed to believe that social 
standing offered a satisfactory guarantee of an 
informant’s veracity, as the Hornby case demonstrates. 
Judge Hornby's apparently paranormal experience (first 
published in the SPE's Proceedings Volume two, 1884) 
was - to the discredit of the Society - suppressed when 
the volume was reprinted because it had been shown to 
be utterly unreliable in all its significant 
circumstantial details (a full account may be found in 
Hall, 1980, pp.65-68). The learned judge's personal and 
professional credentials were impeccable, but his story 
could not withstand even elementary critical scrutiny. 
This was no isolated instance: in 1886, Gurney, Myers,
and Podmore published (under the auspices of the SPR) a 
collection of first-hand accounts of "phantasms of the 
living". Its reception in the contemporary press was 
less than cordial (see Hall, 1980, pp.72-78 for a 
sample, It is noteworthy that C. S, Peirce is listed 
among the critics). The officers of the SPR were 
accused of having been indefensibly lax in the matter 
of securing documentary verification of the reports 
that they had published.
Fourthly, even if we feel inclined to accept that many 
of the reports of spontaneous cases are reliable, it 
has to be said that they present severe problems of 
interpretation. There are two particular faults to 
which these accounts are prone. First, there is a 
tendency to "overdescribe", to report things in such a 
way as to beg the very question at issue: "is this
phenomenon paranormal?" There is a natural human urge 
to tell a good story, and many spontaneous cases 
exemplify this strongly. For example, in the notorious 
case of the haunting of Borley Rectory, Harry Price 
wrote that the belt of a coat worn by a visitor was 
"lifted and dropped again by an unseen hand" (quoted in 
Dingwall, 1956, p.3). The presentation signals clearly 
to us that a paranormal interpretation is intended. But 
compare that statement with "I noticed that my belt 
caught on something for a moment". Phenomenologically, 
the two versions are interchangeable, but how bald, 
flat, and unsensational the latter is, when compared 
with the former. Note the way that Price nudges us in 
the direction that he wishes us to go: it was a hand,
and not a door knob or a nail, say, that caught up the 
belt, and an unseen one at that. But was it unseen 
because it was genuinely invisible, or simply because 
nobody happened to look for it? Notice too the subtle 
insinuation of intentionality in that use of the word 
"lifted". I shall not labour the point; Price's choice 
of words disposes us to view the events in a certain 
light. An interpretation is being foisted on us, and 
this kind of exaggeration is not uncommon in accounts 
of spontaneous cases.
Secondly, many reports are severely "underdescribed": 
there is not sufficient detail given to allow us to 
make a serious critical evaluation. Take this case, 
culled from Volume 33 of the SPR's Proceedings by 
Tyrrell (1947, pp.63-64):
The percipient was married and lived in India [wrote 
. Tyrrell!. Her half-brother, Edward W. Bowyei— Bower, 
was an officer in the R.F.C. In the early morning of 
19th March 1917, he was shot down and killed in 
France. "My brother" she [the witness! says,
"appeared to me on the 19th March, 1917. At the time 
I was either sewing or talking to my baby — I cannot 
remember quite what I was doing at that moment. The
baby was on the bed. I had a very strong feeling 
that I must turn round; on doing so I saw my 
brother, Edward W. Bowyer-Bower. Thinking he was 
alive and had been sent out to India, I was simply 
delighted to see him and turned round quickly to put 
baby in a safe place on the bed, so that I could go 
on talking to my brother, then turned again and put 
my hand out to him, when I found he was not there. I 
thought he was only joking, so I called him and 
looked everywhere I could think of looking. It was 
only when I could not find him that I became very 
frightened and the awful fear that he might be dead 
[sic]. I think it was two o'clock the baby was 
christened and in the church I felt he was there, 
but I could not see him. Two weeks later I saw in 
the paper he was missing yet I could not bring 
myself to believe he had passed away." Allowing for 
the difference of time, the vision coincided very 
nearly with the time of the accident.
I have quoted this case in detail to demonstrate the 
difficulties involved in understanding precisely what 
happened. To begin with, we need to know the time of 
day. "The early morning" is not nearly precise enough: 
was it light or dark? Why cannot the witness remember 
what she was about at the critical moment? Perhaps it 
was very early in the morning; perhaps the baby had 
woken her; perhaps she was waiting for it to go back to 
sleep, and occupying her time in sewing ... a single 
candle burns, she is drowsy, and thinks, in a moment of 
near sleep, that her brother is in the room with her 
... Perhaps it was like that, perhaps it was not. We do 
not know - we cannot know - on the basis of her 
account. The witness baldly asserts: "I saw my 
brother", but was he sitting, standing, pacing the 
room? How did he look: happy, wretched, in pain? How 
did she recognize him? What was he wearing? <If she saw 
an "astral body" was it wearing "astral uniform"?) Did 
the apparition speak, and if so, what did it say? CNote 
that the sister wished to "go on talking"). There are 
many more questions that we need to ask before we can
offer even a tentative assessment, but all we are given 
is the sketchiest outline. This case is not untypical.
Even more underdescribed is an incident reported to the 
SPR by Misses H. M. and L. Bourne, It was first 
published in the Journal (Volume six), and was 
subsequently reprinted by both Myers (1903) and Tyrrell 
(1947). On the day in question, the Bourne family was 
out hunting. The two sisters saw their father some 
distance away, apparently in some distress, and 
signalling to them to join him. They rode over, losing 
sight of him because of a dip in the ground, and when 
they gained the spot where he had been, there was no 
one in sight. Their father,- who had not, he said later, 
been in any kind of danger or distress, denied having 
been in that particular field, or having signalled to 
them. His horse was said to be unmistakable (see Myers, 
1903, Volume one, pp.651-653). The case must be said to 
be mildly puzzling, but in her statement, Miss L.
Bourne adds a further detail: "As my father waved his
hat I clearly saw the Lincoln and Bennett mark inside 
[that is, the hatters' label] though from the distance 
we were apart it ought to be utterly impossible for me 
to have seen it. At the time I mentioned seeing the 
mark in the hat, though the strangeness of seeing it 
did not strike me till afterwards". What are we to make 
of this? What did Miss Bourne see? How are we to 
evaluate her testimony in the light of this curious 
detail?
An account which steered a middle course between both 
overdescription and underdescription would avoid any 
tendentious assumptions about paranormality. As an 
example, consider the Borley incident referred to 
above. A proper, neutral account would have given us 
the name of the visitor, the dates and times when the
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incident occurred and when it was reported, particulars 
of any witnesses, and a simple statement of what was 
known to have happened: unseen hands should remain 
unseen. When couched in such terms, the case might well 
be considered unworthy of further enquiry.
Fifthly, if I seem to be labouring the point about the 
difficulties in accepting testimony in spontaneous 
cases, it is for a very good reason. There is a view, 
one more often implied than directly argued for, that 
science is, at bottom, nothing more than a collection 
of eyewitness reports, a series of observational 
records. (If it were, of course, then psychical 
research would have vindicated its claim to a place in 
the pantheon of science, since its collection of 
reports is vast.) This idea has its roots in the 
empiricist theory of knowledge and the Baconian 
conception of science, which emphasize the priority of 
experience and experiment over theory. But such a view 
is mistaken: science is not to be equated with mere 
fact-gathering, any more than lepidoptery is with 
butterfly collecting. Scientific observation and 
experiment are preconditioned by theoretical awareness: 
the observation fits the theory, rather than the other 
way round. The attempt to give scientific 
respectability to spontaneous cases fails because 
ultimately, science aims for generality, not 
particulars. As Medawar (1969, p.128) has said:
The ballast of factual information so far from being 
just about to sink us, is growing daily less. The 
factual burden of a science varies inversely with 
its degree of maturity. As a science advances, 
particular facts are comprehended within, and 
therefore in a sense annihilated by, general 
statements of steadily increasing explanatory power 
and compass - whereupon the facts need no longer be 
known explicitly, i.e. spelled.out and kept in mind. 
In all sciences we are being progressively relieved
of the burden of singular instances, the tyranny of 
the particular. We need no longer record the fall of 
every apple.
Medawar is, of course, describing the situation in 
mature sciences, and although by common consent 
psychical research could not claim such a status, his 
point clearly shows how any science must be more than 
the sum of its experimental results. In the absence of 
a theoretical standpoint, individual observations are 
nothing more than individual observations.
I have dealt in a sceptical fashion with the 
spontaneous cases but I should be dishonest if I did 
not add that I find many such reports fascinating. Here 
surely is the immediate source of our interest in the 
paranormal: it would be a shallow person who did not
admit to a little tingle of excitement and wonder at 
some of these narratives. Even if all of them were to 
turn out to be nothing more than error, delusion, or 
fabrication, they would still offer the promise of 
provocative insights into the the peculiarities of 
human psychology.
CHAPTER NINE
OBSERVATIONAL CASES
The observational cases are often supposed by psychical 
researchers to offer evidence for the paranormal that 
is superior in quality to that afforded by the 
spontaneous cases, yet beneath that of the experimental 
work. I shall discuss a number of particular problems 
regarding their interpretation, and the difficulties 
involved in assessing the feats of the medium Daniel 
Home. In the course of this discussion, I shall attempt 
to show that the observational cases, despite the 
claims that are made, offer no basis for establishing a 
science of psychical research.
In principle, observational cases are amenable to 
public demonstration. They are usually seen as offering 
direct, though fugitive, evidence for the paranormal.
In this they may be contrasted with the spontaneous 
cases, which by definition occur sporadically and 
without warning, and the experimental cases, where the 
paranormality is subsequently inferred through 
statistical analysis. So it might be claimed that if 
Uri Geller could definitely be witnessed to bend spoons 
on demand, without using any-physical methods, then the 
matter would be closed; sceptics would simply have to 
learn to adapt to the facts. Many sceptics take the 
view that it should be possible to arrange a 
straightforward demonstration of some paranormal event, 
such as spoon bending, with safeguards against cheating 
written into the protocols. The demonstration would be 
held before a committee of expert observers who would
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deliver their verdict. It is vital to draw the rules 
very tightly, and to secure the assent of the psychic 
under test, otherwise subsequent failure can be too 
easily explained away. A number of magicians, among 
them Houdini, Randi, and Berglas, have offered large 
cash prizes to any psychic who can produce a paranormal 
phenomenon under properly controlled conditions. The 
problem with such demonstrations is that we have no 
commonly agreed standard of what "settling the matter" 
might amount to in such contexts. In the absence of any 
theory-based explanation, the phenomena are bizarre 
anomalies, and there are no guidelines to enable us to 
interpret and evaluate them. There have been instances 
where the experts have disagreed, such as the "Margery" 
case (see Mauskopf, 1980).
One reason that is often given for the failure of 
psychics to produce their phenomena is that the 
presence of sceptics inhibits their abilities (see, for 
example, Inglis in Roll, 1981, p.150). The sceptic, it 
is suggested, produces "negative vibrations" which 
interfere with psychic powers. However, in a BBC 
television programme (QED, broadcast on 8th March 
1983), James Randi was shown masquerading under a heavy 
disguise and a pseudonym (Adam Jersin, an anagram of 
his stage name) as a volunteer from the audience at one 
of Geller's stage performances. The usual phenomena 
were punctilious in their attendance and there was no 
apparent inhibition (see Randi, 1983 for a written 
account), Nonetheless, the fugitive nature of the 
phenomena under properly controlled conditions has 
disturbing implications. John Taylor, in the period 
when he was (credulously) investigating the paranormal, 
noted that "this feature of [ metal3 bending not 
happening when the object is being watched - 'the 
shyness effect' - is very common" (1975, p.69). It did
not occur to him until several years later that there 
might be a simpler explanation for this: fraud coupled
with inadequate observation (Taylor, 1980).
The introduction of paranormality as a possible 
explanation for certain peculiar events can generate 
more difficulties than it solves, as potential 
explanatory candidates can be allowed to proliferate 
unchecked. Without a theoretical perspective, we 
quickly find that "anything goes". For example, there 
are numerous poltergeist cases that have been 
attributed by sceptics to earth tremors - a vase falls 
from a shelf, and the psychical researcher claims this 
to be a "poltergeist manifestation". The sceptic on the 
other hand explains it away by reference to geological 
and seismic phenomena. Cornell, who has made a special 
study of the poltergeist (Gauld, 1979), has attempted 
to show that this sceptical view is inadequate. He 
found a condemned building and rigged a heavy duty 
vibrating machine to it. Vases were placed upon shelves 
within the building, but even when the mechanical 
vibrations exceeded anything that would be experienced 
in an earth tremor, they were not dislodged (this 
demonstration was televised on Arthur C, Clarke's ITV 
programme World of strange powers, broadcast on 10th 
May 1985. A written account may be found in Fairley, 
1985, pp.45-46). Cornell no doubt thought that this 
disposed of the idea that tremors could be responsible 
for any poltergeist manifestations, the corollary being 
that a paranormal explanation would thereby be 
vindicated. But once we allow paranorraality to be 
canvassed, the issue becomes confused, for it is 
possible to interpret Cornell's demonstration as 
anything but conclusive.
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Let us imagine that most, even all, cases of 
mysteriously falling vases can be attributed to seismic 
disturbances, but that there are, as Cornell would like 
us to believe, also a few (a very few) poltergeists or 
mischievous spirits. It might be that one of these, 
anxious to maintain a reputation, and unfussy in the 
matter of choosing its victims, might have sabotaged 
Cornell's demonstration by holding on to the vases. The 
sceptic of course would regard such a suggestion as 
frivolous, but Cornell, once he has admitted the 
possibility of a paranormal explanation, cannot treat 
it so lightly. How, we might ask, does he propose to 
discover the truth of the matter?
In the absence of an observational demonstration 
combined with theory, these cases are of no higher 
quality than the spontaneous cases: both depend on
eyewitness testimony, which is subject to the problems 
that I have discussed in the previous chapter. However, 
many of the witnesses have been trained scientists, and 
it has been implied that because such people are, so to 
speak, "skilled in the art of observation", their 
reports should carry especial weight. It is a form of 
ad hominem argument, which accords credit to the 
proponent, rather than, as is usually the case, 
reflecting adversely on the opponent. As Hyman notes 
(McConnell, 1981, pp.156-164), many distinguished 
scientists have given their personal testimony to the 
occurrence of paranormal phenomena, thinking perhaps to 
add scientific lustre to psychical research. But in the 
face of such mysterious events, the scientist is in no 
better case than the remainder of humanity - the 
language game of science does not yet stretch to 
accommodate such things. Indeed the scientist may 
labour under a disadvantage:
Any magician will tell you that scientists are the 
easiest persons in the world to fool. It is not hard 
to understand why. In their laboratories the 
equipment is just what it seems. There are no hidden 
mirrors .or secret compartments or concealed magnets, 
If an assistant puts chemical A in a beaker he 
doesn't (usually) surreptitiously switch it for 
chemical B. The thinking of a scientist is rational, 
based on a lifetime of experience with a rational 
world. But the methods of magic are irrational and 
totally outside a scientist's experience, (Gardner, 
1983, p.92)
It has to be said that most, if not all, of the 
phenomena that are typical of the observational cases 
can be produced by magicians. This does not imply of 
course that because the product is similar, the process 
by which it is brought about must be the same. There is 
an argument that has become, in recent years, 
associated with the name of Randi, and which psychical 
researchers (with a measure of justification) attack.
It runs something like this: "Geller can bend spoons,
and claims he does it by paranormal means. I, Randi, 
can also bend spoons, but by legerdemain. You, the 
observer, cannot tell the difference between our two 
performances. Therefore Geller uses legerdemain, while 
pretending to have paranormal powers, " As an 
application of the principle of economy, this argument 
is not without merit, but it cannot be regarded as 
conclusive. It is true that Randi (1980) believes that 
Geller, and many other psychics are fraudulent, but 
nowhere in his published writings does he put forward 
an unambiguous version of the argument that is 
sometimes foisted on him. In 1985, I discussed this 
very point with him at the London Conference of the 
Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of 
the Paranormal, and he repudiated absolutely any such 
view. Randi*s lesson is, I think, somewhat more subtle: 
Geller (to our astonishment) bends a spoon, and 
moreover claims to do it by using paranormal powers.
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Randi bends a spoon, and admits that he uses sleight of 
hand. And we cannot tell the difference ... Now if 
Randi can fool us, should we not re-assess Geller, 
since we only have his word for it that his spoon was 
bent paranormally? The charge against; Geller is a 
serious one, since if he is using legerdemain, then he 
is doubly dishonest - first in claiming that he does 
not employ conjuring tricks, and secondly in explicitly 
stating that he uses paranormal powers. Randi (1983a) 
urges psychical researchers to take great care in 
evaluating psychics, and to enlist the help of expert 
magicians in the judgement of observational phenomena.
Although the question of fraud casts a long shadow over 
the claims that are made, the sceptic must eventually 
come to a consideration of the case of Daniel Home, 
since he is usually singled out as the one medium who 
was never detected in trickery. Beloff calls Home a 
"special case", and writes that "He, at any rate, was 
never discredited whatever his enemies may have said or 
thought about him and whatever reservations may have 
been voiced by later critics" (Wolman, 1977, p.7). The 
claim that Home was never exposed originated with Myers 
(see Podmore, 1902/1963, p.230), and was given currency 
by Podmore, who, though he had doubts, asserted that 
" Almost every professional medium has been detected in 
producing results by trickery. . . . But Home . . . forms 
an apparent exception. I am not aware that clear proof 
of imposture was ever brought forward against him"
(1897, p. 111).
After this great gap in time, a proper evaluation of 
Home's powers is not possible. From an historical point 
of view, the witnesses are all long dead, and from a
scientific point of view, the phenomena as described 
fail to connect with any current theory, and are thus 
not susceptible to a satisfying explanation (though a 
future breakthrough in theory could lead to a 
revaluation of Home's feats). However, because of 
Home's importance in the history of psychical research, 
I shall offer some notes of a sceptical nature.
Was Home genuine - the one good deed in the naughty 
world of the spiritualists? I cannot, believe that he 
was. In the first place, is not Home's eminence in the 
field suspicious in itself? Let us examine, say, one 
thousand mediums; nine hundred and ninety nine are 
demonstrably fraudulent or subsequently confess to 
having used trickery. One alone remains - is he 
therefore genuine? We should beware of judging him as 
an isolated success: he should be seen in the context
of the others who were found wanting.
Secondly, most of Home's repertoire consisted of 
effects that could be duplicated by magicians (and 
actually were, by Addison - see Wyndham, 1937, p.281). 
Podmore (1897, p.110) notes three phenomena - 
levitation, elongation of his body, and the handling of 
hot substances - which "must apparently be excepted 
from this generalisation". I shall discuss Home's 
alleged levitations shortly, but Podmore is wrong in 
saying that bodily elongation and handling hot coals 
cannot be performed by magicians. Both are-part of -the 
stock-in-trade of a number of them (see Christopher, 
1971, pp.183-184, and Rawciiffe, 1952/1959, pp.291- 
296) .
Further, some of Home's phenomena sound suspiciously 
easy to fake. To take just one example, his celebrated 
ability to play an accordion - held one-handed in a
wire cage - is a feat that would be easier to achieve 
by trickery than, say, playing a trombone under similar 
conditions (but isn’t there, in any case, something 
depressingly ludicrous in the idea of revelations from 
the spirit world being transmitted through the agency 
of something so vulgar as a concertina?) Whether Home 
used trickery or not, he had a thorough knowledge of 
the conjuring techniques used by fraudulent mediums, 
and actually wrote a book on the subject.
Although the SPR has very strict standards regarding 
"mediums" who have been detected in deceit, a number of 
psychical researchers have an oddly lax attitude 
towards them. The argument that they have often urged 
takes the following form: "Mme X performed
satisfactorily on such and such occasions, and no 
trickery could be detected. On the day in question, 
however, owing to . . . exhaustion . . . the presence of 
sceptics ... or whatever, her powers were at a low ebb, 
and so as not to disappoint her sitters, she resorted 
to the use of conjuring methods to produce the expected 
phenomena" . This argument depends on two tacit 
assumptions: first that paranormal phenomena are
dependent on some peculiar individual ability, and 
secondly, that there are no invariable laws governing 
the manifestation of such phenomena. Just as it might 
be said that laws of nature are subject to temporary 
suspension, allowing the paranormal events to take 
place, so any "paranormal laws" that we might care to 
postulate are likewise subject to occasional 
extinction, thus allowing the laws of nature to re­
assert their powers.
Proponents of this argument (for example, Inglis, 1977) 
produce it with such facility that it seems no longer 
to occur to them just how improbable a piece of
reasoning it is. Most .of us have really very little 
idea how conjuring tricks work - magicians would long 
since have gone out of business if we did. But the 
argument invites us to believe that several unusual 
individuals not only possess manifest "psychic 
abilities" but have also undertaken (for what reason is 
never made clear) a course in conjuring techniques, 
requiring many months of concentrated practice to 
acquire a moderate facility. I confess to finding this 
conjunction of alleged paranormal powers with magical 
ability very suspicious indeed, not least in Home's own 
case. (
Thirdly, the claim that Home was never publicly 
exposed, while strictly true, tells less than the whole 
story. It has been said that Olcott found him out in 
"acts of deception" (Wyndham, 1937, p.279), and 
certainly something unpleasant happened during his 
sojourn in France in 1857, when he was the guest of 
Napoleon III and Eugenie. It has been surmised that he 
was found out and sent packing. Dr Barthez, the 
Emperor's physician, wrote in a letter dated 25th 
September 1857 that "The Empress can only plead that 
the Home of today is no longer the Home of yesterday.; 
that he has lost his power; and that he is attempting 
to replace it by recourse to trickery". Eugenie had 
assumed that Home was honest, since no one "would have 
the impudence to deceive the Emperor and herself in 
such a fashion for twelve months on end" (for a fuller 
account of this episode, see Wyndham, 1937, pp.82-85).
If Home had actually been found out, then there were 
very good reasons for keeping the unsavoury facts 
concealed: it would not do for the Emperor to appear as 
the gull of an adventurer.
Here, I think, we come to the nub of the Home question: 
he exhibited his talents under the patronage of rich, 
distinguished, and powerful people. Royalty was not 
averse to entertaining him. It has been said that he 
never accepted payment for his seances; true, perhaps, 
but he was not above receiving lavish hospitality and 
extravagant gifts from some of the leading houses of 
Europe. Attendance at his seances was by invitation 
only, but from time to time, token sceptics might be 
included. While their opinions might be not be in 
doubt, their freedom to investigate certainly was: 
someone invited by the Tsar of all the Russias to 
witness the miracles of his honoured guest would, I 
suspect, feel decidedly inhibited in voicing disbelief 
and backing it with proof. Home was performing for the 
benefit of the converted, the credulous, and the 
conventional. It is important to remember that, however 
enthusiastic Home's supporters were, his public 
reception was often less than cordial, and several 
writers in the contemporary press accorded him 
unpleasant notices. The reported phenomena were not 
regarded as knock-down proofs by these people. If Home 
were genuine, why did he not take up their challenges?
Fourthly, the records of Home's feats often suffer from 
the problems of overdescription and underdescription 
that I have discussed in the previous chapter. His most 
celebrated phenomenon, the levitation of his body, is a 
case in point. There are several accounts of this, but 
when different versions of the same event are compared, 
they present such inconsistencies that ultimately, they 
fail to carry conviction (Hall, 1965), One is left with 
the unpalatable conclusion that, had Home indeed 
succeeded in his remarkable feat, his observers were 
not competent to describe it accurately. It is often 
claimed that all Home's phenomena were produced in
lighted rooms. However, Beloff says that although "Home 
normally operated in good illumination, that is, with 
ample candlelight or gaslight", the celebrated 
levitations always took place in conditions of "low 
illumination" (Wolman, 1977, pp.8,9). In fact, the 
illumination was so low as to be non-existent. Take
this account, which I have conflated from those of
different witnesses to one of the levitations: before
the blinds had been drawn, it was so dark that "we
could see, but barely distinguish, our hands upon the 
table" ... the blinds being drawn, "The room was thrown 
into deeper darkness than before"; ... Mr Bell "saw 
Home's figure pass from one side of the window to the 
other" (quoted by Wyndham, 1937, pp.101-102). In the 
circumstances, I find Mr Bell's feat every bit as 
remarkable as Home's.
Although the observational cases are sometimes said to 
offer the best, most direct opportunity for convincing 
even the hardened sceptic, they cannot be said to have 
succeeded. Fraud and self-deception contaminate them to 
such a degree that controversy must continue to 
surround them. Certainly, they are no basis for a 
scientific discipline.
CHAPTER TEN
HUME ON MIRACLES
Hume's essay on miracles holds a place of particular 
importance in the consideration of spontaneous and 
observational cases, and it has also been suggested 
that its arguments can be deployed against the 
experimental cases, although this has been resisted by 
some .psychical researchers. Having, in the two previous 
chapters, considered some of the problems concerning 
the evaluation and acceptance of spontaneous and 
observational cases, I shall take Hume's discussion of 
miracles as a pivot between them and the experimental 
cases. After outlining the main points of Hume's 
argument, and noting its relevance to psychical 
research, I shall discuss the related matter of what 
Hume's response would have been had he himself 
witnessed a miracle - a matter he does not take up in 
the essay on miracles. The succeeding chapter will 
examine some recent attempts to rework Hume's 
arguments.
Hume begins the main part of his discussion by stating 
that stronger evidence is to be preferred to weaker, 
and that the "evidence for the truth of our senses" is 
stronger than the testimony of others (1975, p.109). 
Wisdom counsels that we proportion our belief to the 
evidence. That evidence we must weigh in the light of 
past experience. Testimony, he continues, is something 
that we depend upon, but individual instances can, in 
the light of our experience, be accepted or rejected.
We may accept it because we know that memory is
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"tenacious", and because people incline towards telling 
the truth. We are more cautious if there is contrary 
testimony, and the quality of the witnesses must also 
weigh with us in making our judgement.
There are, however, reports of some events that are so 
extraordinary that they lie quite outside the normal 
run of our experience. This, Hume says, gives us 
"another degree of assurance against the fact which 
[the witnesses] endeavour to ' establish" .-(p. 113) For an 
event to count as a miracle, there must be a violation 
in the laws of nature (which have become established 
through "firm and unalterable experience" (p.114)). 
Miracles do not happen "in the common course of 
nature". Uniform experience, which establishes what is 
to count as a law of nature, counts against our
acceptance of miracles, but. it also helps us, on the
basis of polar opposites, to define what a miracle is. 
The term "miracle" only functions against a background 
of uniform experience.
Hume now takes the important step of positing an agency 
whereby miracles come about: "A miracle may be
accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature" 
by a particular volition of the Diety, or by the 
interposition of some invisible agent" (p. 115), Could
any testimony ever be sufficient to establish a
miracle? If a person were to testify to having 
witnessed a miracle, Hume would ask himself "whether it 
be more probable that this person should either deceive 
or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates 
should really have happened". "No testimony is 
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony 
is of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more 
miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to 
establish" .
Hume is not prepared to allow that his condition has 
been met, and he offers four reasons for this:
(1) the testimony, in terms of the sheer number of 
genuinely credible witnesses, is of too low a standard;
(2) credulity and "greediness" for miracles are not 
uncommon phenomena - people can be extremely 
suggestible, and sometimes downright gullible;
(3) Miracles "are observed chiefly to abound among 
ignorant and barbarous nations". When we examine the 
histories of such communities, and contemplate their 
beliefs, "we are apt to imagine ourselves transported 
into some new world, where the whole frame of nature is 
disjointed, and every element performs its operations 
in a different manner from what it does at present"
(p. 119)'. This arises from the underdescription often to 
be found in such narratives. As Smithurst has observed: 
"Some of what is said [concerning Greek myths] one is 
at a loss to know how to take literally, as Bullfinch, 
’Chiron was the wisest and justest of all the centaurs 
and at his death Jupiter placed him among the stars as 
the constellation Sagittarius.' Can this be a faithful 
rendering of what they believed? and if so, what on 
earth was it they believed?" (1981, p.28).
(4) Religions depend upon the acceptance of miracles, 
and the different religious traditions (and their 
associated miracles) are usually mutually exclusive.
The miracles reported in the Christian faith would 
normally be denied by, say, the Buddhists, and vice 
versa.- As a consequence of this, no single miracle 
could secure universal support.
We should note that Hume defines a miracle as depending 
upon the interposition of an agent. The agent is taken 
to be God or some other spiritual entity. Hume is, 
then, positing an explanation for the events that are 
reported. For many (Hume included) the explanation must
be regarded as unsatisfactory, but it is an explanation 
nonetheless. It is couched in theological terms, and it 
runs more or less as follows:
There is a God, who has created the Universe, and 
ordered the natural course of events and processes that 
take place within it. These occurrences run 
automatically, without further divine intervention. God 
is, however, omnipotent and reserves for Himself the 
power to intervene in the processes of His creation and 
turn aside the natural order of events. When such an 
intervention occurs, it is termed a miracle.
On this account, miracles are assumed to be more than 
merely unusual, and when they are claimed to occur, 
cause for comment: "Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if
it ever happens in the common course of nature"
(p.115). But however satisfactory this account might 
seem in theological terms, it is clearly inadequate for 
scientific purposes, since it offers us no opportunity 
for making predictions. If God can intervene when, 
where, and in whatever way He wishes (on a divine 
whim), then there can be no regularities from which 
scientific methods could derive explanatory formulas: 
science would be incapable of arriving at any well- 
grounded conclusions concerning the operation of either 
the miraculous or the mundane. In psychical research, 
we find a very similar situation. There, the phenomena 
that are reported are supposed to be the product of the 
shadowy half of the dualist partnership. The mind, it 
is suggested, is usually only capable of acting on the 
physical world through the agency of the body. However, 
it can sporadically break out of its carnal confines, 
to bring about a paranormal phenomenon. If, therefore, 
we choose to suggest that the subject matter of 
psychical research is of the same kind as Hume’s 
miracles, it will be apparent that any- attempt to set
on foot a serious scientific investigation will be 
doomed.
Hume, in framing his definition, posits an actual 
mechanism for the bringing about of miracles. The 
paychical researchers, beyond vague and often 
misleading talk of "the mind" and "its powers" do not 
allow themselves to become so specific when discussing 
psi. How, we want to ask, does the "mind" actually do 
it? J.B. Rhine writes of the "lack of a conscious clue 
to its operation" (Hook, 1960, p.72), and Roll notes 
that "intelligible explanations of psi phenomena are 
conspicuously lacking" (White, 1976, p.3). Any agency 
seems to be absent.
It is of course possible to continue working in the 
hope that an agency or a mechanism could be uncovered, 
just as it is possible to imagine that all psi 
occurrences are brought about by the interposition of 
the Deity, We might even propose that psi occurs 
without any mechanism or intervention at all - as a 
purely anomalous event. Until psychical research is in 
a position to argue for one of these options over the 
others, it is in no position to claim any sort of 
scientific status.
Hume's arguments have not gone uncriticized. Inglis, 
who calls the essay on miracles "scepticism's first 
manifesto" (1977, p.138), claims that recurrent 
spontaneous cases - such as poltergeists - demonstrate 
that the principle of the uniformity of nature, which 
Hume relies on, does not hold: nature is subject to 
occasional breaks in continuity. But all such cases 
rest on testimony, and testimony is not something apart 
from the natural order, it is itself a natural 
phenomenon. The human beings giving their testimony are
part of the pattern, and their reliability must be 
judged in the same way that we judge their statements. 
Just because someone says that they saw something does 
not, of itself, make it true that they did, and 
sensible people do not believe everything they are 
told.
Hume has been accused of being prepared to accept only 
that testimony which would suit his world view: a form
of question begging. However, the alternative stance is 
not without its difficulties. If the presumption of a 
natural order (a presumption that pervasively informs 
our thinking) can be said to amount to question 
begging, then what alternative could the psychical 
researchers themselves propose that does not also beg 
the question? Testimony can only be judged in the 
context of a natural order, and the presumption of such 
an order, far from begging the question, is a 
prerequisite for the making of such judgements.
•*•***
There is a special way of establishing that a miracle 
has taken place, of course, and that is to be an 
eyewitness oneself: to anyone in this position, the
testimony of others is an irrelevance, and Hume, as I 
have said, does not deal with such cases in the essay 
on miracles. One could say that his intention in that 
work was not to dispose of miracles altogether,- but to 
offer a check to them, a defensive rather than 
offensive move (Flew, 1961, p.174), which will put an 
end to at least some of the impertinent solicitations. 
However, it is possible to frame an answer to the 
question "what might Hume have said if he had been a 
witness?" In his Dialogues concerning natural religion 
(1976, p.173) he has Cleanthes ask the company what
they might think if "an articulate Voice were heard in 
the Clauds, much louder and more melodious than any 
which human Art cou'd ever reach: Suppose, that this
Voice were extended in the same Instant over all 
Nations, and spoke to each Nation in its own Language 
and Dialect"; would this not, he asks, be firm proof of 
"a benevolent Being, superior to Mankind"? I think 
Cleanthes was wrong in making this assumption, as was 
Hanson (1971, pp.313-314) , in setting out a remarkably 
similar thought experiment:
Suppose .. . that on next Tuesday morning, just 
after our breakfast, all of us in this one world 
are knocked to our knees by a percussive and ear—  
shattering thunderclap. Snow swirls; leaves drop 
from trees; the earth heaves and buckles; buildings 
topple and towers tumble; the sky is ablaze with an 
eerie, silvery light. Just then, as all the people 
of this world look up, the heavens open - the 
clouds pull apart - revealing an unbelievably 
immense and radiant Zeus-like figure, towering up 
above us like a hundred Everests. He frowns darkly 
as lightning plays across the features of his 
Michaelangeloid face. He then points down - at me!
- and exclaims for every man, woman and child to 
hear: "I have had quite enough of your too-clever
logic chopping and word-watching in matters of 
theology. Be assured, N.R. Hanson, that I do most 
certainly exist."
Nor is this to be conceived of as a private 
transaction between the ultimate Divinity and 
myself - for everyone in the world witnessed, "knew 
by acquaintance", what had transpired between the 
heavens and myself and all men heard what was 
entoned to me from on high. TV cameras and audio­
tapes also recorded this event for all posterity.
Please do not dismiss this example as a playful, 
irreverent Disney-oid contrivance. The conceptual 
point here is that if such a remarkable event were 
to transpire, I for one should certainly be 
convinced that God does exist. That matter of fact 
would have been settled once and for all time.
Both Cleanthes and Hanson assume that such visions 
would actually settle the matter. In both cases, the
apparition gives us reason to think that His nature is 
divine, but there are a number of questions to be 
answered before we are obliged to accept such claims at 
their face value. Certainly, the eyewitnesses report 
something very strange happening, but can they be sure 
that the vision was of God? Could it perhaps have been 
a mischievous Cartesian demon? Even if it were God, to 
what extent would that prove all the things that some 
people say about Him - that He created the Universe, 
and all that therein is, that He is omniscient, and 
will preside over the end of the world, sitting in 
judgement on all men, and so on and so forth?
Even if we set such considerations aside, the cases are 
still by no means straightforward: how, for example, is 
the voice of Cleanthes' God actually produced? What 
kind of vocal chords would be necessary to generate the 
volume required? How does the voice succeed in speaking 
in every different human language simultaneously? This 
is not a closely worked out thought experiment, it is 
little more than a crudely magnified picture of a large 
man with a loud voice, and really much the same could 
be said of Hanson's version. The moment we attempt to 
fill in the details of such a picture, we are left with 
nothing but unanswered questions: what sort of bone 
structure does this figure have? How does its brain 
control the movements of its limbs? (See Smithurst,
1981 for many other similar questions), Faced with 
these "miracles", we have no means of knowing how to 
evaluate them: as Austin says (1962, p.24), "it is not
generally known, or agreed what seeing ghosts is", and 
there is, by the same token, no generally agreed idea 
of what "seeing God is" either. The pictures that we 
are offered need to be more closely worked out before 
we can even begin to pronounce on them.
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It is not without interest to note that Francis 
Hitching, in a paper read in the late 1970s to the SPR, 
remarked that hostile sceptics might come to accept 
paranormal phenomena if they themselves underwent a 
personal confrontation with some experience that they 
could not explain. As Hitching says: "probably the most 
convincing event for the sceptic is his/her own 
naturally occurring psi experience. Time and again, lay 
and scientific sceptics have shifted their beliefs 
after a dramatic, but by no means convincing, psi 
experience" .
Presumably what Hitching has in mind is an overwhelming 
"road to Damascus" experience that would bring about a 
permanent change in the outlook of the hostile critic. 
But how many such changes occur and are actually 
documented? If this has happened "time and again", it 
is odd that it is so little referred to. It is also odd 
that, earlier in his lecture, Hitching complains that 
some sceptics are "religious" in their doubting: they
demonstrate, he feels, a fanatic disregard for the 
truly scientific principles of psychical research. But 
for him then to demand a "religious" conversion to 
"scientific" principles seems absurd. Personal 
experiences which involve anomalies are notoriously 
hard to describe and to evaluate (see, for example, 
Blackmore on the OBE in Shapin, 1983, pp.97-98), and no 
matter how important a person finds her own experience, 
that is not to say that her interpretation of it or her 
estimate of its significance is to be accepted as 
conclusive. In any case, it has been claimed that 
sceptics tend to have lower scores in ESP experiments 
than do believers (the so-called sheep-goat effect); 
asking the sceptic to oblige by having a psi experience 
may well meet with failure.
It is sometimes difficult to be sympathetic to the 
often bizarre suggestions that are put forward by many 
of the psychical researchers. Some people are able to 
perceive miracles, numinosity, and Divine intervention 
wherever they go. Most of us do not, indeed cannot. The 
events that we see are, in essentials, the same. Our 
interpretations of them are what sets them apart. 
Someone tells me that a vase hovered in mid-air, then 
hurtled across the room, smashing to pieces against the 
wall. I was not present, but saw the secretly-taken 
video recording of the same event, and know that the 
vase obeyed the laws of physics when it was 
surreptitiously thrown by a young girl.
It is easy to make reference to a mental picture that 
one has and to claim that it "makes sense" (and 
therefore, we shall be told, makes "logical sense"), In 
such a way, an incompletely worked-out picture can be 
put forward as being viable. But suppose that physics 
were to be adjusted to allow for the occasional 
hovering vase. Would physics (or, indeed, the rest of 
science) be the richer for it? On the contrary; the 
structure of science is cantilevered together. Remove a 
single beam, and you risk the collapse of the whole 
structure. Miracles are underdescribed, and 
indeterminate on many important points. Hanson's vision 
does not-settle the matter conclusively: it is merely
an incompletely worked-out picture, and would require 
supplementation on many particulars before we could 
even begin a serious assessment.
Most of the events that are touted as miracles are, 
however, far less spectacular than Hanson's apparition. 
The miracle might be observed by a believer and a
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sceptic, and one would cry it up as a significant proof 
that the Universe was imbued with hidden meaning, and 
the other would not even notice it: the miracle would 
pass him by. As John Wisdom has said (1953, p.153) "It 
is possible to have before one's eyes all the items of 
a pattern and still to miss the pattern"; it is also 
possible for someone to find a pattern where it is not 
immediately apparent that one exists. Let me illustrate 
this by reference to an incident that happened to my 
mother and her cousin (this is not, then, just another 
case I have read about - I have discussed it with my 
. mother, and have the best of reasons for thinking her 
account to be accurate in all significant particulars). 
They were visiting Liverpool on a shopping trip, and
they knew that an old house which had been owned by
some members of our family for many years was being 
demolished. When they had finished their visits to the 
shops, they drove out to the suburb in order to catch 
one last glimpse of the house before it was razed. They 
arrived at the critical moment, for the demolition 
workers, having stripped what was salvable, were firing 
the house. As their car drew up, flames burst from the 
windows of the shell. To them, it was as shattering as
the burning of Valhalla, This was no "mere
coincidence". I regret to say that my own mundane 
reaction was: "how fortunate you were to arrive in 
time", What my mother still regards as an astonishing 
and numinous event, I consider to be a lucky, but not 
entirely fortuitous, coincidence. Her miracle (if one 
chooses to call it such), has passed me by. The factual 
description in both our cases is the same, but our two 
interpretations of these facts are irreconcilable. Of 
course, she was there and I was not, but even so, it is 
not that my response casts any doubt on her veracity; I 
simply see the event in a very different light from 
her.
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The conceptual baggage that each of us carries around 
and the presuppositions that we bring to bear in the 
interpretation of such cases are vitally important. 
Different people have what Hare has called different 
"bliks" (Flew, 1955), and facts are interpreted within 
the frameworks imposed by such bliks. It is not 
unreasonable to suppose, then, that had Hume seen an 
event which some might proclaim to be a miracle, he 
would refuse to acknowledge it as such — not because he 
doubted that it had happened (his attention having been 
distracted, for instance) - but because his 
interpretation of the facts was radically different.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
MODERN VERSIONS OF HUME'S ARGUMENT
The argument employed by Hume in his essay on miracles 
should strictly only be employed against spontaneous 
and observational cases of psi, where testimony is 
crucial. There is some justification, however, for 
stretching it to cover the experiments (in which the 
statistical scores rather than the testimonial records 
are the significant factor), Hume, in introducing his 
principle of the "laws of nature", is firmly basing his 
argument in an appeal to the uniformity of experience. 
Not only are paranormal phenomena outside our uniform 
everyday experience, they are themselves evanescant, 
and do not appear to obey any laws.
Flew argues (in his edition of the essay) that Hume's . 
thesis can be extended to meet the experimental cases 
because parapsychology has failed to supply a 
repeatable experiment: all we are offered is yet more 
testimony, dressed up in the language of a scientific 
paper. It is not unfair to say, as Spencer Brown (1957)
has done, that the results of an experiment that cannot
be repeated are themselves little better than an 
anecdote. The- long history of fraud in psychical
research, which amounts to an old-established
tradition, should also give us pause. These are good 
reasons for adapting Hume's position to the most recent 
work.
Two other sceptics have discussed the experimental 
results of parapsychology with a particular eye to the
arguments put forward by Hume: C. E.M. Hansel and G.R. 
Price. ■
In his two books (1966, 1980), Hansel takes up a stance
which rests only partly on Hume. He takes a number of 
key experiments from the literature of parapsychology 
which have been singled out by its proponents as being 
"conclusive", and considers in each case whether there 
was any possibility of fraud or error: "if ... it can
be reasonably ascertained that trickery or error have 
been eliminated through the employment of a completely 
watertight experimental procedure then the experiment 
can provide evidence to support the hypothesis of 
extrasensory perception" (1966, p.22). Hansel then 
argues that the major "conclusive" experiments were 
actually conducted under conditions much less tight 
than we had been led to suppose, and so cheating and 
misrecording were possible. Hansel is thus able to 
demonstrate (to his own satisfaction, not necessarily 
that of the psychical researchers) that the experiments 
were very far from being conclusive. Thus, for example, 
in the Pearce-Pratt series at Duke in 1933-34, where 
the two "participants" were supposed to be in separate 
buildings, 150 yards apart, no one checked to see if 
Pratt was actually closeted in the Library. Yet their 
physical separation was supposed to be, says Hansel, "a 
most important control feature of the experiment"
(1966, p.81) .
So far, Hansel, working from the standpoint of 
experimental psychology, takes an a posteriori line 
towards psi: "a vast amount of experimental work has
failed to give a satisfactory demonstration of its 
occurrence" (1959, p.177). He accepts that the 
experiments have produced results which call for an 
explanation, and supplies one in terms of inadequate
design and execution, which allow errors to creep in 
unnoticed, and trickery to be perpetrated undetected. 
However, he also hints at a deeper objection: "it is
not unreasonable to assume that telepathy cannot occur 
in view of the a priori arguments against it" (1959, 
p.177), and "it could, however, be argued that the 
probability that ESP exists is insignificantly small 
and the probability of fraud quite appreciable" (1966, 
pp.21-22). This position comes very close to Hume's, 
but Hansel is careful not to subscribe to it 
wholeheartedly. He does, though, accept Hume's 
principle of the uniformity of nature: "if Uri Geller,
for example, really could predict the fall of a die 
correctly eight times in eight attempts and if he could 
repeat this demonstration many times before independent 
critical experimenters, the assumption of impossiblity 
would eventually have to be rejected" (1980, p.301), 
and "if a process really does exist in nature, this 
fact will eventually silence all objections" (1966,
p.22).
Hansel is not, then, taking a strictly Humean line - he 
is not, despite Palmer's accusation (Krippner, 1978, 
p.64) one of those sceptics who "play the Hume game".
It is true that Hansel's views owe a good deal to Hume, 
but his importance as a sceptical critic lies in his a 
posteriori dissection of many experiments and his 
remorseless cataloguing of their shortcomings. For 
Hansel, it is sufficient to show that fraud could have 
occurred, not that it did, or how. In discussing the 
Soal-Goldney experiments, for example, he suggests a 
number of possible ways in which the results could have 
been produced by manipulation. As it turned out, the 
method used was different (Markwick, 1978), but 
Hansel’s importance lies in the fact that he asked the 
question and attempted to answer it. From such
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trenchant criticism, there might come better designed 
and controlled experiments, and this, presumably, 
should be welcomed by psychical researchers. Hansel has 
been labelled as an a priorist by, among others, Cyril 
Burt and by Targ and Puthoff (see Hansel, 1980, p.301), 
but this charge cannot be sustained. Another critic,
G. R. Price, is, however, most definite in his espousal 
of Hume's position. ;
Price's celebrated article originally appeared in 1955 
(it Was reprinted, with the replies it' stimulated, in 
Ludwig, 1978, and all subsequent references are to this 
collection). Price, unlike Hansel, takes a firm a 7 
priori stance against paranormal phenomena:■"My opinion 
concerning the findings of the parapsychologists is 
that many of them are dependent on clerical and 
statistical errors and unintentional use of sensory 
clues, and that all extrachance results are dependent 
on deliberate fraud or mildly abnormal mental 
conditions" (p.49). This position is firmly in 
agreement with Hume's, which Price acknowledges as his 
starting point. He then goes on to say that "ESP is 
incompatible with current scientific theory". However, 
Price then changes tack, and proposes that ESP 
conflicts with Broad's basic limiting principles, which 
lie, he feels at a more fundamental level than 
scientific theories. Price is prepared, for the sake of 
argument, to take Rhine and Soal at their own 
evaluation, as having demonstrated something "truly 
revolutionary" and "radically contradictory to 
contemporary thought". "The parapsychologists are 
themselves agreed almost unanimously that psi phenomena 
are completely incompatible with modern physics"
(p.150).
There is a tension in Price's account: on the one hand,
he claims that psi conflicts with "current scientific 
theory" and "modern physics", and on the other, that it 
runs counter to "basic principles"; "I accept Broad's 
analysis", he says, "and incorporate it as part of the 
present argument" (p.150). But Broad introduces the' 
principles as a means of defining psi; Price seems to 
want to use them as an a priori argument against the 
existence of psi. But in the remaining twenty one pages 
of his paper, Price confines his attention to certain 
incompatibilities at a "less fundamental level", and 
makes no further reference to Broad's principles 
(beyond saying that we make "certain generalisations 
concerning observable phenomena" , some of which are 
laws of science, others, "so fundamental that we rarely 
name them") .
For Price, reports of paranormal phenomena are to be 
explained in terms of fraud. The crucial passage is as 
follows: "When we consider the possibility of fraud,
almost invariably we think of particular individuals 
and ask ourselves whether it is possible that this 
particular man, this Professor X, could be dishonest. 
The probability seems small. But the procedure is 
incorrect. The correct procedure is to consider that we 
very likely would not have heard of Professor X at all 
except for his psychic findings" (p.157). Price then 
discusses Soal's work, in the course of which, he 
proposes a number of methods whereby the results could 
have been produced by fraudulent means. He concludes by 
presenting a number of designs that "appear to be 
reasonably fraudproof"; however, this vitiates his 
sceptical approach, since if paranormal phenomena are 
impossible on a priori grounds, there is small point in 
carrying out further empirical research.
Price's paper drew a number of responses, including one 
from Soal, commenting in "some amazement" on this 
"diatribe of unsupported conjecture", but failing to 
confront the major issue - Price was actually trying to 
make sense of Soal’s results, to place them in an 
explanatory framework, whereas Soal, by using the 
standard vocabulary of "telepathy" and so on, does not 
offer any serious explanation at all, he simply alleges 
that something odd must be going on somewhere.
Rhine felt that the criticism was "on the whole, a good 
event for parapsychology" because it revealed that the 
results posed a serious threat to mechanistic science. 
But the most substantial reply to Price came from Meehl 
and Scriven. They argue that Price's attack can only 
succeed if ESP is incompatible with modern science and 
if modern science is complete and correct. They point 
out, quite correctly, that Price attempts to 
demonstrate the incompatibility of ESP with physics, 
"rather than relying on Broad's philosophical analysis" 
(p.188), and moreover that it would be rash to claim 
that revolutionary discoveries in science could never 
occur. Scriven has expanded on these criticisms 
(Thakur, 1976, pp. 191-193) by saying that the positions 
of Hume and Price are "far too strong", in that they 
assume that "no revolutionary theory in science could 
ever be accepted, since it involves overthrowing pre­
existing and very well-supported theories". But this 
argument, while it can be deployed against Price, who 
invokes the principles of science in order to frame his 
attack, fails to touch Hume. Laws of nature are what 
Hume specifically appeals to, not laws of science. 
Hume's laws of nature are wider in their range than 
laws of science, and there is a distinction to be drawn 
between the kind of case that Hume puts forward (that a 
bar of lead cannot float unsupported in the air) and
specific laws of science or of physics. Scientific 
theories change, but there are certain facts - part of 
our common stock of unchanging everyday observations - 
that any theory must accommodate, however revolutionary 
it may appear to be.
Attempts by psychical researchers to challenge the 
validity of Hume's arguments and by sceptics to 
redeploy them in the context of experimental 
parapsychology have not always been successful. Hansel 
bases his criticisms largely on a posteriori grounds, 
and makes only passing reference to a priori 
objections. Price is confused over the different kinds 
of a priori objections that can be raised. However,
Flew's insistence on repeatability (as against 
anecdote) and his pointing up the prevalence of fraud 
in psychical research serve to remind us that Hume's 
arguments still have an important place in the debate 
concerning the scientific status of experimental 
parapsychology.
CHAPTER TWELVE
EXPERIMENTAL CASES:
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
I have argued that psychical research makes certain 
untenable philosophical assumptions that vitiate its 
research programme, and that its claim to scientific 
status cannot rest on spontaneous or evidential cases 
alone. But what of the evidence provided by the 
experimental work? Surely, here, it will be suggested, 
are findings that cannot be ignored. Certainly, it 
would be little more than pure prejudice to dismiss 
them out of hand: the experiments present, as I have 
said, the most serious case for the sceptic to answer. 
The results of these experiments are doubtless 
intriguing, but what foundations do they rest on, and 
what explanation can parapsychologists offer for their 
results?
Thouless (1972, p.19) has suggested that the 
experiments are of two kinds. One is designed to 
demonstrate the occurrence of psi, the other to reveal 
its modes of operation. This is, though, little more 
than ex post facto rationalization. The former kind 
simply records some statistical anomalies (the "psi 
hypothesis" is defined only in statistical terms) 
without providing any explanation for them, and the 
latter yields no hard information at all. This, I 
suggest, is because of the underlying assumptions that 
are made. I now want to examine those assumptions, and
consider some of the problems in explanation that are 
encountered.
I have, in Chapter Four, already argued that the 
experimental work falls within the behaviourist 
tradition of psychology. The form of experimentation 
that Barrett and his colleagues pioneered in the last 
century, and which J.B. Rhine consolidated in the 
period between the wars, has not materially altered. 
There is a randomizing device (such as a pack of Zener 
cards) which generates targets, one or more 
participants (or people who are, it is assumed, 
participating), a scoresheet, and a relatively simple 
statistical method for analysing the results. Over the 
years, the mechanics may have been changed 
(computerized random number generators, for example, 
rather than hand-shuffled cards), but these are merely 
changes in technique - the essentials remain the same.
One result of this behaviouristic form of experiment is 
that while input and output are recorded (targets and 
guesses are both listed) no effort is made to look into 
the processes that are going on inside the experimental 
subject, who is treated as a black box. The problem of 
finding out what is supposed to be happening is 
compounded by what I have termed the unconsciousness 
principle. There seems to be no such thing as a "psi 
experience" - no one reports any particular imagery or 
sensation which can be linked to a better than average 
performance in a card-guessing experiment. All that the 
subjects seem to do is guess cards, and there is 
nothing to suggest that there is any experienced 
difference between thinking of a card and getting it 
right, and thinking of another and getting it wrong.
The nearest thing that we seem to have to a conscious 
experience is to be found in those cases where the 
subject indicates that he has a feeling of confidence 
about particular guesses. The experimental literature 
on this question has been reviewed by Carpenter 
(Volman, 1977, pp.219-222), who suggests - with proper 
caution - that certain techniques "seem to hold out 
some promise for success in aiding self-reflectivity". 
But all the cases he cites involve little more than 
hunches: we have no mention of "awareness" or
"conscious experience". These experiments fail to take 
us beyond the idea of guessing, which I have already 
discussed. All that is added is a gloss: guessing can 
sometimes become "confident guessing", but any amount 
of confidence will not enable us to describe what 
actually happens in the course of the experiment.
It is not only the experimental cases that are subject 
to this difficulty. In some spontaneous cases of psi 
gamma which were recorded by L.E. Rhine (1971, pp.45- 
46), there was a measure of conviction on the part of 
the people making the reports. These "conviction cases" 
seem to be "instances in which the ESP message had 
somehow been made conscious. Consequently they were 
examined to see if the persons betrayed any method by 
which the transfer into consciousness had been 
accomplished. However, no such indication could be 
found. The persons simply believed without any reason."
The failure to find any psychological experience would 
not be fatal, however, if some physiological factor 
could be uncovered. The discovery of, say, some 
neurophysiological event or process which occurs during 
a parapsychological experiment, and which is positively 
correlated with the hits scared would certainly count 
as a major breakthrough. Neppe's work (as an example,
see his 1983 paper) is an interesting pointer in this 
direction, but further and better results must be 
obtained before serious predictions can be made.
The work of the pseudonymous Lloyd (1973) should also 
be considered in this context. His experiment, which 
has been favourably mentioned by Owen and Sparrow 
(1976, p.5), could have been one of the most important 
pieces of work ever carried out in parapsychology, if 
only "Lloyd" had taken the trouble to design it 
adequately. The subjects were asked to create "a mental 
image" of a cup of coffee, and to attempt "to 
psychically communicate this image to the receiver". 
"This technique", he says, "requires considerable 
practice". While this was going on, "Lloyd" monitored 
various neural events in his subjects. He discovered 
that there was a significant positive correlation 
between the occurrence of psi and events in the brain. 
It should be said that this impressive result is less 
exciting than it sounds, for the scores were not taken 
singly but were averaged over the whole series; 
subsequent attempts to replicate have been 
unsuccessful, and "Lloyd's" work is treated with 
caution by parapsychologists (Wolman, 1977, pp.708,
719). In any case, the experiment is tendentious to a 
fault: "Lloyd" speaks of "what is believed to be a 
transmitted thought" (p.74) without any adequate 
characterization of what a "transmitted thought" might 
be like, or how we might "practise" transmitting them, 
still less how we might "believe in one" when we saw 
one, or indeed recognize one as such when it was 
transmitted to us.
Because we never see the ESP or PK in action} the 
parapsychologists have been forced to rely on 
statistical techniques to detect their occurrence. The
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cards are turned, the dice are rolled, and the scores 
recorded. Only after the event, and after a lengthy 
session of checking and calculation, can we propose 
that a paranormal event has taken place. This situation 
is particularly striking in the PK cases: here, the
assumed effect is very different from what we might 
expect to see. Statistical results are far less 
compelling than actually being able to see the dice 
moving about without being touched or interfered with 
in any way.
The use of statistics in science is an accepted 
standard technique, but there are signs that for 
parapsychology, it has become an end in itself. Drury, 
in discussing some problems involved in medical 
diagnosis (1973, p.9), quotes at length from the 
nineteenth century French physician, Bernard. The 
points made are so apposite that I reproduce it in 
full:
In every science we must recognise two classes of 
phenomena, those whose cause is already defined; 
next those whose cause is still undefined. With 
phenomena whose cause is defined statistics have 
nothing to do; they would even be absurd.As soon as 
the circumstances of an experiment are well-known we 
stop gathering statistics. ... Only when a 
phenomenon includes conditions as yet undefined, can 
[should?] we compile statistics; we must learn 
therefore that we compile statistics only when we 
cannot possibly help it; for in my opinion 
statistics can never yield scientific truth, and 
therefore cannot establish any final scientific 
method.
Statistics can bring to birth only conjectural 
sciences; they can never produce active experimental 
sciences, i.e. sciences which regulate phenomena 
according to definite laws. By statistics we get a 
conjecture of greater or less probability about a 
given case, but never any certainty, never any 
absolute determinism. Of course statistics may guide 
a physician's prognosis; to that extent they may be 
useful. I do not therefore reject the use of
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statistics in medicine, but I condemn not trying to 
get beyond them and believing in statistics as the 
foundation of medical science.
Parapsychologists overvalue their results in just the 
way that Bernard warns against: the statistics
certainly do look curious, and suggest that something 
odd is going on that should not be going on. But 
something more is required: the statistics must not
only look curious, they must be significant. The actual 
level of significance is arbitrarily defined, and 
Canter (1985, p.2) condemns it as "unscientific 
posturing" to place much faith in it: "the curiousness
of this reliance on arbitrary statistical levels to 
provide an indication of significance is further 
highlighted when it is appreciated that none of the 
great theoretical contributors to psychology have ever 
relied on statistical significance as the main defence 
of their case". Rhine, however, is much more sanguine: 
statistical significance means "simply that by general 
agreement among scientists, it would be justifiable to 
consider that the results require some other 
explanation than chance; in a word, they are lawful or 
reliable" (1948, p.34). The use of the word "lawful" in 
this context is strange, since the point of collecting 
the statistics in the first place was to try to 
establish laws, so that further figure-gathering would 
be unnecessary. Rhine seems not to want to get beyond 
his statistics, and at the same time to make a specious 
claim to scientific credibility.
Tyrrell <1947, pp.103-104) holds that it is proper for 
each person to fix their own point of significance, 
adding that because the experiments of Rhine and Soal 
"have yielded results so enormously far above chance 
...the point of significance is unimportant". So much 
doubt has been cast on these experiments in recent
years that Tyrrell's quixotic proposal would now find 
few supporters.
Statistically significant deviation from the mean 
chance expectation is taken as the criterion for saying 
that a paranormal occurrence has taken place. Although 
Rhine talks of "some other explanation than chance" it 
is never seriously in doubt that the only other one 
that he is prepared to countenance is the hypothesis of 
paranormality. The statistics do not function as 
evidence for this hypothesis, they are used to define 
it. So whenever a score deviates from the mean chance 
expectation, it is assumed that it must be brought 
about paranormally. But in spite of the cliche, figures 
do not speak for themselves - they have to be 
interpreted, and it is sound interpretation that is 
signally lacking; all we have are some rather odd 
statistics and a very tendentious interpretation. As 
Spencer Brown puts it: "Any attempt to randomize, of
which tables of random numbers and psychical research 
experiments are both typical examples, will lead all 
too frequently to the curious results which have been 
thought in the past by psychical researchers to be 
evidence of telepathy and whatnot" <1957, pp.116-117).
There are two other important features of the 
parapsychological experiments that we should note, and 
these concern the apparent efficacy of psi regardless 
of any limitations of space and time. The postulation 
of precognition and of other varieties of temporally 
displaced phenomena shows that parapsychology is 
clearly disposed to accept the possibility that time 
can be transcended, and can even flow backwards. In. 
just the same way, it seems that space is no barrier to 
psi; no matter what the distance, the strength of the 
"psi signal" is not significantly attenuated. The
inverse square law does not hold. Even over substantial 
distances, there is no detectable impairment. For 
Barrett (1912, pp.108-109), this was decisive proof of 
the non-physical nature of psi phenomena: they "do not
belong to the material plane, and therefore the laws of 
the physical universe are inapplicable to them".
A similar position was reached by Tyrrell, in his 
critique of the radiation theory of psi. If telepathy, 
he says, were to obey the inverse square law, then "a 
person who could transmit a telepathic message across 
the ocean would produce an enormously more powerful 
effect across a table" (1947, p.69). How this "more 
powerful effect" might manifest itself is not 
specified. Would the subjects find themselves wrenched 
from their seats by the force of the radiation, or 
would they simply score a few more correct guesses?
It might be suggested that the inverse square law does 
actually apply, as Meehl and Scriven propose (Ludwig, 
1978, p.188), but that the telepathic signal, though 
considerably attenuated, is still capable of 
functioning. Whether we accept the radiation theory or 
not (and there seems little to be said in its favour), 
there can be no doubt that, if the inverse square law 
does hold, there is no way of demonstrating it. Psi 
seems to be quite unlike any known form of 
electromagnetic radiation, penetrating Faraday cages 
and travelling over vast distances without any 
discernible lessening of its power.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
EXPERIMENTAL CASES:
II. SOME PROBLEMS
In the introduction to his edition of Hume's essay on 
miracles (1985), Flew notes three major problems that 
lie in the way of the acceptance of the claims made by 
parapsychology. These are the prevalence of fraud and 
self-deception, the lack of any repeatability of the 
phenomena on demand, especially in other laboratories, 
and the glaring absence of any remotely plausible 
theory to account for the results.
Flew's position is an interesting one, developing as it 
has over more than thirty years. In the early 1950s, he 
was seriously - but cautiously - interested, and 
expressed the hope that experiments would continue, so 
that some underlying principles might be discovered. On 
the question of untenable philosophical theories which 
so often form a part of psychical research, he has 
always been firmly critical. Now, his position has 
become much more sceptical: inadequate philosophical
models such as Platonic-Cartesian dualism have not been 
abandoned by- psychical researchers, and genuine 
understanding of the experimental results seems as 
elusive as ever, despite the accumulation of even more 
results over the intervening years. But Flew is no 
ordinary sceptic: he treats the results with care, 
rather than disdain, and is prepared to accept them as 
being statistical quirks or mere coincidences. He does 
not dismiss them out of hand, as many sceptics do, but
neither does he jump to all manner of conclusions about 
what is being proved. This position, known as Flewism, 
raises some interesting questions in the philosophy of 
parapsychology.
I have already discussed some aspects of fraud in 
relation to the spontaneous and the observational 
cases, There is too close a connexion between the 
phenomena of psychical research and conjuring tricks 
for anyone without an expert knowledge of magic to feel 
comfortable. It is not necessary, either, to assume, as 
Eysenck has done, that if trickery were to be employed, 
it would require a large scale conspiracy. An 
experimenter can, even when part of a research group, 
still single-handedly tamper with the results, as is 
shown in the well-known cases of Soal and Levy.
Flew*s second objection, that of the absence of 
repeatability of experiments, is probably the most 
common complaint to be advanced, certainly by the 
scientific community. The experiments have not, in 
general, shown themselves to be repeatable, regardless 
of whether the replications are carried out by 
different workers in different laboratories, or by the 
original workers themselves. Until a repeatable 
experiment is forthcoming, many scientists argue, 
parapsychology should be denied any scientific status. 
Such a demand can be misunderstood, for science in 
general does not depend on repeatability. There are 
certain disciplines, which, by their nature, cannot 
offer repeated instances of particular phenomena: 
geology and palaeontology are two obvious examples. And 
there are other sciences, such as astronomy and 
meteorology, where phenomena may recur, but only 
rarely, and certainly cannot be brought about on 
demand. The importance of repeatability is to be found
in the experiments1 sciences, where methods; can be used 
to isolate and measure the different variables that are 
involved in the production of the phenomena under 
investigation.
Scriven has suggested (Colodny, 1964, p.97) that this 
demand for repeatability may be too strong:
If I make the claim that a certain kind of drug will 
cure diabetes, administered in a specific way, then 
I expect when I administer it in this way to find 
this result. That is not the kind of claim that is 
being made here. The claim that is being made tin 
parapsychological cases] is that some people have a 
certain capacity. The appropriate comparison is with 
claims about individuals who are alleged to be 
calculating prodigies or eidetic imagers.
But there are two important differences here. The 
calculating prodigies can produce their feats on 
request. Although, as Scriven says, their powers may 
wane over the years, they can calculate on demand in 
all manner of circumstances. So far as the 
parapsychology experiments suggest, even the handful of 
"star subjects" that have been discovered are not 
capable of producing good results in all conditions, 
especially when sceptics are present. Moreover,
Scriven*s analogy is not a true one. The calculating 
prodigies all do something which you or I could do, 
given the aid of a calculator or paper and pencil. It 
is just that they do it in their heads, and at 
remarkable speed, ESP is not like that; I cannot buy a 
machine that will help me to guess which card you are 
now looking at. I know what it is to do mental 
arithmetic, but not to perceive extrasensorily, Having 
carried out a calculation in my head, I can write down 
the steps in the process on paper, and survey my 
working out of the problem. ESP, however, remains as 
mysterious in its operation as ever.
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For some psychical researchers, the absence of 
repeatability has been a cause for excitement rather 
than despair. Rhine certainly exhibits this tendency 
strongly, claiming that the very lack of regularity and 
consistency in his results is not only a challenge, but 
a vindication of his view that paranormal phenomena are 
non-mechanistic, and thus, he would argue, non­
material.
But even if repeatability could be achieved, it would 
only be the beginning: repeatability is needed not
simply to vindicate the phenomena but to set the new 
science of parapsychology on secure foundations. Once a 
repeatable phenomenon is found, systematic work could 
be carried out to isolate the significant factors that 
bring it about. We could not, however, assume that the 
present parapsychologists would be the most competent 
group of specialists to carry out this work (just as, 
for example, flying saucer enthusiasts might not be the 
best experts to investigate extra-terrestrial beings, 
were some to be discovered).
Flew's third objection is the absence of any serious 
theory to explain the results. There is no shortage of 
ideas in this area, but the essential feature has to be 
testability. As Walker has said, "There are at present 
a large number of 'theories', hypotheses, concerning 
the nature of psi. The number can grow essentially 
without limit,' and avail nothing. Theories have a value 
only to the extent that they provide a consistent 
understanding of experimental data. In this regard, 
most theories have explained almost none of the 
detailed data developed by parapsychologists" (1984, 
p. 326). McConnell agrees: "large-scale theorizing, not 
closely tied to the data, is not acceptable" (1982,
p.22).
There seems, among parapsychologists, to be a naive 
empiricist view of the workings of science. After an 
extensive period of data-gathering, the scientist is 
supposed to sit down and seek out underlying 
regularities, and then go back and check to see if they 
actually hold. This view is very clearly expressed by 
Carrington. The scientist, he says, "wishes neither to 
to prove nor to disprove anything. ... The facts are 
the most essential things of all. Theories can follow" 
(1932, pp.14, 16). Rhine was also content to leave
theory till later: it is "not assumed that ESP is
continuous and regular in its function. Any assumption 
whatsoever about it is to be avoided at this point" 
(1940, p.16). Parapsychology can lay claim, of course, 
to a vast body of what Carrington would call facts, 
that is, experimental results. But are these worth 
anything as they stand? One can imagine an enthusiastic 
amateur meteorologist carrying a thermometer around 
with him, and keeping a record of the atmospheric 
temperature every hour, regardless of where he happened 
to be. After many years of devoted collecting, he would 
have amassed an impressive array of such "facts", but 
to what purpose? Unless the observations can be shown 
to mesh in with other associated observations (of, say, 
atmospheric pressure), they remain a collection of 
unrelated numbers.
Theory is logically prior to experiment: we cannot
begin to design an experiment without having certain 
theoretically determined expectations. To state the 
matter crudely, unless we know what we are looking for, 
we shall be in no position to say whether or not we 
have found it. We do not fumble about, trying different 
things "to see what happens". But neither should we 
attempt to rewrite science on a major scale unless we
have some incontrovertible results to offer: mere 
speculation is not enough.
As an'example of the sometimes whimsical theorizing 
that can go on, consider this proposal made by Donald 
and Martin (Martin, 1983). Their "theory", which relies 
on the assumption of backwards causation, is called the 
"past directed negentropy theory". As Martin puts the 
matter, if psychic phenomena were real, "there would 
have to be a revaluation of several branches of 
physics". Mow that is, to say the least, a large claim. 
Unfortunately, what Martin then does is not to show 
that such phenomena are real - that, it seems, is to be 
taken for granted. He simply suggests that the laws of 
physics should be rewritten (discarding the second law 
of thermodynamics in the process) to accommodate the 
results.
The results themselves, though curious, are by no means 
so clear— cut as parapsychologists like to claim. Psi is 
simply another name for statistically significant 
deviations from the mean chance expectation. The so- 
called psi hypothesis has no explanatory value - it 
tells us nothing of how things work in the world. 
Although Rhine sometimes urges the rejection of 
mechanistic models (which he identifies as outmoded 
relics of the nineteenth century), his own hypothesis 
takes us well beyond the limits of what can be 
legitimately asserted.
The problem of constructing viable theories admits of 
no easy solution. Thouless has argued (1972, pp.2-3) 
that we can expect no guidance from common sense, and, 
given the inherently queer nature of the phenomena, one 
can feel a certain sympathy. But robust common sense 
might urge that the results are nothing more than fraud
and error. Thouless disagrees: he is looking for a 
"scientific" solution, and he relies on an analogy with 
two physical phenomena. The behaviour of subatomic 
particles and the transmission of light waves through a 
gravitional field both run counter to our common sense 
expectations. If common sense can be mistaken about 
these, then it should not attempt to pronounce on 
parapsychology. But the analogy is a poor one: common
sense does not comprehend such things as subatomic 
particles and light waves, and thus is not entitled to 
make assumptions about their behaviour. Common sense is 
firmly rooted in our everyday experience of the world, 
and in our ability to make rational inferences on the 
basis of that experience. It could be said that nobody 
encounters these phenomena as such, except for 
professional physicists (that is to say, they are 
uncommon cases to begin with). What is required are 
explanations, a commodity in which common sense rarely 
trades. Any fool knows that apples fall to the ground. 
Physics shows us how. The paraphysicist Elizabeth 
Rauscher (in a BBC Radio 4 interview on International 
Assignment, broadcast on 17th December 1984) pointed 
out, by way of demonstrating the limitations of 
physics, that although we know how gravity works, we do 
not know why. An answer which aimed to serve what 
Wittgenstein called "philosophical clarity" might be 
that that is just the way gravity is.
Important as the prevalence of fraud, the lack of 
repeatability, and the inadequacy of theory may be, 
there is another compelling reason why parapsychology 
should be denied scientific status. That is its 
tendency to "fudge". Suppose that we run a card- 
guessing experiment, El, and obtain a significant 
score. A week later, we run a replication of that 
experiment, E2, in which all the circumstances are kept
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as close as is humanly possible to those in El. The 
only difference between the two is in the results. In 
El, the score is high, in E2, it is in accord with the 
mean chance expectation. What can we say? The sceptic 
would probably aver that El was flawed in some way, or 
just a lucky chance, and that the results in E2 
represented nothing more interesting than the familiar 
statistical tendency of regression to the mean. The 
parapsychologist, on the other hand, is likely to mark 
down El as a case of psi, but to propose that E2 was 
marred by some unconscious psychic blocking by tlie 
experimenter or the subject - the so-called 
experimenter effect, which, it should be noted, allows 
the parapsychologist to advance a psychic explanation 
even when there is no evidence for it ("heads I win, 
tails you lose..."). The parapsychologist, then, who 
would have been delighted to have a replication of El, 
is not prepared to count E2 as a disproof. 
Parapsychology makes itself fireproof by fiat: a
positive score is a confirming instance, a chance score 
is one where the subject's ESP is blocked by the 
experimenter's, a negative score is "psi missing". This 
is nothing more than fudging. The corollary of it is, 
however, that if disproof and falsification have no 
value to the parapsychologists, can they any longer 
speak meaningfully of proof or confirmation?
If this seems to be a harsh, criticism, consider the 
matter of "chronological decline" in scoring. A 
subject, having begun with high scores in earlier 
tests, will, over a long series, find that decline sets 
in: practice, it seems, does not make perfect (see
Rhine, 1940, pp.284, 314). Both ESP and PK are unstable 
and fugitive. Rhine's method of dealing with this 
difficulty is first to ignore it: variations in scoring 
"are outside the scope of concern under the problem as
-158-
formulated. Statistical significance does not require 
uniform performance" (1940, p.16). Of course, if 
performance were uniform, then the statistics would 
never have been required at all. His second move is to 
claim that this "decline effect" is an important aspect 
of the paranormal: "This decline evidence has all the 
merits of a confirmatory experiment" (1948, p.138).
This decline in scoring, which may be nothing more than 
regression to the mean, has, in Rhine's hands, become 
another "paranormal effect".
Hyman has referred to this tendency as the "patchwork 
quilt fallacy" (Frazier, 1985, p.198). Anything that is 
found in an experiment "becomes part of your data".
Thus scores below chance are cases of psi missing, 
scores hitting the previous or the next target are 
cases of displacement. Given such latitude in the post- 
experimental analysis of results, it is difficult to 
fail to find something to report.
Although many scientists have focused on the 
repeatability issue as being the central problem, it is 
actually a mere symptom of what is wrong. The lack of 
theory combined with the absence of regularities 
together constitute the main obstacle in the way of the 
acceptance of parapsychology as a science. Lack of 
repeatability is, of itself, disturbing, but it is not 
crucial. Until we have theory-based predictions, the 
extent to which experiments fall short of being actual 
replications cannot even be measured.
The factors that may be relevant in any one experiment 
are simply not known, and the theoretical framework of 
parapsychology is not adequate to the task of providing 
even a brief list of them. Ve do not know if it makes a 
difference to the outcome if the experiment is run on a
-159-
Tuesday rather than a Friday. We could run the same 
experiment over and over again, but even if we got the 
same scores on some occasions, we could not be sure 
that we had actually repeated the experiment in all its 
significant particulars. Parapsychology has established 
no coherent account of what might be going on in its 
experiments, nor any recipes for bringing psi about. 
Claiming that the experimenters themselves 
unconsciously use their own psi to enhance or inhibit 
the scoring - the so-called experimenter effect - 
begins to look more like an excuse for failure than a 
genuine scientific hypothesis.
Playfair (1984, p.3), drawing on the unpublished work 
of Batcheldor, suggests that recording events on "audio 
tape does not seem to inhibit psi phenomena, [whereas] 
video certainly does ... there has to be a 'loophole' 
to allow for differing interpretations of a given 
event, if there is a mind involved that requires such a 
loophole". Unfortunately, to the sceptic, such a 
suggestion sounds very much like a variant of the 
parental admonition that children who don't believe in 
fairies will never be able to see them.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
EXPERIMENTAL CASES:
III. THE QUEST FOR SCIENTIFIC STATUS
Given that parapsychology has amassed a great quantity 
of data, but still has no serious theories, how does 
its claim to scientific status stand? In this chapter,
I shall argue that it has failed. I shall pay 
particular attention to the inability of parapsychology 
to make testable distinctions between different 
phenomena that it investigates, I shall go on to 
discuss its claim in the context of the work of three 
recent philosophers of science, and show that in each 
case, parapsychology falls short of their requirements. 
Finally, I shall consider the kind of stance we should 
take towards the experimental work.
The crucial task for parapsychology in interpreting its 
experimental results is to decide on the closely allied 
matters of differentiation and reduction of phenomena. 
It must ask if it is possible to differentiate between 
the various categories of psi phenomena to a meaningful 
degree, and also if it is desirable to reduce these 
categories to a number of more basic types. We need to 
know not just that something odd is going on, but that 
it is going on in such and such a way, and for so and 
so reasons.
The problem of differentiation has recurred throughout 
the history of psychical research <1 have already 
discussed it in the context of the survival question,
and followed Dodd's argument that ESP must be 
considered at least as plausible a paranormal 
explanation as survival for the mediumship cases). As 
early as 1897, Podmore, in the course of a discussion 
of Reichenbach's experiments, was led to ponder the 
matter (p.92). He begins by taking a sceptical position 
towards the phenomena, but then proposes that he might 
be prepared to accept them, at least for the sake of 
discussion. What, then, might be going on? He doubts 
the wisdom of accepting the proffered explanation for 
the results (couched in terms of "luminous emanations" 
from magnets - an unlikely idea, on the face of it) and 
declares that they could equally well be glossed as 
"thought transference from the minds of the 
experimenters". In making this observation, Podmore may 
well have been succumbing to a feeling that, since the 
idea of thought transference made more sense to him 
than did luminous magnets, then the former explanation 
was the more plausible (Podmore was, of course, a 
leading member of the SPR in its early days, and played 
a prominent role in its early telepathy experiments). 
But he may have been groping to the more radical 
position of accepting that, given the evidence, and the 
framework within which we have to interpret that 
evidence, we just cannot say one way or the other. 
Knowing Podmore's capacity for scepticism, I should 
suspect the latter.
Whichever interpretation might be the case, Podmore*s 
problem highlights the difficulties involved in 
differentiation, Rhine suffered similar problems. In 
1930, he noticed that the distinction that had hitherto 
been glibly made between telepathy and clairvoyance was 
to say the least problematic. He was obliged to subsume 
both under the common label GESP (general extrasensory 
perception). He then went on, quite illegitimately, to
assume that they were "essentially the same ability" 
(1948, p.44), but it may have been the paucity of his 
conceptual framework, or the inadequacy of his 
experimental designs, rather than some inherent quality 
in the phenomena themselves, that led to his taking 
this position. The experimental methods adopted and the 
assumptions underlying them guaranteed from the outset 
that no distinction could be drawn at all. H, H. Price 
notes (Wheatley, 1976, p.121) that it is "not at all 
easy in practice to distinguish clairvoyance from 
telepathy". Because of the way things have been set up, 
it is actually impossible. As Stauffer notes: "the
minute the clairvoyant effect is verified", an 
interpretation in terms of precognitive telepathy can 
be substituted (1977, p.84).
Even ESP and PK cannot be clearly distinguished. Take a 
case of "dice influencing". Here the experimenter sets 
the targets, and the subject is supposed to influence 
the fall of the dice so that a preponderance of the 
target is cast. The obvious interpretation of 
statistically significant scores would be that the 
subject was offering up energy to the dice, and thus 
causing the deviant results. But it could just as 
plausibly be argued that precognition was the vital 
factor: the experimenter, unconsciously precognizing
the scoresheets that would have been compiled during 
the experiments, was in a position to select just those 
targets that the dice would favour in that run. Bor all 
the "willing" on the part of the so-called subject of 
the experiment, she made no actual contribution to the 
paranormal effect.
Once we admit the very possibility of the paranormal, 
it seems that our conceptual framework begins to crack, 
and "explanations" can be multiplied without limit.
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Thouless (1972, p.192) suggests that procedures 
"independent of human activity" (such as temperature 
changes recorded in daily weather reports) might be 
used for preparing random targets. In this way, he 
feels,' the plausibility of the argument from 
experimenter contamination is reduced, though he admits 
that there must still be a lurking doubt (one can 
imagine PK being used to change the level of the 
mercury in the thermometers). He suggests, though, that 
in certain cases it is legitimate to prefer one 
interpretation over another. "Yet obviously", he says, 
"the PK explanation of success . . . would be very much 
the more probable since the alternative precogniton 
explanation would require that precognition was working 
with an efficiency such as has never been observed in 
an experiment designed to measure precognition".
This is nothing but question-begging: the experiments
that were designed to measure precognition do not 
necessarily measure anything of the kind. There is, for 
example, the possibility that the future event may have 
retroactively influenced the brain of the so-called 
precognizer by PK - a case of retroactive PK rather 
than precognition. Thouless, in his attempt to solve 
this problem of alternative explanations, cannot simply 
extract one thread - precognition — from the others and 
.* take it as his fixed point of reference.
In recent years, the parapsychologists have made no 
progress with the problem. Consider the following 
extract from an interview with Richard Broughton by Pat 
Spivey (1983, p.4):
R.B. - I devised my first real computer psi game,
back in ’ 77.
P.S. - Was it a PK game?
R. B. - That was a psychokinesis game. Well, it is 
hard to say what it was actually. It was probably 
psychokinesis, but it could have been precognition.
Attempts to draw such distinctions have failed. One of 
the earliest was carried out by McMahan (1946). She 
believed that her experiment would be one in pure 
telepathy. The targets would be written down in coded 
form, the code being known only to herself and her 
assistant. In this way, she assumed, the list of 
targets would not be available for "clairvoyant 
inspection" by her experimental subjects. What McMahan 
could not rule out, however, was the possibility that 
the subjects might, unconsciously, make use of a two­
pronged attack to uncover the coded targets by 
clairvoyance, and the code itself by telepathy. They 
might even have used precognitive clairvoyance to check 
the list of decoded targets that McMahan would prepare 
(for the purposes of checking) after the experiment 
itself had been carried out. As it stands, her design 
was far less water-tight than she imagined.
Schmidt, in one of his mechanized experiments (1972), 
has used a specially constructed apparatus which can, 
he assumes, test for either PK or precognition. In the 
experiment, the machine is, unknown to the subject, 
occasionally switched from one mode to the other. 
Differences in scoring patterns reveal which mode the 
subject has been using. The apparatus•(which is a 
random event generator) should be checked regularly to 
ensure that its output of targets is truly random. Such 
tests, however, depend upon a crucial assumption. The 
machine is simply left running in order to generate a 
series of results. If this is found to be random, then 
the machine is taken to be performing correctly. Psi, 
we have to assume, only enters the picture when a
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subject is seated before the machine for the purpose of 
making an experiment. But Schmidt's device be
consistently malfunctioning, and producing non-random 
sequences of the kind reported in the experiments. Only 
when the machine is given a dry run, for the purpose of 
testing, is this malfunction depressed, by the action 
of Schmidt's unconscious psychokinesis, hence 
producing, for the first time, a random sequence.
Braude (1979, p.32) allows that it is "difficult to 
distinguish experimentally between real-time and 
precognitive modes of psi". This "difficulty" arises ex 
hypothesis and it is no answer to say that a particular 
experiment proves that- psi occurs, but cannot (as yet) 
put forward anything more about it: parapsychology, on
such an account, would be a barren little science. If 
the completely pure experiment is a "theoretical 
impossibility" (p.30), is not the theory itself in 
great need of rethinking? It is clear that attempts at 
differentiation cannot be regarded as safe.
These problems of differentiation are not confined to 
the experimental cases, but can occur in spontaneous 
cases too. Take, as an example, the sinking of the 
"Titanic" (a favourite with psychics). Some claims to 
have precognized the disaster have been made, and, 
assuming that we do not wish to invoke coincidence as 
the most likely explanation, precognition will be 
regarded as the obvious candidate. But that is not-the 
only possible paranormal explanation that we could put 
forward. Consider the following: the course that the 
"Titanic" was to take on its maiden voyage was 
determined well in advance on its sailing, and would be 
known to numerous people. The presence of large 
icebergs and the seasonal patterns of winds and 
currents in that part of the ocean was also known to
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various specialists in meteorology, seamanship, and 
oceanography. Had this knowledge been pooled before the 
"Titanic" sailed, then it might have been realised that 
there was considerable danger in sailing by that 
particular route.
As I have said, someone predicting disaster on the eve 
of sailing would be assumed to be using precognition. 
But there is nothing to prevent us putting forward an 
explanation in terms of multiple simultaneous 
telepathy, in that the predictor obtained her 
information from the several experts who were in 
possession of it. She herself cannot say whence it 
came, since the unconscious nature of psi precludes any 
firm evidence on this point, I do not say that either 
explanation is satisfactory, or that one is more 
preferable than the other; I do ask how 
parapsychologists propose to judge between them.
To his credit, J.B. Rhine came to realize, at the end 
of a long career, that there was something radically 
wrong with the "science" that he had done so much to 
develop. In a paper entitled (significantly) Telepathy 
and other untestahle hypotheses (1974), he admits that 
telepathy "remains only an interesting speculation, one 
that cannot be confirmed by any known method" (p.145). 
But why, one might wonder, did it take Rhine so long to 
discover the problem? He seems to feel that the 
difficulties posed'are of a purely practical nature - a 
"severe challenge", which, "in the interest of 
progress", is unavoidable (p.138). But the issue is 
raised by. the experimental programme itself. The use of 
behaviouristic techniques and the assumption of the 
principle of unconsciousness both undermine any 
attempts to differentiate.
The problem has been taken up by Meehl (1978a). He 
describes a simple test which will give us grounds for 
preferring either PK or precognition in the 
interpretation of particular experiments, though he 
admits that it does not settle the matter conclusively. 
If we have a random event generator (REG) controlled by 
a radioactive source, we should expect it to produce a 
series of targets that is genuinely random. Let us 
assume that it is programmed to generate two-valued 
targets. The experimental subject is asked to guess 
what the next target is going to be. This would seem to 
be an experiment in precognition, but it could also be 
taken as an attempt on the part of the subject to 
influence the working of the REG by PK. On the face of 
it, we cannot be certain which description is to be 
preferred. However, Meehl argues that we can arrive at 
a solution, which, while not absolutely certain, is 
more than merely persuasive.
Let us assume that the subject scores a statistically 
significant number of hits over an extensive series. In 
order to differentiate between the two interpretations, 
we have only to examine the list of targets. Meehl 
points out that if the list follows a purely random 
sequence (as we should expect, if our knowledge of the 
physics of radioactivity is accurate), then we should 
assume that the subject was using precognitive 
clairvoyance. If, on the other hand, the target list 
shows significant deviations from the random pattern, 
then we should assume that the subject was using PK to 
alter the sequence of physical events.
However, Meehl's test is not without certain 
difficulties. Although the reasoning behind it sounds 
very reasonable and straightforward, it ultimately 
fails to provide an adequate method for
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differentiation. The procedure depends on the 
assessment of randomness in a 1ong run of trials (this 
is necessary because we cannot take a single target in 
isolation and say whether it is random or not). Meehl's 
test can only have application for whole series. We can 
say, following Meehl, that a series seems, on the 
whole, to be a case of PK, but there can be no 
guarantee that all the correct individual calls within 
that series are PK. There may be a few stray examples 
of precognition lurking that will serve to defeat the 
analysis. Meehl's test is bedevilled by a similar 
difficulty to that found in the well-known problem of 
differentiating between an ordinary guess and a 
paranormal one. At the level of individual calls, there 
is no way of doing so.
Meehl assumes that the principle of economy may be 
invoked to settle the matter: there must be just one 
explanation that is tenable - the correct calls must be 
due to either PK or clairvoyance. Further, there is 
assumed to be only one "subject" involved in the 
experiment. Both assumptions need not be the case. One 
could imagine that someone who is remote from the 
experiment is unconsciously interfering with the REG by 
PK, and that the "subject" then- precognizes the altered 
targets. On Meehl's criterion, we should simply judge 
the subject to be using PK.
If' the models of precognition and PK that are 
subscribed to by most psychical researchers had any 
cash value, then we could settle the question of 
differentiation very quickly. For in PK, we are 
supposed to do something, and in clairvoyance, we are 
supposed to think something. The difference would seem 
to be clear-cut. Unfortunately, the unconsciousness
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principle renders any attempt at. finding out what is 
going on impossible.
The application of the principle of economy - Ockham's 
razor - is frequently recommended in psychical 
research, both by sceptics and, occasionally, by 
believers such as Meehl, as though it would solve all 
problems. It will not. Ockham*s razor is a device for 
judging the efficiency of competing explanations; of 
itself, it can settle nothing. Given two or more 
explanations, we can cut away the inefficient ones, 
leaving the one which is simplest. That does not mean 
that this explanation is right and the others wrong: it
indicates that we should examine it before the others, 
and design our experiments on the basis of it. Should 
it fail, we look to the other candidates, which will, 
because of their greater complexity, require more 
sophisticated experimental design. In the context of 
experimental sciences, Ockham's razor can suggest a 
research strategy, but it cannot, in advance of the 
results, settle the matter one way or the other. Those 
psychical researchers who, like Meehl, use it as an aid 
to understanding cannot rely on it to any extent, and 
even the sceptic's use (intended to nudge us in the 
direction of an explanation couched in terms of fraud 
or scientific ineptitude) while it is telling, should 
not be regarded as conclusive.
Prompted by the difficulties involved in making sound, 
testable distinctions between the various kinds of 
phenomena that are assumed to occur, some psychical 
researchers have asked if it might not be possible to 
reduce the number of possible candidates. In this way, 
cases might be reinterpreted as, say, types of PK in 
its various forms. But as Scriven has said: "we have
not achieved much success with the reductionist path:
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although possible in principle, independent 
confirmation has been lacking" (Thakur, 1976, p.188). I 
am not sure that Scriven is right in asserting that 
"independent confirmation" of any particular form of 
reduction is actually possible, and I should welcome 
some examples. Given that psi operates without any 
conscious awareness, the possibility that we might find 
just one mode of operation that resists 
reinterpretation in terms of another mode seems 
doubtful. This doubt arises not because, as Scriven 
suggests, there has been a lack of empirical success, 
which, with a little extra work, we shall be in a 
position to reverse. The reason for this failure lies 
in the way that the experimental research programme was 
set up. In parapsychology, we have models of what is 
taking place, and we have experimental methods. But 
models and methods fail to mesh in one with another. 
Experiment in parapsychology is incapable of gaining a 
purchase on the very questions that it was designed to 
answer.
■****
Can parapsychology lay any satisfactory claim to 
'-scientific status? How does it measure up when compared 
with the stipulations of some influential philosophers 
of science? I shall consider its position with respect 
to the theories of three major figures: Popper,
Lakatos, and Kuhn.
The Popperian view (1959) makes the experimental 
falsification of theories the touchstone of the 
scientific enterprise. Bold conjectures, being more 
amenable to falsification than modest proposals, are to 
be welcomed as examples of confident risk-taking. Once 
a proposal has been tested and found wanting, however,
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ad hoc shifts must not be made in the hope of salvaging 
the falsified theory (the introduction of epicycles 
into Ptolemaic theory is an historical case in point 
here).
Now psi, it might be said, is a very bold conjecture 
indeed. It will not, however, meet Popper's criterion, 
for while boldness is a prerequisite, so also is 
falsiflability. To show that they have scientific 
content, conjectures must make themselves vulnerable to 
falsification. In experimental parapsychology, not only 
are the proofs doubtful, there seems to be no sort of . 
disproof either. A negative result in an experiment is 
not taken as showing that psi does not take place, but 
dismissed as an occasion when negative vibrations or 
the experimenter effect have blocked out the "real" psi 
that was, we are asked to assume, going on all the 
time.
Lakatos (1978) is more accommodating to ad hoc shifts. 
He takes the view that there is a "protective belt" 
that surrounds scientific theories, rendering them 
partially immune from the rigorous falsificationism 
advocated by Popper. However, Lakatos explains how this 
protective belt functions by reference to examples from 
a developed theory (that of orbital planetary motion 
and perturbations). The shifts.that he describes are 
not truly ad hoc, rather, they are special conditions 
which are allowed for by the theory, and which can be 
worked out in its context. To allow such moves is not 
to overthrow the theory (as Popper suggests) but to use 
it creatively to allow for special cases.
Lakatos makes an important distinction between 
"progressive" and "degenerating" research programmes, 
based on the extent to which a programme's theoretical
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growth anticipates its empirical findings. Roughly, a 
programme where experiment is theory-led can be said to 
be progressive, and one where results pile up without 
theoretical foundations is degenerating. Parapsychology 
measures up poorly against such a yardstick. It fails 
to predict "novel facts with some success" (Lakatos, 
1978, p.112), and its theoretical growth is by general 
consent almost non-existent.
Not only does theory fail to explain experimental 
results, the results themselves seem to be subject to 
periodic downwards revision. Stokes (1984), in 
reviewing a collection of essays by Martin Gardner 
(1983), protests at his highlighting of Rhine's early 
experiments^including the Pearce-Pratt series, earlier 
called into question by Hansel), and complains that 
Gardner is sedulously flogging a "dead (and decaying) 
horse" (1984, p. 89). Such a view is disturbing. Not" so 
very long ago, these experiments were cried up by 
parapsychologists as providing much more than merely 
persuasive evidence for psi. Only isolated sceptics 
voiced informed doubts (and were sometimes criticized
*
for doing so). Eventually, after years of attrition, 
the parapsychologists themselves seem to have accepted 
that there might be something unsatisfactory about this 
work (and also, indeed, about Soal's experiments).
Now it must be said that the early experimental work of 
Rhine and Soal constitutes a significant part of the 
very foundations upon which the edifice of 
parapsychology has been built, and parapsychologists, 
at the time, seemed to be quite happy with the results. 
To dismiss these experiments, half a century on, as a 
"dead horse" could be taken as suggesting that, before 
too long, more recent experiments might be subject to a  
similar process of rejection. The point is that Rhine
and Soal conducted their experiments using essentially 
the same underlying assumptions that are made today. To 
be sure, the new techniques may rather more reliable, 
but the original card guessing work is of a piece with 
the technologically sophisticated experiments using 
random number generators. If we .are to accept that 
Rhine's early work is a "dead horse"; then we are 
forced to the unpalatable conclusion that his results 
were due to either fraud or incompetence. This 
allegation cannot be shrugged off lightly.
Kuhn's seminal idea of the scientific paradigm (1970) 
has been adopted by a number of psychical researchers. 
Its use may, however, give rise to more problems than 
it solves. There is much loose talk of paradigms in 
contexts where it is quite inappropriate. Consider 
Inglis (1977, pp.12-13): "Kuhn's theme offered a way
out of the dilemma posed by the rejection of the 
supernatural. What I have done is work within a 
hypothetical paradigm, writing on an 'as if' assumption 
- the events being related as if they may have 
occurred". This is a misapplication of Kuhn’s idea. 
Inglis helps himself to the concept of a paradigm for 
the purpose of retailing a considerable body of purely 
anecdotal cases, which fall by definition outside the 
range of scientific discourse. If such things as Inglis 
relates actually took place, then, should he wish to 
furnish a scientific explanation of them, he would 
still have to offer a truly Kuhnian paradigm within 
which they could be comprehended. Playing a game of 
"let's pretend..." is not enough. His "hypothetical 
paradigm" is actually a piece of blatant question- 
begging, and is quite the wrong assumption to make at 
the outset of such a work.
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Can we say that parapsychology has anything approaching 
a real paradigm? There seems to be no consensus of 
opinion here. At the 1976 Parapsychology Foundation 
conference (Shapin, 1977), which took as its theme "the 
philosophy of parapsychology", no less than three 
papers discussed paradigms in some detail. Stanford 
(p.1) is prepared to allow that there is a "paradigm 
(perhaps, in almost a Kuhnian sense)" in
parapsychology. Edge, however, calls for a new paradigm 
in physics, which will encompass paranormal phenomena, 
and Thakur notes the "'theoretical anarchy' within 
contemporary parapsychology", which suggests that 
research is not yet paradigm-based (p.199). The 
divergence of opinions here is a strong indication that 
there is so far no clearly developed Kuhnian paradigm.
Parapsychology has so far failed to provide 
satisfactory testable predictions and recipes. All it 
can offer is a collection of unexplained (and possibly 
unrelated) data. One searches in vain for something in 
the nature of mechanisms or causal links. For some, 
this is taken to be a profound and exciting indicator 
of the revolutionary nature of parapsychology. Both 
Rhine and Koestler attack Newtonian, mechanistic 
thinking as crude and outmoded. They forget, though, 
that Newton, in his lifetime, was himself attacked 
because his proposed mechanism, which implied action at 
a distance, was occult (Hesse, 1961). The significant 
difference is that Newton* s theories generated testable 
predictions. Parapsychology seems to offer us little 
more than oddities.
****
So what stance should we take towards the reports that 
are made by the parapsychologists? Belaff (Ludwig,
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1978, pp.353-370) has proposed that there are five 
basic explanatory approaches to the experimental data:
(1) Outright scepticism, whereby the results are 
explained away;
(2) Flewism, which accepts the results, but denies that 
anything particularly interesting can .be said about ‘ 
them;
(3) Normalization, in which parapsychology is 
eventually integrated within the mainstream of science;
(4) The acceptance that parapsychology must be regarded 
as lying outside the province of science;
<5) Some form of synchronicity, as outlined by Jung.
As I said in the opening chapter, Option (1) - 
outright scepticism - may well be equal to explaining 
away most, if not all, the data, but it signally fails 
to impress the psychical researchers themselves. As 
long as the controversy continues, parapsychology has 
no hope of being accepted by the majority of scientists
Option (5), that of synchronicity, has, since Beloff 
originally wrote his article, been decisively disposed 
of by Braude (1979, pp.217-241). Of the proposals 
offered by Beloff, that leaves only’(2), (3), and (4).
It should be noted that of these three, indeed of all 
the five, options, only (3) makes any pretensions of 
offering us anything like a science of psychical 
research. But so many of the phenomena that are claimed 
to occur are so strikingly bizarre that they seem to 
demand (if we take them seriously) an explanation that 
lies beyond what mainstream science is likely to be 
able to offer. The sort of anomalies with which 
psychical research deals are very different from those 
which Kuhn suggests are to be found at the fringes of 
an obsolete paradigm. It is not that such things do not
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quite fit the current paradigm of, say, physics - they 
lie completely outside it. Physics does not deny them, 
because physics has nothing to say about them. 
Carrington C1932, p.61) claims that "ordinary science 
... contends that there are no haunted houses at all". 
But this is not the case: science attempts to explain 
the world without recourse to such "explanatory 
devices" as haunted houses, and does so remarkably 
successfully. On the subject of haunted houses, it has 
no fixed opinion (individual scientists may have, of 
course, just as they may have views on the existence of 
God). If we look up "haunted houses" in the indexes to 
scientific textbooks, we will find no references to 
support Carrington's contention, because such matters 
are simply not comprehended in such books. To try to 
redraw the boundaries of science so as to include them 
would not be to generate a, broader— based discipline, a 
"science with added paranormality". Rather, it would be 
to destroy the coherence of science, perhaps so 
drastically that there would no longer be any 
scientific framework left into which the paranormal 
could be fitted.
Option (3) takes the view that paranormal phenomena are 
(at bottom) law-governed. As such, given a concerted 
effort, their secret cannot long remain hidden. But 
where are the laws, or even rough approximations to 
them? Because of the unconscious nature of psi,. 
parapsychology is estopped from investigating the 
regularities underlying its phenomena. The use of 
devices such as Mill’s canons is ruled out - such 
techniques as concomitant variation, in which the 
experiment is repeated while different factors are 
varied in turn - are not only not used in 
parapsychology, they cannot be used. The reason for 
this is not that the lack of repeatability makes it
difficult; we simply do not know what factors may be 
relevant, and we have no way of finding out.
But if we were to subscribe to option (4), and admit 
that parapsychology deals in nothing more than the 
supernatural, the anomalous, then what attitude should 
it take to the laws of science and, more generally, the 
laws of nature? If paranormal phenomena contravene 
these laws, then there are two possibilities; either 
the laws are themselves drawn too tightly, or these 
laws are subject to occasional suspension, allowing the 
paranormal to break through.
Parapsychology has to clarify how it stands with 
respect to these different possibilities. Does it take 
the "nomological" line of (3), or does it prefer the 
"supernatural” view of (4) - and if so, what is its 
attitude to laws of nature? Can it redraw these, giving 
them broader applicability, or does it opt for what we 
might term "suspensionism"?
Of all Beloff’s five categories, I am inclined to opt 
for Flewism as being the one that creates the least 
intellectual discomfort. If standard scepticism is the 
atheist response to psychical research, then the form 
of Flewism that I espouse is the agnostic version (in 
T.H. Huxley's original sense: it is not that the
evidence is so far incomplete, it is that, given the 
nature of the evidence, we just cannot say. whether 
there is anything serious in it or not). In the next 
chapter, I shall explore the reasons for my taking this 
sceptical position.
PART FOUR
CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
SCIENCE AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH
We have seen that lack of repeatability and. the 
evanescence of paranormal phenomena have been 
traditional targets for criticism by the sceptic. These 
are, however, merely symptoms of the problem: it is the
unconsciousness principle that undermines the 
scientific pretensions of parapsychology. If we were to 
follow the psychical researchers, we would have to 
allow that the results of their experiments point to 
the conclusions that human beings can obtain 
information from one another by mind-to-mind contact 
without perceptual mediation, discover information 
about material objects without employing their sensory 
organs, and move objects (without touching them) by 
means of sheer willpower. But if we consider the 
implications of the unconsciousness principle, we can 
see that psychical research can actually give us no 
such assurances.
Psychical research is prepared to allow that the 
unconsciousness principle may be admitted, but onl3T in 
a very attenuated form. The name usually given to it is 
"the experimenter effect". While it can offer no 
recipes for bringing about its results, no necessary 
conditions for paranormal events, and is unable to 
isolate any significant variables, psychical research 
is prepared to say that its evanescent, unrepeatable 
phenomena may be affected by some kind of experimenter 
effect,
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What is an experimenter effect? Social scientists are 
aware that the outcome of an experiment can be affected 
by the attitudes and preconceptions of the 
experimenter. Self-fulfilling prophecies, the Pygmalion 
effect, and the Rosenthal effect are well-known cases 
of the desired result being brought about by the 
influence of the experimenter. Braude, in a discussion 
of this matter (1979, pp.32-41), concentrates on such 
difficulties, which are not unimportant, but of little 
special interest for parapsychology. He virtually 
ignores a second form of experimenter effect, however; 
one that is crucial to parapsychology.
The classic study which made this problem clearly 
apparent is that reported in 1953 by West and Fisk.
West and Fisk alternated as experimenters in a card 
guessing series. Their subjects themselves were not 
made aware of this alternation (the experiment, using 
sealed packs of target cards, was carried out by post). 
Generally speaking, West's results showed a negative 
deviation from chance, but not one that was 
statistically significant, whereas those of Fisk were 
both positive and significant. They argue that "This 
suggests that D.J.W. [West] is a jinx and gets only 
null results, for the scores of his section have only 
diluted the better results obtained when G.W.F, C Fisk] 
was experimenter" (1953, p.186).
The West/Fisk experiment thus-suggests that some 
experimenters may have an inhibiting effect on the psi 
of their experimental subjects. This, it is thought, 
might account for some consistent failures to score.
For instance, Beloff, a competent and careful 
experimenter and a believer in the paranormal, 
consistently fails to secure positive results. The 
question of why some fail rather than why some succeed
is, perhaps not surprisingly, considered with greater 
enthusiasm in certain quarters. Thus Haynes (1982, 
p. 11) takes it for granted that the "experimenter 
effect is to be interpreted as being one of inhibition 
by the experimenter: an attitude of caution is presumed
to be non-conducive of psi in the subject". Here, the 
suggestion is that the subject can be put off by too 
stringent safeguards and a coldly scientific atmosphere 
during the experiment. Psi, it is implied, is some kind 
of ability or performance, and one that can readily be 
inhibited.
Now we know how to apply the concept of inhibition in 
"normal" cases, and are aware of the signs that mark 
its presence: the subject may fidget nervously, speak
incoherently, avoid our gaze. In the experiments, 
however, none of these typical indicators need be 
present. All that happens is that the subject does not 
get quite as many guesses right as we might have hoped. 
Now if the inhibition that is talked about were 
anything like the inhibition that we are familiar with, 
it should be possible to overcome it by means of 
habituation. Sheer practice and familiarity ought to 
banish any inhibition. However, this does not seem to 
occur, and Haynes's use of the term has really little 
more than metaphorical significance.
Other parapsychologists have posited the more radical 
view that some experimenters might themselves 
unconsciously block out the psi signals with their own 
psi, presumably in a similar way to a radio station 
"jamming" another by broadcasting noise on the same 
frequency. Sargent, for example, explicitly canvasses 
such a possibility in a paper read to the SPP (Inglis, 
1981). The idea cannot be discounted, though it must be
said that it creates nice problems of experimental 
design.
The difficulty, and a proposed solution to it, have 
been framed as follows by White: "if psi is a reality,
it would be impossible to rule out the experimenter in 
the results of any investigation. Therefore, we must do 
the next best thing: delineate in as much detail as
possible exactly what the experimenter's influence is 
and how far it can be expressed. ... We cannot obtain 
reliable information about the subjects in psi 
experiments ... until we learn how much of the 
subject's response is attributable to the experimenter" 
(Wolman, 1977, p.298). But this position cannot be 
sustained. Because of the unconsciousness principle and 
the behaviouristic nature of the experiments, we are 
precluded from discovering the extent to which an 
experimenter may influence the outcome of an 
experiment. We may feel that common sense bids us make 
assumptions, but there is no method of identifying with 
any certainty who (or, indeed, what) is "participating" 
in a parapsychology experiment.
What has happened here is that the picture of an 
"agent" and a "patient", controlled by an experimenter, 
has been unquestioningly accepted. The agent transmits, 
the patient receives, and the experimenter records and 
interprets. But then repeatable results are not 
obtained..The experimenter, being the only member of 
the trio not so far implicated in the paranormal 
transaction, is then included, as an ad hoc explanatory 
device, to save the appearances.
Although the experimenter effect is superficially 
attractive to psychical researchers, there is, as 
Girden has said, nothing to support it: "whatever the
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views of the possible role of the experimenter in psi 
tests, they are pure speculation. There has been no 
experimental evidence that an experimenter has ever had 
such an effect in ... tests (Carterette, 1978, p.405). 
But what might such evidence be like? If psi is 
unconscious, then how are we to establish that the * 
experimenter is having any influence at all? To ask him 
to stay away from the building during the experiment is 
no answer, since psi appears to operate without regard 
for spatial distance. To obtain from him a sworn 
affidavit that at no time did he influence the 
experiment by means of his own psi will not help 
either., since, if psi is unconscious, how could he 
know? If psychical researchers have failed to find a 
reliable method for bringing psi about, they can hardly 
be in a position to exclude it.
Broad once suggested that, if only clairvoyance were a 
conscious faculty, then those who possessed it would be 
"invaluable helpers in physical laboratories" (1953, 
p.45), It is not, and the problems for science of that 
fact are potentially (but only potentially) 
devastating.
Inglis (Roll, 1981, pp.148-149) goes so far as to 
suggest that some experiments in conventional science 
may have been .contaminated by experimenter psi. Citing 
Neal Miller's research into biofeedback (which had 
subsequently proved impossible to replicate), Inglis 
speculates that perhaps Miller, or one of his 
assistants, might (unconsciously) have brought about 
positive results by psi.
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Inglis falls to allow for psi contamination from a 
quarter remote in both space and. time from Miller's 
laboratory. Like White, he would rather take the easy 
course, and. assume that only Miller or his associates 
could have any kind of psi influence on the results.
(It should be said that the invocation of psi in such 
experiments, especially in a field of research that is 
notoriously beset by pitfalls, is little more than 
speculation at the best; while it cannot be ruled out, 
it need not be taken too seriously).
The problem of psi contamination by an experimenter in 
orthodox science has also been discussed by Mundle 
(1973), with reference to.Mendel's celebrated work in 
plant genetics. He reminds us that Fisher was able to 
demonstrate that Mendel’s results are suspect, because 
they are just too neat. It is possible that Mendel 
tidied up his figures, or, as Hardy suggests, that 
Mendel's gardeners gave him the results that he had 
already told them that he was expecting (see Koestler, 
1971, p.56). Mundle goes further, and - tentatively - 
suggests that Mendel might have used psychokinesis to 
influence the growth of his seedlings in the desired 
ratio. This is certainly a radical proposal: other
considerations apart, one might ask what had prompted 
Mendel to prefer that particular ratio to such an 
extent that his unconscious PK affected his seedlings, 
and why they then grew precisely in accordance with 
that ratio. A great deal is being taken for granted 
here.
Such extravagant proposals are not rare in psychical 
research: Pratt, in his response to Markwick's critique 
of Soal's card guessing work, displays a similar 
tendency to prefer a paranormal account even when a 
more straightforward version could readily be offered
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(Pratt, 1978). Rather than accept that Soal 
(consciously or unconsciously) tampered with the target 
series, Pratt proposes that Soal was his own 
experimental subject, and in setting his targets was 
precognizing what Shackleton was going to guess.
Schmeidler (Wolman, 1977, p.148), discussing Spencer 
Brown's work with random number tables, remarks that 
"he found significant corespondences, followed by 
declining correspondences. They supported his argument 
but alternatively could be interpreted as showing his 
successful use of ESP (or PK) in his first choices of 
the 'right' places to enter the table". Schmeidler 
derides Spencer Brown's method of using the tables as 
"naive", but this is to miss the point. Spencer Brown 
is arguing that psi does not have a separate existence, 
independent of the statistics (as Girden has said, 
"operationally, psi is a statistic" (Carterette, 1978, 
p.406)). In her too ready assumption of the reality of 
psi, it is Schmeidler herself who is being naive.
Once such a position has been reached, it is hard not 
to see the potential for psi everywhere. The difficulty 
with such a posture, apart from its wilful credulity, 
is that it relies not only on the acceptance of psi, 
but also on the evidence of the experiments that are 
supposed to have established its reality, and its 
efficacy. But then, how do we know if these very 
•experiments have not been contaminated by the 
unconscious psi of others? Once we accept the 
possibility of psi, on its own terms, we are estopped 
from saying anything useful about it, and the essential 
purpose of our experiments is defeated. Finding out how 
psi operates is rendered impossible,
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Not only is parapsychology impossible; orthodox science 
itself must succumb. The claim that psychical research 
might actually overturn science can be read in two 
ways. First, it might mean that science will need to 
carry out considerable re-thinking in order to 
accommodate the findings, and that the resulting 
science will be very different from that which exists 
at present. Secondly, and much more strongly, it could 
mean that the operation of psi is so insidious that 
conventional science becomes impossible. The 
unconsciousness principle, which allows that psi is ex 
hypothesi undetectable and can operate from remote 
times and places, means that the operation of normal 
scientific procedures becomes impossible. If followed 
to its conclusion, such a position would lay waste the 
principles on which experimental science is based and 
invalidate, with the rigour of a Cartesian demon, every 
single experiment that had ever been conducted. Science 
would be impossible. This is, to say the least, a 
disturbing conclusion.
It is, however, relished by Inglis: "psi experimenter
effect, if it can be demonstrated ... will hand you 
that sharp instrument, Occam's razor - for so long used 
against you, but henceforth a weapon in your own hands, 
with which the skeptics can be effectively castrated" 
(Roll, 1981, p.148). Inglis, in thinking that his 
prescription would undermine only those "orthodox 
psychologists" who criticize parapsychology (p.149) is 
understating his case. The image of castration is 
entirely appropriate: science becomes impossible if we 
accept Inglis*s assumptions. There is just one problem: 
the experimenter effect cannot be demonstrated. In 
calling for an abandonment of "protocolitis", and a 
return to informal methods of research, Inglis misses 
the central problem. What needs to be dismantled is not
-187-
the experimental outlook, but the set of assumptions on 
which the experiments are based. His proposal, if 
followed, would create a form of psychical research 
amounting to little more than the unsystematic 
collection of bizarre stories,
* * * * •
Because psi is unconscious, psychical research cannot 
gain a grip on it. The use of control groups in 
experiments, and the isolation of different variables 
are in principle impossible. To take any other view 
amounts to idleness or wishful thinking. Nonetheless, 
it is sometimes suggested that controlled experiments 
have been carried out.
A controlled experiment aims to isolate a particular 
factor in a causal process. Thus if, for example, a new 
drug to cure influenza is discovered, its efficacy 
might be tested by monitoring the progress of a group 
of sick patients, half of whom had been given the drug, 
and half of whom had not (the latter being termed the 
"control group"). By comparing the progress of the two 
groups, physicians would be in a position to assess the 
efficacy of the new drug. (It should be said that in 
parapsychology, the term "controls" can also be used to 
mean the precautions that are taken to exclude normal 
sensory perception of targets. This is not the sense 
that I shall discuss here).
Sargent finds a number of controlled experiments: "if
you wanted to look for literature which has quite a 
range of control groups it would be the hypnosis 
literature where control groups have been much more 
frequently used. I think there are something like 23 
comparisons of hypnosis and control groups in the
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literature" (Shapin, 1983, p.115). Against this rather 
economical view, Thouless says: "it would be tedious to
list all the experiments that have been done with 
controls. They are very numerous" (1963, p.112). But 
could any of these experiments have had controls at 
all?
Thouless suggests that they did: "the results of an ESP
guessing experiment can for example, be compared with 
the results of observations which are like the 
experiment in every respect, except that the score 
obtained must be a chance one since it is obtained by a 
process in which ESP cannot enter" (1963, p.110). Thus 
one might shuffle two Zener packs, and compare them 
card for card, counting each agreement between the 
packs as a hit. Then the hits could be compared with 
the hits scored in an experiment. It is hard to see 
what this would prove. In the first place, the card- 
matching ritual is not "like the experiment in every 
respect" . It would (assuming it were carried on for 
long enough) result in a series of chance scores, as 
Thouless requires, though one wonders what exactly is 
the point of doing it, for the odds against chance can 
be calculated beforehand. And although Thouless demands 
that the process be one "in which ESP cannot enter", he 
has no way of excluding it. For all he knows, the cards 
may have been influenced by the "psychic shuffle", 
which is defined by Rhine (1948, p.61) as being when 
ESP itself "is used in the act of shuffling, aiding in 
placing the cards so as to make them match" the 
targets.
How can Thouless tell that ESP cannot enter into the 
procedure? Psi is not significantly attenuated by 
distance: the inverse square law does not hold. Psi 
occurs without conscious awareness on the part of the
subject. And when we introduce temporal displacements, 
the prospects grow even more dismal. Let us imagine an 
experiment, apparently in simultaneous telepathy: 
subject SI concentrates on individual Zener cards, and 
subject S2 writes down his guesses. They sit in two 
separate rooms in a building in London in 1980. The 
scores, over a long series, are interpreted as being 
indicative of psi hitting directly on the target.
On the face of it, this would seem to be a clear case 
of simultaneous telepathy. But is it? For let us 
further imagine that someone, call her X, is sitting in 
a building in New York in 1990, She is able, through 
retrocognitive clairvoyance, to have access to the 
sequence of cards that were the targets in the London 
experiment ten years before. She obtains this quite 
unconsciously, and is not even aware of it, so wa need 
not think of her as "possessing information", still 
less of "having knowledge". She might spend her spare 
moments doodling with pen and paper, in a reverie - the 
phenomenon that is known as automatic writing. S2 is 
able, through precognitive clairvoyance, to obtain 
(again unconsciously) the results of X's doodlings, and 
so to record on his scoresheet sufficient correct hits 
in the series to convince his experimenter that a 
paranormal interpretation is called for. Psychical 
research cannot deny such a possibility, but neither 
can it confirm it. On its tenets, both these 
interpretations (and many others) are equally valid; 
one "explanation" is potentially as useful as any 
other.
It will doubtless be said that, if we are to entertain 
such lush proposals as these, the operation of 
particular kinds of psi would have to be very much more 
efficient in their working than experiments have shown
them to be (see, for example, Thouless, 1963, p.85). 
This is mere question-begging: the experimental results 
that we have, and which we might think we have 
interpreted properly, cannot be used as a yardstick to 
measure other interpretations by. For we have no canons 
of interpretation in this area, no standards laid down 
that wiil license us to prefer one version of events 
over another: psi1s modus operandi might be as simple
or as complicated as we might care to imagine, but 
parapsychology is ex hypoihesi incapable of arriving at 
any definitive solution.
In the everyday mental life of all human beings, there 
are many curious.intrusions. As I walk down the street, 
I may imagine a sound or a smell which can be captured 
with a Proustian vividness. An idea, quite unbidden, 
may "pop into my head". These are common occurrences, 
and surprise no one. But could their origin be 
paranormal? Could it be that, just as I am locking my 
office door in the evening, and, for no obvious reason, 
begin humming to myself the trio from Act Three of "Der 
Rosenkavalier", someone is, somewhere, rehearsing it, 
or playing a record, and telepathically transmitting 
the sounds to me so that I begin to hum them? I may 
have thought that I was acting quite spontaneously, but 
perhaps I was the victim of ESP. "Why not?" some might 
say, but "how?" is the proper question.
So what can psychical research do to alleviate the 
difficulties that stand in the way of its developing 
scientific hypotheses? Scriven (1956) suggests that, as 
we become more familiar with certain paranormal 
phenomena, we shall come to accept them more readily: 
any oddity that at first may have struck us will be ,
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diminished. Hypnosis, for example, no longer seems 
supernatural to us, even though we know very little 
about it; familiarity has blunted the edge of its 
strangeness. In much the same way, Scriven suggests, as 
we become more familiar with the "supernatural", then 
we shall find it less disconcerting. This cautious 
stance has much to commend it: perhaps paranormal 
phenomena (if there be such) are beyond our present 
capacity for understanding, and the most we can hope to 
do is to record instances as and when we come across 
them. If so, there is something to be said for 
acknowledging as much, and dismantling the edifice of 
"parapsychological science".
Scriven's notion of "familiarity" is, however, not 
without its problems. He seems to be suggesting that if 
sufficient work is done, regardless of whether any 
understanding accrues as a result, then we shall have 
gained familiarity. But after more than thirty years, 
although the journals have continued to detail new 
research, familiarity seems as elusive as ever, 
"Familiar" can, however, be glossed in two quite 
different ways. We can claim to be familiar with the 
re-appearance of Hailey's comet, because it has been 
well-documented over many centuries and its orbit has 
been computed. But that does not make the re-appearance 
itself a familiar phenomenon at all - it happens far 
too rarely for that. It is familiar in the former sense 
because we have discovered the underlying regula.rities 
and causes, and we know what to expect. It would have 
to re-appear very much more frequently before we could 
claim any familiarity with it in the latter sense. And 
it appears that it is this latter sense that Scriven is 
asking for, for he explicitly states that understanding 
of the phenomenon is not essential. All Scriven offers 
is the vague promise that by carrying out many more
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experiments, which yield roughly similar conclusions, 
we might feel less intellectual discomfort.
There are possibilities in the fields of physiology and 
psychology. Suppose that there were some 
neurophysiological event or process which was found in 
both the agent and the patient, and was constantly 
correlated with correct guesses. This would certainly 
be strongly suggestive, and would provide an exciting 
topic for further research. But it would only be a 
beginning. We should also have to show that the brains 
were not merely acting in temporal coincidence, but in 
a causally related way. In the absence of any conscious 
experience, this would be impossible. To show that no 
other human being was acting as an unconscious 
intermediary between the agent and the patient, we 
should have to test every single person, simultaneously 
with the experiment, to ascertain that none of them was 
also registering a similar brain event. Even this would 
fail to provide the requisite assurance, for we must 
also allow for the possibility of both retrocognitive 
and precognitive telepathy. In order to exclude the 
possibility that someone is unconsciously influencing 
the experiment from some remote epoch, we should have 
to run the brain test on everyone that ever lived or 
ever shall live, for every second of their lives.
If, however, psi were conscious - if there were some 
definite sensation or experience to mark out its 
occurrence - then it would long ago have been 
incorporated into the mainstream of science. One can 
imagine experiments being conducted, and arriving at 
some definite conclusions. After an experimental 
session, dialogue of the following sort might ensue:
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Experimenter: Well, that was most satisfactory. You've 
done twenty complete runs this afternoon, and your 
scoring is quite impressive. You clearly have some 
degree of non-mediated perception, or NMP as we call 
it.
Subject: You should find around four correct calls per
run, over and above the five that I should have got 
right by chance. On the last run we did, I think that 
calls 3, 5, 7, and 9 are the ones to look out for; I 
definitely felt the sensation then, a sort of tingling 
in the centre of my forehead. It's quite an odd feeling 
- one you can't mistake, really.
Experimenter: Good. In fact, you scored correctly on 
calls 2 to 8, and on 10 and 12. Numbers 2, 4, 6,,8, 10,
and 12 were just lucky guesses, although you did get 
one more right than we should expect by chance. Anyway, 
there's no NKP experience there, so we can write them 
off. 3, 5, and 7 you got by NMP, but 9 you were wrong 
about, in spite of the experience. When we've done some 
neurological tests, we may find an answer to that 
problem.
The purpose of this little fantasy is to emphasize the 
fact parapsychology would have been a very different 
kind of science if there had been some psychological 
and neurological aspects to psi. Indirect inference 
seems, however, to be the only method of bringing it to 
light. By conducting its experiments at the macro­
level, concentrating on molar events in human behaviour 
(such as the guessing of cards), parapsychology bids to 
maintain its scientific pretensions. But when we turn 
our attention to the micro-level (the introspection of 
psychological events, or the monitoring of 
neurophysiological processes), we find nothing 
consistent at all.
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Parapsychology fails to come to grips with the very 
phenomena it has set out to study. The phenomena are 
simply left dangling, with neither theory nor model to 
explain them. The phenomenon of psi must be taken to 
be, at best, statistical. Although parapsychology might 
continue to carry out experiments, and infer that 
"something paranormal must have happened" whenever 
extra-chance scores are obtained, it will still fail to 
provide any proper understanding.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
THE IMPOTENCE OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH
Is psychical research a science? That is "'the central 
issue to which I have addressed myself. Traditional 
scepticism has often focused its attack on the 
phenomena themselves, and on their inherent 
improbability. As I have said in Chapter One, such 
charges fail to impress the psychical researchers 
themselves, and are often written off as mere 
prejudice. The right question here is not: do such
things happen? We should rather ask: if they do happen,
can we say anything significant about them? Only if we 
can say such things is there any hope for a science of 
psychical research.
As I have indicated, the failings of psychical research 
are to be found at a more fundamental level than mere 
experimental detail. If the metaphysical assumptions 
that lie behind an experiment are faulty, then whether 
someone might have cheated is not immediately relevant 
to our verdict. Bad metaphysics can bring forth only 
bad science.
The quality of science depends not only on sound 
foundations and the absence of fraud or sloppy 
procedures. Interpretations, as well as "raw facts", 
are involved here, and if those interpretations are 
tendentious, unwarranted, or at fault in some other 
way, then the experiments will not prove nearly as much 
as some people would like us to believe.
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The "two person" dualist account of human nature is 
discredited, and it is surprising to see that it still 
survives, indeed flourishes, in psychical research. 
Because parapsychologists such as Rhine accept dualism, 
they are able (in behaviouristic experiments) to study 
just one half of the partnership, and then make all 
sorts of unwarranted assumptions about "the mind". This 
is seen most clearly in Rhine's naive and tendentious 
talk of "the soul hypothesis" (1948, pp.165-166).
We have to accept that psi is the name given to some 
statistical anomalies; ESP is not a form of sensation 
or perception, nor we can lay any claim to derive 
knowledge of the world from its operation. But these 
statistical quirks have been reified: an event or
process is supposed to bring them about, Psi is the 
cause that they are all supposed to have in common.
But it is clear that, though many psychical researchers 
like to think of these things as being caused, they are 
unable to provide any satisfactory causal account of 
their operations. Psi is apparently uncaused and 
meansless. Some parapsychologists appear to find this 
exciting. Talk of backwards causation must be regarded 
as premature. Indeed, the introduction of such a topic 
into the debate only serves as a smokescreen to conceal 
the absence of any seriously thought out causal 
connexions.
Spontaneous cases, which are prone to both 
overdescription and underdescription, are no sound 
basis for a scientific study. Nor can the observational 
cases be taken as reliable. There has been too much 
fraud, and too little serious theorizing to allow us to 
accept them as completely reliable. It could not be 
denied, though, that future discoveries might lead to a
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revision of theory, in a way that would accommodate the. 
prodigies of such as Daniel Home. In the meantime, 
however, there is nothing to be gained by disinterring 
long-forgotten accounts.
The metaphysical bases on which psychical research has 
been constructed are thus fatally flawed. So much the 
worse, the psychical researchers might say, for 
metaphysics. But the scientific techniques that are 
used are also flawed, in such a way as to make the . 
scientific pursuit of the paranormal a self-defeating 
exercise.
Because there are neither psychological nor 
physiological changes associated with correct guessing 
of cards or with the willing of dice, and because psi 
apparently operates regardless of the limits of space 
and time, there is no hope of science gaining a 
purchase on the results. The terminology suggests 
pictures for which there are no tests. The models fail 
to mesh in with the methods. In "explaining" the 
results, we can substitute one picture for another, 
with no apparent gain or loss. Telepathy and psi are 
not even explanatory fictions: they offer no
explanations
If we accept the basic assumptions of psychical 
research, and allow that the alleged phenomena occur as 
described, then this "science" is seen to have an 
uncertainty principle built into it. For all the talk 
of theory, psi turns out to be only a statistical 
oddity: a literally anomalous occurrence. If we accept 
this view, then the problems that beset us disappear: 
the failure of parapsychology to explain its data can 
be understood.
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Psychical research may continue to catalogue anomalies, 
and perhaps make attempts to classify them. This might 
be an interesting exercise, but its scientific worth is 
questionable. To say "we are investigating the 
unexplained, and here are our results: a miscellaneous 
rag-bag of curiosities" is hardly a statement of a 
viable research programme. To use the techniques of 
science, without a sound theoretical basis, to "see 
what happens", is a recipe for frustration.
If paranormal phenomena occur, then either they are 
law-governed or they are not. If they were law- 
governed, then we could investigate them 
systematically, and experimental parapsychology might 
became integrated within the mainstream of science. 
There are good reasons for thinking that not only will 
this not happen, but that it cannot happen. So what is 
left for psychical research? If there are no laws of 
the paranormal, then, should psychical research wish to 
continue its work, it must make a choice between two 
alternatives. If a paranormal phenomenon is taken to be 
one that transgresses a law of nature, then either the 
law of nature has just been too tightly drawn, and will 
need relaxing slightly, to allow for odd contingencies; 
or, more radically, the laws of nature must be assumed 
to be subject to occasional temporary suspension, 
allowing the paranormal to break through. I do not say 
I feel any particular attraction for either of these 
ideas. What I say most emphatically is that psychical 
research, if it is to be taken seriously, has got to 
make up its mind about this question.
But perhaps there is no transgression at all: perhaps
all we have are, as I have suggested, a few quirks. We 
need not assume that science should explain everything. 
If I score seven out of twenty five, and the person who
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concentrated on the cards says that I must have been in 
direct, unmediated mind-to-mind communication with her 
in order to do it, I shall probably feel that a law has 
been broken in some way. If she says that I have shown 
some anomalies in guessing, I will probably shrug, and 
say that I was lucky.
What psychical research must have, if it is to make any 
progress at all, is some definite psychological and 
physiological data to examine. Then, by rigorous 
application of such techniques as concomitant 
variation, it might arrive at some proposals worthy of 
our consideration. If, however, it persists in the 
remorseless cataloguing of queer events, without 
providing any satisfying explanatory structure within 
which they can be comprehended, then it can be seen to 
rest on a series of mistakes.
APPENDIX
A sense of the ridiculous 
Skeptical Inquirer, 5(3), 51-56, 1980
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A Sense of the Ridiculous
Where is it v/hen we need it?
John A. Lord
In studies of the paranormal, we are frequently urged to maintain a due 
skepticism. 1 say “due,” because, of course, a jo/a/skepticism in the face of 
overwhelming evidence is unscientific and self-defeating. But the Com­
mittee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranorm al insists 
that paranormal claims not be rejected a priori, antecedent to inquiry. I 
want to suggest that this position is too liberal, because it places the onus of 
proof on the skeptic.
Part of the problem for most of us is that proper inquiry usually takes 
up a great deal of time, often costs money, requires considerable spe­
cialized knowledge and expertise, and may well induce a distinct feeling of 
sterility "and wasted effort, especially when that effort could have been 
devoted to more obviously profitable studies. (Carl Sagan, for example, 
comments ruefully that the writing of his critique of Velikovsky diverted 
him from his mainstream research.1)
I am sure, though, that the scientists and magicians who carry out 
such work would justify it in two ways:
1. It fulfills a useful function by educating an apparently incredibly 
credulous public, showing them the errors to which so much 
paranormal research is prone (and at the same time countering the 
popular accusation that scientists are by nature aloof toward and
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biased against the “new paradigm”).
2. It gives the critical investigator an opportunity to be involved in 
some possible (though rather improbable) major developments in 
our concepts of man and the universe. Marks and Kammann 
mention this a few times in the course o f their recent book,2 and I 
am quite sure that James Randi would not begrudge a single penny 
of his 510,000 prize if, by awarding it, he could be the first to 
publish a cast-iron, replicable paranormal finding in the columns 
of, say, Nature: certainly it would guarantee him immortality in 
the history of science.
But what of the rest of us? How can those skeptics who are (like 
myself) neither trained scientists nor professional magicians hope to assess 
the claims that are constantly being made? Do we have a weapon in our 
armory that we can use to combat at least some of the wild claims that are 
made, not only by unscrupulous journalists but also by “hard-headed” 
scientists who work in laboratories? *
I suggest that such a weapon is available: I suggest that most (if not all) 
skeptics possess a quality that is singularly lacking in many paranormalists 
and their followers. It is not simply that we are rather more, and they rather 
less, skeptical or critical. It is rather that we possess a sense of the 
ridiculous, whereas they do not. Anyone having this quality is less likely to 
be taken in by insubstantial claims. Of course it is not sufficient in all cases: 
there will always be some claims that will demand minute critical scrutiny, 
but it does at least rule out, at a stroke, the grosser manifestations of the 
paranormalists.
By “a sense of the ridiculous,” I do not simply mean a sense of humor: 
too many critical writers have an unfortunate habit of lapsing into 
facetiousness when discussing the evidence for the paranorm al, making 
feeble jokes at the expense of “ideas” that deserve more robust treatment.
No w it is true, as I have said, that many paranormal claims are not, on 
the face of it, a priori ridiculous: biorhythms would be a good example. It is 
an undisputed fact that certain organisms display periodicity, and given 
the existence of, say, the human menstrual cycle and of some circadian 
rhythms, it would be foolish (without further investigation) to laugh at the 
proposition that there are 23/28/33-day cycles in all human beings. Of 
course the suggestion that such cycles are constant and unchanging has a 
suspicious ring: it sounds altogether too procrustean. But the claim is not 
so ludicrous that it might not be true, and so it demands (and has been 
given) proper scientific investigation.3 Much the same might be said of the 
Gauquelins’ claims for astrobiology.
What 1 have in mind when I speak of using a sense of the ridiculous are 
those cases that are so patently silly that to give them serious attention
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presumes a worth in them that they clearly do not possess. They are so 
manifestly bankrupt that to give them critical consideration would be to 
insult the readers of such criticism—and it would insult them by assuming 
that, among other things, they did not have a proper sense of the 
ridiculous.
Take Uri Geller, for example. I never saw his performances on British 
television in the early seventies, but I subsequently gathered from the 
newspapers that something very peculiar had taken place. Did I believe it 
all? (I was fairly credulous at the time.) I can’t actually recall caring very 
much one way or the other. Of course Geller was subsequently exposed by 
various investigators; but before I ever read their versions of what had 
probably taken place, I came across a statement made by Dr. Puharich, 
Geller’s manager. He said that Uri derived his powers from computers 
stowed in flying saucers from the planet Hoova! Further investigation was 
now unnecessary. Uri was bending metal by either normal or paranorm al 
means: if normal, then it was a conjuring trick; if paranormal, then it was 
due to some distinct and measurable physical forces and not, emphatically 
not, to psychic vibrations from “Hoova” or anywhere else.
Another good case is that of Harry Price, the doyen of British ghost- 
hunters, who founded his own “National Laboratory of Psychical Re­
search” and managed to create the impression that he was a critical, 
skeptical practitioner. His greatest triumph was the investigation of Borley 
Rectory (the “most haunted house in England”), about which he published 
two best-selling books. The claims he made were backed by eloquent 
testimony from responsible and respectable people, and for many years it 
seemed as if Price had succeeded in producing a genuine record of well- 
authenticated phenomena. There was a definite case to answer, and it was 
answered decisively in two books that appeared after his death.4 From  
these thorough, soundly researched books, Price emerges as a rogue and a 
charlatan, a bare-faced liar and a falsifier of evidence.
The story badly needed telling, and the authors tell it superbly. But the 
real problem is, should it have needed telling? The public was taken in by 
Price’s Borley books, and massively taken in a t that. But should people 
have been taken in at all? Not if they had any sense of the ridiculous, 
coupled with a knowledge of Price’s other activities. For at the time he was 
engaged on his Borley investigation, Price published (in collaboration with 
R. S. Lambert) a book called The Haunting o f  Cashen’s Gap.5
This book purported to be a serious inquiry into the case of Gef, an  84- 
year-old talking mongoose from the Isle of Man. I should point out that, 
not only have I never read this book, but I have no desire to  do so (there 
are, I think, better things I can do with my time). Now if Price were (as he 
claimed to be) a serious critical investigator, how could he bring himself to
Spring 1981 53
-204-
waste his talents on such palpable twaddle? And, if he didn’t actually 
believe it for a moment, why take up the public’s time with this nonsense? 
On the first assumption, Price would be reckoned a fool; on the second, a 
knave, and clearly not worth further consideration by any sane person with 
a sense of the ridiculous.
Turning our attention from talking mongooses to talking horses, we 
encounter Lady, who was investigated (and found genuine) by no less a 
pioneer than J. B. Rhine.6 So far, I am unimpressed, if slightly amused. Of 
course apologists might urge that this “ research” was carried out early in 
Rhine’s career—are we not all entitled to a few mistakes? On the other 
hand, we are always reminded that, when Rhine embarked upon his career 
as a parapsychologist, he was already a trained scientist (a botanist, in 
fact). In any case, Rhine continued to have no doubts about Lady. Nearly 
thirty years later, he wrote, with sublime innocence, “Experimental work 
. . .  has already produced evidence of good exploratory character that at 
least one horse . . . has shown behavior consistent only with the psi 
hypothesis.”7
Rhine’s major work has now been placed in a far less positive light by 
Hansel;8 but even so, we must ask how anyone could be deceived by such 
an obvious music-hall act as a talking horse. It is not simply that Rhine 
must have been an incompetent investigator, as Milbourne Christopher 
hints.9 Anyone who is taken in by such ridiculous pantomime games is 
clearly lacking a sense of the ridiculous, and how such a person could ever 
come to be regarded as a leader in his chosen field is beyond my 
comprehension.
Examples of such nonsense could be multiplied ad nauseam. I shall 
add just one more. When Betty Markwick finally demolished the already 
shaky experiments of S. G. Soal,10 J. G. Pratt made a reply. Markwick 
pointed out that the targets used by Soal were not compiled from random 
number tables as had been claimed. Instead, Soal, either consciously or 
unconsciously, had prepared targets that were anything but random. In his 
rejoinder, Pratt states:
I do not mind revealing that I am the person who suggested that Soal might 
have become his own subject on some occasions when preparing the list of 
random numbers on the record sheets before the sittings were held. This 
“explanation” [my scare quotes] would require that he used precognition 
. when inserting digits into the columns of numbers he was copying down, 
unconsciously choosing numbers that would score hits on the calls the subject 
would make later. For me, this “experimenter psi” explanation makes more 
sense, psychologically, than saying that Soal consciously falsified his own 
records, but I do not argue that it should be accepted by others as the likely 
interpretation."
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Faced with such willful credulity as this, what can one possibly say? The 
case is obviously more subtle than the others I have quoted, for P ra tt is 
trespassing against more than our sense of the ridiculous—he is betraying 
his fundamental ignorance of a significant principle of the philosophy of 
science: ad hoc shifts should play no part in serious scientific discourse. If 
our theory does not account for observed events, we salvage what we can 
and abandon the rest. We do not engage in attempts to patch it up and 
claim that it still works but in a different way. I can only agree with E. J. 
Dingwall when he says that “perhaps Andrew L an g . . .  was right, when he 
was reported as saying that sometimes it looked as if psychical research 
does somehow change and pervert the logical faculty of scientific minds.”12
In the face o f P ratt’s folly, I can only laugh: are not, after all, such 
reckless attempts to save a doomed experiment totally ridiculous?
But I do not expect that this will be appreciated by the believers, for 
who cares to be laughed at? Am I not myself, they may ask, being 
ridiculous: over-incredulous, and unscientific into the bargain? I can only 
reply that a critical treatment of claims as absurd as those I have instanced 
would be a totally inappropriate response. If someone wants to tell me that 
dice experiments show that some people are luckier than others, or that 
card-guessing experiments demonstrate that some people are better at 
guessing than they ought to be, then that is fine: at least it gives us 
something solid to bite on, something that might be worthy of critical 
investigation. But flying saucers from Hoova and talking mongooses? No, 
the only proper response to such ridiculous claims is to laugh them out of 
court. Serious argument would be a waste of time not only for the skeptic 
but (dare I say it?) for any sane person.
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